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Abstract 
 
An adequate account of musical understanding must be 
sufficiently detailed and nuanced so as to be able to make 
sense of the experience of listeners with diverse musical 
and cultural backgrounds.  It should also help us begin to 
understand the wide variety of responses to music, including 
the responses of those who hear music as having semantic 
content.  I approach these issues in the more general 
philosophical context of aesthetic understanding.  As an 
approach to my own position, I examine the accounts of 
aesthetic understanding offered by Nelson Goodman, Roger 
Scruton, and Peter Kivy.  Because each can be seen as 
broadly within the Kantian tradition, I also undertake an 
examination of Kant’s aesthetics. 
My account of what it is to understand music and of how 
this understanding is achieved draws upon a phenomenological 
analysis of listening.  I argue that a continuum of two 
levels of understanding music can be distinguished.  At the 
lowest level, “recognitional understanding,” the listener 
can hear a series of tones as a rhythmic and melodic 
gestalt, and understand a minimum of expressive and gestural 
characteristics.  The second level, “enhanced 
understanding,” requires greater sensitivity to the music’s 
expressive character, being able to place the music in an 
appropriate historical context, and some awareness of 
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musical form.  Beyond these two levels but presupposing them 
is a third, which I call “interpretive understanding.”  
Listening to music, we sometimes get the sense that the 
music is “profound” or has something to say, if only we 
could grasp it. 
For musical understanding of any sort, involvement with 
the music is crucial.  I develop an account of involvement 
with music which stresses the similarities between following 
a musical performance and following or constructing a 
narrative.  I conclude by suggesting the ways in which my 
account of musical understanding captures some of the 
strengths of the accounts already discussed (while avoiding 
their weaknesses), and consider some objections which might 
be made against it. 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
People with little or no formal musical education seem 
to understand and enjoy music.  Indeed, the concert-going 
and CD-buying public may find their understanding of music 
so unproblematic that the question “Did you understand it?” 
would seem odd.  Yet unfamiliar music (whether culturally 
unfamiliar or based on an unaccustomed tonal structure) may 
in fact prompt perplexity, incomprehension, and consequent 
dislike of the music.  These two types of experiences – 
transparent understanding and a lack of understanding 
combined with aversion - are clearly different, but just 
what these differences are and how they are to be accounted 
for, is elusive.   
 In what follows I address these questions:  (1) What is 
“musical understanding” and how is it achieved?  (2) How is 
understanding a musical performance similar to and different 
from understanding other types of artwork or understanding 
other types of auditory stimuli?  I approach these issues in 
the more general philosophical context of aesthetic 
understanding, and I see musical understanding as part of 
the larger philosophical project of elucidating and 
explaining the nature of understanding more generally.  
Musical understanding is thus a conceptual problem, having 
affinities with both musicology (the study of musical 
 11 
 
structure and history) and empirical psychology, yet 
overlapping completely with neither. 
1.1 Defining “Music” and “Understanding” 
 Before going too far I need to state the limits of my 
enquiry.  I propose to take “music” in a fairly wide sense.  
It will be useful to explore some of the difficulties 
inherent in giving either an exhaustive or a narrowly 
defined characterization of music.  Consider the range of 
music to which we have access:  In the contemporary 
developed west a remarkably wide variety of music is 
available – including art music from different historical 
periods, varieties of commercial music, and folk music from 
all over the world.  In addition, music stores typically 
offer for purchase a range of recordings which are not 
generally considered to be “music” – rainforest sounds, 
chants and spoken word, whale song, birdsong – but which one 
can listen to as if they were music. 
 While there is wide agreement that music is a worldwide 
human phenomenon appearing in every culture, there is no 
universal consensus as to its scope and definition.1  I 
suspect that if contemporary western listeners were 
surveyed, most would define music as an art of sound, 
intentionally produced and appreciated by humans, and it is 
 
1 For a discussion of the use of the term “music” among American 
conservatory students, see Henry Kingsbury, Music, Talent, and 
Performance:  A Conservatory Cultural System (Philadelphia:  Temple 
University Press, 1988). 
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likely that they would also make some mention of a 
connection between music and emotion.  If pressed, they 
might add that music can be a fine or “high” art (in the 
form of operas, symphonies, chamber music, etc.), as well as 
being found in more popular forms (rock music, jazz, folk, 
etc.) 
A consideration of music as understood by non-western 
cultures quickly makes such a concept of music questionable.  
Music is not universally characterized as purely auditory; 
it may be thought of as having a indispensable verbal or 
gestural component.  Most pre-literate peoples seem to 
conceive of the words and melody of a song as one unit that 
cannot be separated.2  Song and dance are one in Polynesian 
music.3  Traditional Ghanian “music” includes drumming, 
dancing, and singing, which are together considered one 
inseparable thing.4  The demand that music be a product of 
human intention is also not universal.  Some cultures 
consider bird songs to be music, and for the Kaluli of Papua 
New Guinea, the sounds of the forest are literally music.5 
Music is not everywhere considered a fine art – indeed 
“fine art” is itself not a universal category and is 
 
2 Nettl, Music in Primitive Culture (Cambridge:  Harvard University 
Press, 1972), 21. 
3 T. Barrow, Traditional and Modern Music of the Maori (Wellington and 
Sydney:  Seven Seas Publishing Pty Ltd., 1965), 7. 
4 Kathleen Marie Higgins, The Music of Our Lives (Philadelphia:  Temple 
University Press, 1991), 14. 
5 Higgins, The Music of Our Lives, 15. 
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relatively recent in the western tradition.6  The music of 
most pre-literate peoples (despite some notable exceptions) 
serves particular purposes other than aesthetic enjoyment.7  
The different functions ascribed to music vary considerably.  
Traditional Maori music was thought to have magical powers 
to bring about favourable circumstances or obtain some 
desired end.8  The Navaho traditionally believed music to 
have a medicinal effect on humans; “good” music is that 
which cures the patient.9  Music has a quasi-legal function 
among Greenland Eskimos; when one member of the community is 
the victim of some shame, attack, or threat, he or she 
challenges the responsible party to a “song duel.”  
Antagonists improvise derisive songs about one another 
before the rest of the group.  The singer who is judged by 
the audience best able to convey his or her point of view is 
said to have won the “fight.”10 
 We need not look to “exotic” cultures or to the work of 
ethnomusicologists to see that music has diverse cultural 
functions and plays many different roles.  In the west, 
music is typically used to soothe children (lullabies), to 
lighten labour (think of the people who have “Saturday 
 
6 See Paul Oskar Kristeller, “The Modern System of the Arts:  A Study in 
the History of Aesthetics,” Journal of the History of Ideas 12 (1951):  
496-527 and 13 (1952):  17-46. 
7 Bruno Nettl, Music in Primitive Culture, 6. 
8 Barrow, Music of the Maori, 6. 
9 Higgins, The Music of Our Lives, 12. 
10 Nettl, Music in Primitive Culture, 13; and Charles Hoffman, Drum 
Dance:  Legends, Ceremonies, Dances and Songs of the Eskimo (Agincourt, 
Ontario:  Gage Publishing, 1974), 55. 
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Afternoon at the Opera” or Broadway showtunes accompany 
their household chores, not to mention more traditional work 
songs), to facilitate social relations (background music at 
dinner parties or romantic evenings), in worship services, 
to accompany television and films, and to calm and delight.  
What constitutes an “appropriate” response to music depends 
greatly on its social context.  It is considered an 
appropriate response to join in with singing in church and 
around a campfire, but not at the opera.  Audience behaviour 
differs considerably depending on whether one is listening 
to jazz in a smoky club, to rock in an outdoor arena, or to 
chamber music in a concert hall.  A flamenco guitar recital 
which is listened to in silence and then receives 
enthusiastic but polite applause in Toronto’s Roy Thompson 
Hall may be interrupted with shouts of “Olé” and accompanied 
by rhythmic hand-clapping when performed in a small town in 
Spain. 
 A glance at the history of philosophical and scientific 
speculation about music reveals even greater levels of 
complexity.  Music has been a subject of scientific enquiry 
since the sixth century B.C.E. when Pythagoras connected 
certain musical intervals with definite numerical ratios.11  
The concept of harmony has been prevalent in discussions of 
 
11 Arpád Szabó argues that the mathematical concept of “interval” could 
not have originated without musical experiments using the monochord.  
See his The Beginnings of Greek Mathematics (Dordrecht:  D. Reidel 
Publishing Co., 1978), 121. 
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ethics since at least the writings of Heraclitus, and is 
invoked by both Plato and Aristotle.12  Socrates’ concern in 
book three of the Republic with permitting only certain 
musical modes in the ideal city is relatively well-known, 
but it is less noted that Aristotle ends his Politics with a 
discussion of musical education and the role of music making 
in the life of a free man.13  Plato’s Timeus, with its 
insistence on the importance of harmony at the universe’s 
creation and within the individual soul, is further 
testimony to the complexity and importance of music in 
ancient thought.   
Together with arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy, 
music was part of the medieval quadrivium – the “exact” 
portion of the seven liberal arts.  It was not until the 
18th century that music gradually dropped out of the 
mainstream of what was then considered science.14  Modern 
historians of science have tended to overlook that Johannes 
Kepler’s discovery of the laws of planetary motion was an 
outgrowth of his central research program – the search for 
the laws of harmony governing the heavens and the other 
domains of nature.15   
 
12 See Sidney Zink, “The Good as Harmony,” The Philosophical Review 53 
(November 1944):  557-74. 
13 See Plato, Republic 398d-399e and Aristotle, Politics 1337b23-1338b8 
and 1339a11-1342b34. 
14 H.F. Cohen, Quantifying Music:  The Science of Music at the First 
Stage of the Scientific Revolution, 1580-1650, UWO Series in Philosophy 
of Science, vol. 23 (Dordrecht:  D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1984), xiii. 
15 Cohen, Quantifying Music, 15. 
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 All of this is to say that I shall not be able to 
delimit the many senses and varieties of what is considered 
to be “music” and what is listened to as if it were music.  
Furthermore, I shall not attempt to do justice to everything 
which might be thought to be important for understanding 
music as both an art and an object of scientific study.  I 
shall, however, try to simplify my enquiry while yet hoping 
to cover as many aspects of musical experience as possible.  
My basic (simplified) paradigm will be that of a 
contemplative listener who attends to the music and 
considers music to be an art.  I will not be able to say 
much about the (considerable) phenomenological difference 
between listening to a live performance and to a 
recording.16  Nor will I be able adequately to investigate 
the social aspects of musical understanding.  This paradigm, 
limited to engaged or “serious” but not necessarily 
musically trained listeners, applies to a wide range of 
people during at least some of their listening experiences.  
It seems elementary enough to be manageable, yet not so 
simple as to lack interest. 
 Similarly I shall not be concerned with delimiting 
precisely my second key term – “understanding.”  Consider 
the following diverse senses: 
Archie understands the words spoken by Bill. 
 
16 On this issue see Evan Eisenberg, The Recording Angel:  The 
Experience of Music from Aristotle to Zappa (New York:  Penguin, 1988). 
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Charles failed to understand the poem he had been 
assigned to memorize. 
Deirdre understood the story of Noah’s ark. 
Ellen did not understand the native’s gesture, and 
ended up taking a wrong turn. 
It took only a single glance for Fred to understand 
that the evening would not go well. 
Gabriel understood that Helen was sad, and likely upset 
with him as well. 
Irene understood the mathematical proof at once. 
John’s understanding of the scientific formula was 
limited by his ignorance of basic chemistry. 
Karen could not say how, but she understood that it 
would soon rain. 
 
 Since one of my primary aims will be to unpack and 
clarify what is central to “understanding” music, attempts 
to delimit it now could beg the question.  Suffice it to say 
that the definition of “understanding” I assume in the 
course of the investigation tries to encompass the 
ambiguities and respect the tension between the different 
senses of understanding invoked above.  
More specifically, I consider understanding to be the 
result of cognitive activity, as opposed to sense 
perception.  I recognize that understanding sometimes 
involves interpretation, which may be more or less 
idiosyncratic, and I assume that understanding is 
communicable, whether in words (encompassing technical as 
well as metaphorical language), gestures or pictures, etc.  
Perhaps most crucially, I take understanding to be an 
achievement.  Despite the range of possible defensible 
interpretations, there is a normative difference between 
correct understanding on one hand, and a lack of 
 18 
 
understanding or misunderstanding on the other.  (Although 
discriminating one from the other is not always 
straightforward.)  A central theme of Plato’s Theaetetus is 
that the definition of knowledge is arrived at only by 
sifting through the capacity for ignorance and error.  I 
have found that thinking about what it is to misapprehend or 
lack comprehension of music has helped me come to a 
conception of what it is to understand music. 
 Music has often been linked with the “ineffable.”  
Perhaps everyone has had the feeling that there are aspects 
of life or art – gestures, silences, tones of voice – which 
hold significance, yet in what precisely this significance 
consists it is difficult to say.  While I think that this 
feeling can be analogous to the feelings we sometimes have 
listening to music, I will avoid talk of “ineffable” 
feelings or significance.  In an obvious sense, music is 
beyond words and so literally ineffable.  As to the deeper 
sense of ineffable – the idea that some things are too 
profound to be expressed in mere words – I have found it of 
little help in my own thinking about music. 
1.2 Philosophical Approaches to Understanding Music17 
 While many philosophers have addressed the topic of 
understanding music, they have by no means all been talking 
about the same thing.  Philosophical accounts of 
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understanding music have been motivated by different issues 
and problems, and largely constitute attempts to answer 
different questions.  The accounts provided by various 
philosophers have played different roles in the context of 
their greater philosophical projects.  For example, Kant’s 
references to music constitute a small aspect of his system 
as a whole, while Schopenhauer’s are central to his work.   
An aspect of understanding music that strikes one 
thinker as absolutely fundamental, others will pass over in 
silence. Stephen Davies, for example, has argued (against 
what he argues to be the “common view”) that musical 
understanding involves a consideration of how a particular 
work (say, a sonata) differs from others of its kind, and 
also a grasp of what distinguishes one musical kind from 
another (say, a quartet from an overture).18  It is 
difficult to say whether the fact that other philosophers 
have not challenged him on this indicates broad agreement, 
or a lack of interest in the problem he has identified.  
Some, such as Mark DeBellis and Diana Raffman, discuss the 
problem of musical understanding solely in terms of 
individual cognition.19  Others have stressed social and 
 
17 I am assuming here a broad conception of “philosopher” and 
“philosophical,” as I see no good reason to limit the discussion to 
professional philosophers.  
18 Stephen Davies, “Musical Understanding and Musical Kinds,” Journal of 
Aesthetics and Art Criticism 52:1 (Winter 1994):  69-82. 
19 See Mark DeBellis, Music and Conceptualization (Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University Press, 1995); and Diana Raffman, Language, Music, and Mind 
(Cambridge, MA:  The MIT Press, 1993). 
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cultural factors.20  Together with those who have explicitly 
addressed the issue are others who, in the course of 
discussing another philosophical aspect of music, such as 
its capacity for representation or the nature of musical 
expression, assume an account of what it must be to 
understand music and how that understanding is achieved.   
Hence to speak about “the” problem of understanding 
music would be misleading.  I have identified four main 
areas of inquiry addressed in philosophical discussions of 
understanding music.  They are:  the connections between 
music and the emotions, the status of figurative language as 
applied to music, the effects of specialized training, and 
the possibility of cognitive content in music.  Other 
questions are addressed, but these four seem to be central.  
While I do not deal with these topics systematically, 
attention to each has informed my research and thinking 
about musical understanding more generally.  In particular, 
this division has allowed me to bring together a 
heterogeneous range of material, including work done by 
professional philosophers, as well as work of philosophical 
interest by psychologists, critics, musicologists, etc. 
Before giving an account of the aspects of musical 
understanding I hope to address, it will be helpful to 
 
20 For example, see John Blacking, How Musical is Man?  (Seattle and 
London:  University of Washington Press, 1983); and Laurence D. Kimmel, 
“The Sounds of Music:  First movement,” Journal of Aesthetic Education 
26:3 (Fall 1992):  55-65. 
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survey briefly some of the work already done.  Some of the 
philosophers I consider have written on only one of these 
areas, some on several.   
Music and emotions:  Is it necessary to recognize and 
acknowledge the emotional character of performed music in 
order to understand it?  If I were to say that I found the 
Adagio from Schubert’s String Quintet in C (D956) light and 
cheerful, would that count as evidence I had misunderstood 
it?  Are emotive descriptions of music (happy, sad, 
yearning, etc.) reducible to technical terms?  If I could 
give a technical musico-structural analysis of Schubert’s 
Adagio, would the judgement that the music was sad and 
poignant convey anything not already captured in the 
technical analysis?  Can music arouse the emotions that it 
conveys, and if so, is there a relationship between 
recognizing music’s emotional character and responding 
emotionally to it?  An affirmative answer to the previous 
question prompts the further question of just how music 
arouses emotions and what role this arousal plays in our 
understanding.  The picture is additionally complicated when 
it is recognized that the listener’s actual aroused emotions 
may or may not correspond with the emotions expressed by the 
music, and the fact that the listener’s state of mind prior 
to listening can influence the emotional character of what 
he hears. 
 22 
 
 Recognition of the emotional character of performed 
music as fundamental to understanding might strike some as 
so obvious as not to need argument.  Yet the point has been 
contested.  R.A. Sharpe has written, 
I do not think that emotion qualities are of any great 
significance in the appreciation of music.  ‘The gifted 
listener’, as [Aaron] Copland felicitously called him, 
appreciates music without being very interested in 
emotion qualities or in his own emotional reactions…21 
 
If emotional qualities have no “great significance” in 
the appreciation of music, and assuming some connection 
between appreciation and understanding (or at least, 
attempts to understand), then being mistaken about the 
emotional qualities of music can hardly be important for 
understanding.  Diana Raffman questions whether it even 
makes sense to characterize a listener’s assessment of 
emotion in music as correct or incorrect rather than typical 
or atypical.  A listeners’ reaction may surprise us, but we 
would no more call him mistaken than we would say that a 
diner was mistaken to prefer one dish over another.22  
 The question of whether music arouses emotions in 
listeners, and, if it does, what significance these emotions 
have for understanding, continues to divide philosophers.  
Several have argued that, at least sometimes, expressive 
music arouses emotions in listeners.  This position is held 
 
21 R.A. Sharpe, Review of Music and the Emotions by M. Budd in British 
Journal of Aesthetics 26:4 (Autumn 1986), 398.   
22 Raffman, Language, Music, and Mind, 58-59. 
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by (among others) Frances Berenson,23 Davies,24 Jerrold 
Levinson,25 Roger Scruton,26 Colin Radford,27 and Aaron 
Ridely.28  Among these, Berenson, Davies, and Ridley have 
maintained a stronger position, according to which emotional 
responses to music can play an important role in 
understanding it. 
 Peter Kivy holds an intermediate position.29  He 
regards the recognition of music’s emotional character as 
fundamental to understanding it, but questions the 
importance of emotional responses to music. 
Figurative Language:  Listeners who have not had formal 
musical training (and some who have) tend to describe music 
in figurative or metaphorical terms.  For example one might 
say that a piece moves along briskly, or that a particular 
performance drags, or that one pitch is lower than another, 
or that a melody undulates.  What are the limits of 
figurative language as applied to music?  To what extent is 
language used figuratively in such assertions, and does the 
answer have any implications for musical understanding?  Is 
 
23 Frances Berenson, “Interpreting the Emotional Content of Music,” in 
The Interpretation of Music Philosophical Essays, edited by Michael 
Krausz (Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 1993), 61-72. 
24 Stephen Davies, “Why Listen to Sad Music if it Makes One Feel Sad?” 
in Music and Meaning, edited by Jenefer Robinson (Ithaca and London:  
Cornell University Press, 1997), 242-253. 
25 Levinson, “Music and Negative Emotion,” in Music and Meaning, 215-
241. 
26 See chapter 3, section 4. 
27 Colin Radford, “Muddy Waters,” Journal of Aesthetics and Art 
Criticism 49:3 (Summer 1991):  247-52. 
28 Aaron Ridely, “Musical Sympathies:  The Experience of Expressive 
Music,” Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 53:1 (Winter 1995):  49-
58. 
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such use of language in some way fundamental to hearing 
music as music, or does it rather have the status of a 
heuristic device? 
 Scruton, for one, would argue that all of the 
assertions about music in the previous paragraph are 
figurative:  Music does not literally move or undulate, and 
pitches are not located in space and so cannot be literally 
higher or lower than one another.30  Nelson Goodman 
similarly holds that emotion terms applied to music are not 
literal; as music is not sentient, it cannot be literally 
happy or sad.31  In contrast, others have defended the 
literal application of emotive terms to music.  According to 
Kivy, for example, music is expressive of emotion in much 
the same (literal) way that human movements and pictures of 
St. Bernards can be expressive of emotion; all can be seen 
as appropriate to the expression of a particular feeling.32 
According to Scruton, metaphor is a crucial aspect of 
our response to music; hearing music as music is founded 
upon metaphor, and understanding music involves invoking 
correct metaphors.33  Similarly, Daniel Putnum has argued 
that learning in music occurs by exploring the avenues 
opened up by metaphor.  Music, like language, can become a 
dead metaphor; when this happens, people cease to hear music 
 
29 For details, see chapter 4, sections 2 and 3. 
30 See chapter 3, section 1. 
31 See chapter 2, section 2. 
32 See chapter 4, section 2. 
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and instead hear a succession of sounds.34  Marion Guck 
recognizes the importance of metaphor, without going as far 
as Scruton or Putnum.  Although metaphoric description and 
other less formal discourse about music have come to be 
dismissed by musicologists, she finds that they facilitate a 
more profound hearing of musical works.  For example, 
Chopin’s prelude in B minor, opus 28, no. 6, can be imagined 
as having two-measure arching melodies nested within phrase-
length arches, which are in turn nested within a single arch 
encompassing the whole piece.  Listening to the music with 
these metaphorical descriptions in mind, Guck found that she 
could attend to and make sense of ever more refined details 
of the music and its structure.35 
 Specialized Training:  Tones in a musical context have 
dynamic qualities – they may create expectancy or satisfy 
it, appear in a state of tension and unrest, or in a state 
of balance and rest.36  Listeners without formal musical 
training can hear these tonal relationships without being 
able to name the different degrees of the scale or know 
which tones in a piece correspond to which scale degrees.  
 
33 See chapter 3, section 2. 
34 Daniel Putnum, “Some Distinctions on the Role of Metaphor in Music,” 
Journal of Aesthetic Education 23 (Summer 1989):  103-06. 
35 For the full analysis of the Chopin prelude, see Marion A. Guck, “Two 
Types of Metaphoric Transference,” in Music and Meaning, 201-212.  Of 
course, some would disagree that characterizing a melody as “arching” is 
metaphorical at all. 
36 I have assumed here aspects of Victor Zuckerkandl’s analysis and 
conception of musical experience.  See his Sound and Symbol:  Music and 
the External World, Bollingen Series XLIV, trans. Willard R. Task (New 
York:  Pantheon Books, 1956).   
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Similarly, an untrained listener may feel that a certain 
musical work or performance has a particularly cohesive 
quality without being able to say why this is the case.  
What effect does formal musical training, including auditory 
training, have on musical understanding?  Do different 
degrees of musical understanding correspond neatly with 
different levels of formal training?  Is formal or technical 
training the only way to increase musical understanding?  
Similar questions can be asked of the musical training, 
formal and informal, specific to different cultures.  Do 
African listeners, for example, perceive rhythm differently 
from European listeners? 
 Even if we limit the discussion to Western listeners 
and set aside cultural variations, the differences made by 
specialized training are difficult to detect and quantify.  
For one, there is a lack of explicit agreement as to what 
constitutes “formal musical training.”  Do we count as 
“trained” only those with degrees in musicology or do we 
include anyone who received a C+ or better in a music 
appreciation class?  Do we include anyone who can play a 
musical instrument, or do we limit the class of musically 
trained to those who play well?  What about those who play 
well but are self-taught?  While they lack formal training, 
would we want to put them in the same category as others who 
also lack formal training, but neither play an instrument 
nor sing?  These complications have received little 
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attention from philosophers, and few participants in the 
discussion take the trouble to be clear about what they mean 
by “formal training.”  Some concentrate on knowledge of 
large-scale musical form, others on the subtleties of pitch 
and scale-position discrimination in moment-to-moment 
listening.  The result is that discussions of technical 
training and musical understanding are not always 
discussions of the same thing. 
 As might be expected, there is a range of opinion among 
philosophers regarding the effects of specialized training 
on musical understanding.  Malcolm Budd maintains that a 
listener need not master technical terminology in order to 
understand music.37  The reverse is held by Benjamin Boretz:  
He has argued that non-technical terms such as “sad” applied 
to music can be compared to prescientific attributions of 
anthropomorphic characteristics to natural phenomenon.  Such 
non-technical language are symptoms of an underprivileged 
stage of cognition.38 
 Michael Tanner and DeBellis hold similar positions with 
regard to role of technical training in understanding music.  
For Tanner, understanding music is a matter of grasping why 
the music is as it is, and each level of musical 
understanding requires the grasp of an ever more technical 
 
37 Malcolm Budd, “Understanding Music,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society, Supplement 59 (1985):  233-48. 
38 Benjamin Boretz, “Nelson Goodman’s Languages of Art from a Musical 
Point of View,” Journal of Philosophy 67 (August 1970):  548. 
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vocabulary.39  DeBellis takes the view that technical 
training in music is more than the ability to apply a 
specialized vocabulary.  Auditory training actually 
influences the way one hears music, such that DeBellis 
argues that the experiences of listeners who have had this 
training are different from the experiences of those who 
have not.40  (However, he nowhere gives an explicit account 
of musical understanding, and his discussion of the 
experiential and aesthetic differences made by auditory 
training is disappointingly thin.)   
 Like Budd, Kivy and Levinson reject the notion that 
only listeners with formal training can truly be said to 
understand music.  Kivy has argued that understanding how 
music is put together and why it has the characteristics 
that it does, is not necessary for understanding music.  As 
long as listeners can describe what they hear, and this 
description corresponds to what is going on in the music, 
they can be said to understand.  The effect of musical 
training is to provide a richer listening experience.41  
Levinson defends “concatenationism” – the view, derived from 
19th century musicologist Edmund Gurney, that musical 
understanding is centrally a matter of apprehending 
individual bits of music and the immediate progression from 
 
39 Michael Tanner, “Understanding Music,” Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society, Supplement 59 (1985):  215-32. 
40 Mark DeBellis, Music and Conceptualization.   
41 See chapter 4, section 3. 
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one bit to the next.  He doubts that formal musical training 
will help most listeners apprehend large-scale form in 
music, and doubts the importance of such apprehension.42 
Musical “Content” and Cognition:  What do you 
understand when you listen with understanding?  Some say 
that certain music strikes them as profound or true, or even 
as having moral value.  What can this mean?  Music is 
sometimes assumed to bear a great deal of extra-musical 
content.  To mention just one example, Ivan Hewett finds the 
music of Arvo Pärt and Henryk Górecki wanting because, 
“genuine religious music must engage with doubt….”43  Can 
music convey something like a semantic content, with 
“semantic” understood as whatever systematically contributes 
something to the sense, reference, or truth of propositions?  
Is the value of listening to music contained solely in the 
beauty of the tones of which it is comprised?  Is there more 
to understanding music than simply being able to follow 
along?  If an aspect of understanding music does indeed 
involve apprehension of an extra-musical content, how does 
the listener accomplish this? 
 Philosophers’ attitudes to the possibility that musical 
experience can have cognitive value tend to reflect larger 
theoretical commitments.  Those with a formalist orientation 
 
42 Jerrold Levinson, Music in the Moment (Ithaca and London:  Cornell 
University Press, 1998). 
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hold that the perceptual elements of an artwork and the 
relations holding between them are the primary locus of 
aesthetic value, and tend to reject the existence of extra-
musical content.  Immanuel Kant, Eduard Hanslick and Kivy 
belong in this group.44  Those who take a semiotic approach 
to art and treat it as a type of symbolic system have been 
friendlier to the idea of extra-musical content.  However 
they have differed as to what extent the symbolic relations 
inherent in music are regular or “language-like.”  Nelson 
Goodman and Suzanne Langer (among others) belong in this 
group. 
There are many intermediate positions between formalist 
and semiotic approaches.  Davies holds that music has 
meaning, although it is not a symbol system that conveys 
semantic or quasi-semantic content.  Levinson, while not 
holding a semiotic view of art, has argued that some senses 
of “musical truth” have meaning and are worthy of 
interest.45  Furthermore, in his view it is legitimate to 
talk about music being “about” things outside of the music – 
emotions, death, etc.46  Radford implies a similar position 
 
43 Ivan Hewett, “Screams Inside a Circle of Fifths,” review of Arvo Pärt 
by Paul Hillier and Henryk Gorecki by Adrian Thomas, in Times Literary 
Supplement 24 October 1997, 21. 
44 A fuller discussion of formalism is to be found in chapter 5, 
sections 2 and 3. 
45 Jerrold Levinson, “Truth in Music,” in Music, Art, and Metaphysics:  
Essays in Philosophical Aesthetics (Ithaca:  Cornell University Press, 
1990):  279-305. 
46 Jerrold Levinson, “Musical Profundity Misplaced,” Journal of 
Aesthetics and Art Criticism 50:1 (Winter  1992):  58-60. 
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in his discussion of music and morality.47  James O. Young 
goes so far as to argue that music can be a source of 
knowledge as well as pleasure, and can help us understand 
non-musical matters.48 
Why have I identified the four areas discussed above – 
music and the emotions, listeners’ use of figurative 
language, the effects of specialized training, and the 
possibility of semantic content in music - as central?  It 
is likely that the most transparently important topic of the 
four is that of the connection between music and the 
emotions.  Indeed, Francis Sparshott has written that the 
there is reason to think that the concept of emotion itself, 
which has its origins in the contrast between reason and 
desire in Plato’s Republic, was developed in conjunction 
with music theory.49  Many listeners’ initial attraction to 
music is for its emotional resonance, and sensitivity to 
music’s affective character may remain the fundamental 
component of their listening experiences.  I would 
conjecture that the greater part of philosophical 
speculation on music, as well as a large amount of empirical 
research, concerns the nature and expression of emotion in 
music, and its effect on listeners.  Even if I were to come 
 
47 Colin Radford, “How Can Music be Moral?” Midwest Studies in 
Philosophy 16 (1991):  421-438. 
48 James O. Young, “The Cognitive Value of Music,” Journal of Aesthetics 
and Art Criticism 57:1 (Winter 1997):  41-54. 
49 F. E. Sparshott, “Aesthetics of Music:  Limits and Grounds,” in What 
is Music:  An Introduction to the Philosophy of Music, edited by Philip 
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to only negative conclusions about the role of emotion in 
understanding music, these would still be of significant 
interest. 
Understanding music (or indeed understanding almost 
anything) would seem to involve a minimum of two elements:  
an understanding subject and a more or less understood 
object.50  Philosophers have tended to address the “object” 
side of musical understanding with questions about the 
possibility of music’s cognitive content.  Just what is 
understood in musical experience, and what is the nature of 
musical “meaning”? 
Philosophical inquiry about the “subject” side of 
aesthetic appreciation is expressed in questions about 
different types of listeners (“trained” as opposed to 
untrained, for example), and differing modes of language 
use.  Attention to the status of figurative language as 
applied to music reflects a now standard philosophical move.  
Largely thanks to the influence of Ludwig Wittgenstein, many 
hold that a study of how language is used and developed can 
transform and even dissolve philosophical problems.  Since 
most people lack a technical vocabulary with which to 
describe the music they hear, their only avenue is 
figurative language.  Even those who possess a specialized 
 
Alperson (University Park:  Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994), 
38. 
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vocabulary must use more or less figurative language when 
communicating with the non-initiated.  It seems fruitful to 
ask whether utterances about music of different characters 
reflect different levels or varieties of understanding.  
Questions about the effect of specialized knowledge – 
whether professional training or the sensitivity required to 
appreciate different musical cultures - is another way of 
attending to the subject in aesthetic experience.  Do 
differently trained listeners have different listening 
experiences, and if so, are these differences a matter of 
degree or kind? 
1.3 The Problem of Musical Understanding as I Discuss It 
 Music can inspire many responses.  With respect to 
understanding, I would suggest that there are three that are 
basic: 
Unmediated understanding:  This is the response which 
most of us have when we listen to music of our own cultural 
tradition, including most popular and mainstream art music.  
We hear the music “as music” and do not suffer any feelings 
of incomprehension.  Music which is deliberately 
exclusionary – certain avant-garde art music, and popular 
music specific to certain subcultures (punk, etc.) - is not 
usually intended to evoke this response. 
 
50 The possibility of understanding and failing to understand oneself 
raises some interesting questions.  Can one fulfill the role of knowing 
subject and known object at the same time? 
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Incomprehension and aversion:  This is the response to 
music which one does not understand and does not care to 
hear again.  The music which brings about this response will 
vary according to different listeners.  Some may love 19th 
century orchestral music but find their patience tried by 
more recent experimental composers, say Berio, Partch, Cage, 
or Babbit.  Others may have this reaction in response to 
music which is culturally unfamiliar.   
Intrigued Uncertainty:  In this type of response, the 
listener is not quite sure that he has understood the music 
in question, but does not react aversively.  Instead, the 
listener wants to hear the music again in order better to 
comprehend it.  The listener may feel that the music has 
been trying to tell him something that he has not 
understood.  As with the aversive reaction described above, 
the music which inspires this response will vary among 
listeners.  Few serious listeners, I would say, felt that 
they “got” Bach’s Well-Tempered Clavier on first hearing.  
The same composers who inspire an aversive reaction in some 
may intrigue others.  Similarly, culturally unfamiliar music 
may fascinate and charm some listeners, just as it confuses 
and annoys others. 
 I would suspect that almost every listener has at some 
time experienced each of these three reactions to some music 
or other.  What is the nature of the experience underlying 
each of these responses, and how does one go from 
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incomprehension and aversion or intrigued uncertainty to 
greater appreciation, if not understanding?  A related 
question is to what degree is musical experience 
intersubjective?  Imagine that I can follow the musical 
logic of Berg’s Violin Concerto and am eager to listen to it 
again, but you find the music off-putting - alienating and 
chaotic - and do not wish to rehear it.  We might be in the 
same concert hall responding to the same auditory stimulus, 
but it would seem that we have had very different musical 
experiences. 
 Even when one has achieved an unmediated understanding 
of a work (as distinct from familiarity with a specific 
performance), such understanding is not necessarily final.  
One may be very familiar with a certain work and listen to 
it confidently.  However hearing another performance with a 
different interpretation – perhaps one that is innovative, 
more nuanced, or shows greater historical sensitivity – can 
make a listener feel that she is hearing the work anew and 
call into question her previous aesthetic complacency.  The 
listener has not gone from incomprehension to understanding; 
yet something has changed in her experience of the piece, 
whether we characterize it as an enhancement of 
understanding or some altogether different type of 
experience.   
 Does musical understanding consist in more than just 
following along – having some sense of the musical syntax or 
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logic?  I suspect that it does.  Along with hearing music 
“as music,” there can be other more “semantic” levels of 
understanding.  It is possible to have the sense that you 
have followed along, made sense of each transition, and yet 
at the end not have a feeling of deeper or more complete 
understanding.  This is comparable to the experience of 
reading some poetry:  One may understand the meaning of each 
word and understand the transition from line to line, yet 
still feel at the end that one has missed something.  Hence 
I am suspicious of the view that differences in musical 
comprehension are reducible in every case to differences in 
technical musical knowledge.  As indicated above, most 
listeners without formal training can follow music “as 
music,” and the feeling that music is trying to convey some 
semantic content can strike trained as well as untrained 
listeners.   
 An account of musical understanding, then, should be 
able to make sense of ordinary listening experience 
(resulting in unmediated understanding), as well as help us 
better to comprehend the experience of music that challenges 
us.  In what follows I examine in detail three recent 
accounts of aesthetic understanding – those of Goodman, 
Scruton, and Kivy.  The first two focus specifically on 
music.  In considering their views, I will need to pay 
attention to the following: 
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The Nature of the Musical Object:  In each of the three 
types of response discussed above, the listener realizes 
that he has been listening to music.51  It is interesting 
that most people can distinguish music (even unfamiliar 
music) from noise, even without a cultural context.52  While 
most people have some (vague) idea of what music is, I doubt 
that many would survive a Socratic inquisition on the nature 
of music with their beliefs intact.  Are the birds that sing 
in your garden at dawn every morning making music?  What 
about if someone were to record them and sell the results at 
HMV packaged with tasteful cover art?  In particular, 
questions about the ontological status of music are 
unimportant to most listeners.  Ontological confusion and 
inconsistent views on the nature of music are no barriers to 
aesthetic understanding and appreciation.   
 However, what a philosopher says about musical 
understanding will partly be determined by her conception of 
the nature of the musical object.  Can music represent non-
musical objects and events?  How is music expressive, and of 
what can it be expressive?  What is the status of figurative 
language as applied to music, and how important is the 
broader cultural and aesthetic context in which we listen?  
 
51 Here and in what follows, I understand “music” as a neutral or 
descriptive term, rather than as evaluative.  
52 Devoid of an institutional setting, I wonder whether the average 
person could successfully determine which of an unfamiliar set of 
objects were considered as “art” by an alien culture? 
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Answers to these questions and others will influence a 
philosopher’s account of musical understanding. 
Meaning and Content:  Can music have extra-musical 
meaning or content, and if so, how is that meaning embodied 
by the music?  Some listeners claim to “hear” a great deal 
in music that other listeners do not.  It is possible to 
argue that the former are simply mistaken, are not 
concentrating on the music, or have over-active 
imaginations.  Yet given the epistemological difficulties in 
understanding and characterizing “normal” listening 
experience, on what basis can these imaginative listeners be 
dismissed?  Is there no way to make sense of their 
experience, without at the same time alienating other 
listeners who claim to hear no more than “the music itself”?  
Answers to these questions will influence what a philosopher 
takes to be the scope of and correct approach to musical 
interpretation. 
The nature of the listening experience:  Each of the 
philosophers I consider in detail believes that listening to 
music is a cognitive experience and that the pleasures 
evoked by music may be intellectual as well as sensual.  
That is, they hold that music is an object for the mind, as 
much as or more than for the ear, and that understanding 
music involves more than reaction to a stimulus or the 
perception of sound.  A flawed or implausible account of the 
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listening experience will provide a shaky foundation for any 
view of musical understanding. 
 
The range of philosophical opinion on musical 
understanding does not suggest that this experience is 
easily grasped.  Moreover, an account of musical 
understanding must  be sufficiently detailed and nuanced so 
as to be able to make sense of the experience of listeners 
with diverse musical backgrounds and different degrees of 
technical expertise.  It should also help us begin to 
understand the wide variety of responses to music, including 
the responses of those who hear music as having semantic 
content.  In the next three chapters I examine in detail the 
accounts of aesthetic understanding offered by Goodman, 
Scruton, and Kivy.  While their views are quite different 
from one another, each can be seen as broadly within the 
Kantian tradition.  For that reason I also undertake an 
examination of Kant’s aesthetics (chapter five).  Finally, 
in chapter six I offer my own account of what it is to 
understand music and of how this understanding is achieved, 
drawing largely on a phenomenological analysis of listening. 
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Chapter 2  
Goodman on Understanding Art 
 Goodman’s contribution to the philosophy of music is 
sometimes assumed to consist primarily in his discussion of 
musical notation.  As philosophically rich as this 
discussion is, I will argue that it has little to do with 
music as an art or “way of world making.”  To appreciate 
Goodman’s contribution to the philosophical issues 
concerning music, we will have to investigate his approach 
to art more generally. 
 Goodman’s approach to art is cognitive.  Knowledge we 
may have about a work informs our perception of it, and the 
appreciation of art can in turn give rise to knowledge, 
conceived of as the advancement of understanding.  In this 
chapter I examine those aspects of Goodman’s theory of art 
which bear on the problem of understanding art.  This will 
include his conceptions of representation, exemplification, 
expression, metaphor and style.  As we consider his ideas on 
understanding art generally, we will ask what application 
these have to understanding music more specifically.   
 First, we will have to take a brief look at Goodman’s 
conception of notation. 
2.1 Notation and Worldmaking53 
 
53 My goal in this section is not to evaluate Goodman’s conception of a 
notational system or the applicability of this conception to standard 
musical notation.  This has already been done by abler critics than 
myself.  See for example Benjamin Boretz, “Nelson Goodman’s Languages of 
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 For something to be a notational system, it must 
fulfill certain syntactic and semantic requirements.  Only 
two of these requirements will concern us here.  First, the 
characters in a notational system must be finitely 
differentiated or articulate.  That is, it must be 
theoretically possible to determine, for every two 
characters K and K*, and every mark “m” that does not 
actually belong to both, either that “m” does not belong to 
K or that “m” does not belong to K*.54  For example, a 
handwritten numeral one (“1”) must be recognizable as such; 
if it can be mistaken for a numeral seven (“7”), then the 
(handwritten) notational system to which it belongs is not 
syntactically articulate.  Music in standard notation seems 
to meet this syntactic requirement:  The “shape” and 
position of a note on the staff tells us its pitch and 
relative duration.  Systems which do not meet this 
requirement are said to be syntactically dense.   
The second requirement is semantic finite 
differentiation:  It must be theoretically possible to 
 
Art from a Musical Point of View,” Journal of Philosophy 67 (August 
1970):  540-52; Peter Kivy, Sound and Semblance:  Reflections on Musical 
Representation (Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1984), 108-23; 
Stefano Predelli, “Goodman and the Score,” British Journal of Aesthetics 
39:2 (April 1999):  138-147 and “Goodman and the Wrong Note Paradox,” 
British Journal of Aesthetics 39:4 (October 1999):  364-375; and William 
Webster, “Music is Not a Notational System,” Journal of Aesthetics and 
Art Criticism 29 (Summer 1971):  493-97.  Rather, I want to consider 
Goodman’s conception of notation sufficiently so as to be able to 
distinguish considerations proper to the notational system of music from 
those applicable to music as heard. 
54 Nelson Goodman, Languages of Art (London:  Oxford University Press, 
1969), 135.  Henceforth LA; further references will be given in brackets 
in the text. 
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determine, for every two characters K and K* which do not 
have identical compliance classes, and every object “w” that 
does not comply with both, either that “w” does not comply 
with K or that “w” does not comply with K* (LA, 152).  For 
example, the mark “l” may have three compliance classes:  A 
lower case “L,” an upper case “i,” or the numeral one.  If 
the mark “l” is part of a notational system, it must be 
theoretically possible to determine to which of these 
characters it is supposed to refer.  Again, the standard 
notation of music would seem to meet this requirement:  A 
trained listener will be able to determine the symbol for a 
given musical tone and relative duration.  Systems which do 
not meet this requirement are semantically dense.  Goodman 
cites syntactic and semantic density (the very properties 
which preclude a symbol system from being notational) as two 
“symptoms” of the aesthetic (LA, 252).  
The primary function of a musical score is the 
authoritative identification of a work from performance to 
performance (LA, 128).  An “authentic” performance of a work 
both complies with and exemplifies the score. (LA, 236-
37).55  In a series of Replies to Commentators, Goodman says 
 
55 Goodman’s criteria of an authentic performance as one that complies 
with the articulate elements of the score (that is, not with verbal 
instructions, tempo markings or traditions of performance) has been the 
subject of much controversy.  (See for example, besides the works 
already cited in the first footnote, Stephen Davies, “Authenticity in 
Musical Performance,” British Journal of Aesthetics 27 (Winter 1987):  
39-50;  and Jerrold Levinson,. “Autographic and Allographic Art 
Revisited,” in Music, Art, and Metaphysics:  Essays in Philosophical 
Aesthetics (Ithaca:  Cornell University Press, 1990), 89-106.)  This 
 43 
 
that much of what he says about music happens to be about 
notation, 
and this may easily create a false impression.  
[Commentator Jens] Kulenkampff does well to point out 
that in my view notation is not music, a musical score 
is not a musical work, and the major aesthetic 
characteristics of music are not to be understood in 
terms of the characteristics of notational systems.  
The musical work consists of performances, and these 
usually function quite differently from a score.56 
 
 These remarks have several implications.  For one, they 
vindicate my strategy to consider Goodman’s approach to 
music without delving too deeply into his views on notation, 
since the “major aesthetic characteristics” of music are not 
to be understood in terms of notational systems.  Goodman’s 
characterization of a musical work as a set of performances 
supports the position that the proper objects of aesthetic 
appreciation and understanding are performances rather than 
works, a view that fits in nicely with my strategy to focus 
on the listening experience as foundational.  Moreover, we 
will have occasion to recall these remarks when we consider 
some of Goodman’s comments on representation in music, and 
on the cognitive aspects of music appreciation. 
2.2 Varieties of Denotation 
 In this section I consider what it means for music to 
exemplify, express, and represent, according to Goodman’s 
 
issue will not concern us here; as I argued in chapter one, questions 
about the ontology of music and of individual works of music, while 
philosophically of great interest, rarely have significance for ordinary 
listeners. 
56 Nelson Goodman, “Replies,” Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 39 
(1981):  274. 
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understanding of these terms.  For Goodman, representation 
and expression are both types of denotation in which certain 
relationships have become fixed by habit; these 
relationships are not absolute, universal, or immutable (LA, 
45-50). Denotation is the relationship which a symbol has to 
the object to which that symbol applies.57  For example, the 
word “cat” denotes the four-legged mouse-chasing animal.  
Denotation, Goodman says, is the core of representation and 
is independent of resemblance (LA, 5).58  The relationship 
between symbols and what they denote can be literal or 
metaphoric.  For example, in literature the cat is sometimes 
used as a symbol for physical passion.   
 Representation is of objects or events; expression is 
of feelings or other properties (LA, 46).59  Along with this 
 
57 As Stephen Davies points out, the “crucial” notion of denotation is 
not analyzed by Goodman and acts as a “primitive” in his theory.  The 
only shortcoming Davies points out as arising from Goodman’s failure to 
analyze denotation is that it renders Goodman’s discussion of the 
representation of fictions (Pickwick, unicorns, etc.) “so unconvincing.”  
See Davies, Musical Meaning and Expression (Ithaca:  Cornell University 
Press, 1994), 76.  The problem of the representation of fictions 
pertains primarily to the visual arts and so will not concern us here. 
58 Note that Goodman does not claim that representation is entirely a 
matter of convention, rather that, “no firm line can be drawn between 
what is conventional and what is not.”  Quoted from a personal letter to 
E. H. Gombrich in the latter’s “Image and Code:  Scope and Limits of 
Conventionalism in Pictorial Representation,” in The Image and the Eye:  
Further Studies in the Psychology of Pictorial Representation (Oxford: 
Phaidon, 1982), 284n. 
59 Of course, Goodman’s nominalism does not allow for talk of 
“properties,” and in using the term I do not mean to imply any 
ontological committments.  However, Goodman asserts that his discussion 
of exemplification does not require acceptance of either nominalism or 
platonism.  See his “Variations upon Variation, or Picasso back to 
Bach,” Acta Philosophica Fennica 43 (1988): 176-77 (note 4).  One 
consequence of Goodman’s metaphysical “tolerance” here is that Douglas 
Arrell’s claim that Goodman’s nominalism “distorts” his account of 
exemplification and lays it open to objections, will have to be 
reconsidered.  See Douglas Arrell, “Exemplification Reconsidered,” 
British Journal of Aesthetics 30:3 (July 1990):  233. 
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difference, representation and expression differ as to 
“direction.”  A picture, for instance, subsumes what it 
represents, so that a picture of a donkey can be classified 
as a donkey-picture.  What is expressed by the picture, say, 
sadness, subsumes the picture as an instance (LA, 52).  
Expression is a special case of exemplification, such that 
what is expressed is metaphorically exemplified (LA, 85).  
An object exemplifies a property when it is literally or 
metaphorically denoted by the corresponding predicate and 
refers to that property.  Exemplification is thus possession 
(of a property) plus reference (LA, 52-53).   
 On Goodman’s understanding, when something exemplifies 
something else, it serves as a sample of it.  Take, for 
example, the scented slips of paper which are inserted into 
the pages of magazines to advertise perfume.  The slips of 
paper exemplify (or stand as a sample of) certain features 
of the perfume – most notably its smell – but do not 
exemplify certain other features, such as the size and shape 
of the perfume bottle they advertise.  To exemplify, then, 
is to “bring out” or “call attention to” a feature, but not 
necessarily to stress it, as exemplification might be very 
subtle.60  An artwork does not exemplify or express all of 
 
60 Goodman, “Variations upon Variation,” 169. 
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the features it possesses; only those which are relevant to 
its functioning as a work of art (LA, 87).61 
The logic of exemplification has to be distinguished 
from the process which we undergo when we want to say what 
is exemplified by a given artwork.  A representational 
artwork denotes what it represents.  In exemplification, the 
artworks are denoted, rather than denoting.  For example, a 
picture may represent and so denote a seascape; the same 
picture may exemplify and so be denoted by the words “calm,” 
“tranquil,” etc.  There is no one-to-one relationship 
between the various elements of the artwork and what is 
exemplified.  Discovering what an artwork exemplifies is 
like applying an ungraduated meter, where every difference 
in pointer position constitutes a difference in degree, and 
we can never determine the position of the pointer with 
complete precision. Saying what an artwork exemplifies is a 
matter of finding the right words, and we can never be sure 
which of two equally suitable terms is exemplified by the 
artwork in question.  Using the analogy of the meter again, 
the direction of exemplification is from the quantity 
measured back to the position on the gauge, and with an 
ungraduated meter, we can never determine the quantity 
measured with precision (LA, 234-36). 
 
61 Goodman reiterates this point in “Some Notes on Languages of Art,” 
Journal of Philosophy 67 (August 1970):  567. 
 47 
 
 The “lack of precision” inherent in the process of 
discovering or saying what qualities are exemplified by an 
artwork has troubled some commentators.  Henning Jensen 
charges that Goodman does not attempt to solve the problem 
of deciding which properties are relevant to a work of art, 
and that any theory which disclaims this responsibility is 
“seriously flawed.”62  Douglas Arrell concurs, finding 
Goodman’s failure to clarify the notion of exemplificatory 
systems (that is, the systems which determine which of their 
predicates objects exemplify), “perhaps the most serious 
criticism” of his theory.  According to Arrell, if the arts 
are governed by exemplificatory systems, we should be able 
to write exemplificatory dictionaries and grammars for 
them.63  Stephen Davies notes that a work could possess a 
property without that property being exemplified.64  He 
contends that: 
The failure to spell out both what exemplification 
amounts to in an artwork and what is sampled in 
exemplificatory contexts calls into question the 
success of Goodman’s theory in its claim to distinguish 
expressive from other, merely possessed, properties.  
He seems to take aesthetic/artistic importance as the 
sole criterion for identifying exemplified properties 
(whereas he should regard the aesthetic/artistic 
importance of a property as explained by, and hence 
distinguishable from, its being exemplificatory.)65 
 
 
62 Henning Jensen, “Exemplification in Nelson Goodman’s Aesthetic 
Theory,” Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 32 (Fall 1973):  49-50. 
63 Arrell, “Exemplification Reconsidered,” 237. 
64 Davies, Musical Meaning and Expression, 140. 
65 Davies, Musical Meaning and Expression, 144. 
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 While it is true that Goodman says less than one might 
like about the nature and significance of exemplification in 
the arts, I do not find that this reticence jeopardizes his 
position to the extent that these critics seem to think.  
Arrell’s contention that we should be able to provide 
exemplicatory dictionaries and grammars for the arts if 
Goodman is right, is surely extreme.  Works of art (here 
performances of music) are not notational systems or 
languages, although Goodman’s title Languages of Art may 
inadvertently give that impression.  Although Goodman does 
not say so explicitly, it seems to me that his theory 
implies we must decide which features of an artwork possess 
aesthetic significance on a case-by-case basis.  Features of 
an artwork which impress us as significant on an initial 
exposure, may later seem not so important, or important in a 
different way, or for different reasons.  So we cannot 
always establish, definitively and absolutely, which 
features of an artwork are significant.  Rather than a 
shortcoming, this strikes me as a strength of Goodman’s 
position.  He is able to account for our occasional 
uncertainty in the face of particular artworks, as well as 
our changing evaluations and interpretations of them. 
For example, Jascha Heifetz’s performances of Bach’s 
Unaccompanied Sonatas and Partitas for Violin likely 
impressed his contemporaries by their speed and technical 
brilliance.  But the conception of what these works sound 
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like has changed since Heifetz recorded them in the 1950’s, 
partly under the influence of historically informed 
performance practices.  On listening to his recordings today 
we cannot but compare them with more sparse and restrained 
interpretations, and are likely to be struck by Heifetz’s 
extremely romantic and lush readings.  Certain aspects of 
these performances simply did not stand out for Heifetz’s 
original audience, because the music of Bach was conceived 
to sound a certain way.  Since our expectations have 
changed, our evaluation of Heifetz’s performances has 
changed with them, and different aspects of them come to our 
attention.  So today these performances exemplify “1950’s 
Bach style” in a way they could not have for an audience who 
knew no other way of hearing Bach. 
Since expression is metaphorical exemplification we 
will need to examine Goodman’s understanding of metaphor 
(LA, 68-71).  Most simply put, a metaphor is the application 
of an old label in a new way.  This application must be in 
some sense contra-indicated.  We might say, for example, 
that a melody is sad, but since melodies are not sentient 
this cannot be literally true.  Metaphorical possession is 
not literal possession, but neither is it automatically 
false.  The metaphorical and the literal have to be 
distinguished from the actual.  A predicate may apply to an 
object without applying literally.  This is not to suggest 
that any predicate can be applied to any object.  A 
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statement can be both literally and metaphorically false; 
that a certain melody is gay is literally false and may be 
metaphorically false as well.  Goodman explains, “whereas 
falsity depends on misassignment of a label, metaphorical 
truth depends on reassignment” (LA, 70). 
Goodman’s account of artistic expression has not been 
immune from criticism.66  Perhaps the most serious 
shortcoming is identified by Davies, who notes that Goodman 
can explain artistic expressiveness as symbolic in character 
only if he can distinguish literal from metaphoric 
exemplification.67   
Markus Lammenranta finds two difficulties with 
Goodman’s contention that music expresses the emotion labels 
of ordinary language.68  First, if linguistic predicates are 
the only labels that music can express, we must admit that 
people who cannot describe accurately the expressed emotions 
simply do not understand expressive music.  Lammenranta 
claims that this is not a “desirable conclusion,” although 
 
66 Although Howard argues that the musicological and psychological 
evidence supports Goodman’s theory of expression as applied to music.  
See his “Music and Constant Comment,” Erkenntnis 12 (January 1978):  73-
82. 
67 Davies, Musical Meaning and Expression, 166.  The notion of 
“metaphoric” exemplification or possession only has sense if we have 
already defined literal possession.  But if we distinguish those objects 
which literally possess a given property from those that do not, then 
either “metaphoric” possession delineates either a subset of the former 
(objects which literally and metaphorically possess a given property), 
or of the latter.  However talk of the set of objects which do not 
possess a given property “and metaphorically so,” is nonsense.  If a 
melody is sad, it is literally sad; if it is not sad, it is not sad, 
metaphorically or otherwise. 
68 Markus Lammenranta, “Nelson Goodman on Emotions in Music,” Acta 
Philosophica Fennica 43 (1988):  210-16. 
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he does not say why.  Second, ordinary language does not 
seem adequate to name the emotions expressed in music.  
These worries seem to me exaggerated.  It seems to me in 
fact to be the case that the inability to recognize (and 
somehow describe) music’s expressive properties does 
indicate a lack of understanding.  Lammenranta’s own 
solution to the problem, which he sees as consistent with 
Goodman’s conceptual framework, is that emotion labels are a 
kind of “mental image.”  Indeed there is nothing in 
Goodman’s system which precludes music from expressing 
images, gestures, moods, etc.  Nor does Goodman insist that 
understanding an artwork’s expressive properties must always 
be cashed out in an ability to describe them verbally.  I 
could express my understanding of music by doing an 
interpretive dance or painting a picture.  
More generally, Francis Sparshott has noted that 
Goodman’s account of expression does not privilege emotion 
or feeling terms – these just furnish one common set of 
metaphors.  Sparshott wonders, then, if Goodman’s discussion 
of expression is of a different subject than that engaged by 
Herder, Rousseau, Croce, Collingwood, and others.  Sparshott 
concludes that while Goodman cannot accommodate expression 
as “a lyrical cry from the heart,” his account corresponds 
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better than one might have expected to the symbolic 
relations implicit in traditional theories of expression.69    
Other commentators have been troubled by a perceived 
“over intellectualization” in Goodman’s account of 
expression and theory of art more generally.  Arrell charges 
that Goodman’s theory denies the “immediacy” of our 
experience of art.  On his reading, Goodman implies that we 
first, say, perceive music, and then later make a connection 
with a predicate – “this refers to ‘joyful.’”70  There are 
several problems with this characterization.  For one, there 
is nothing in Goodman’s account that indicates he rejects 
the possibility of an immediate (as opposed to an 
“unmediated”) reaction to art.  Secondly, while the 
qualities expressed by some artworks do indeed strike one 
directly and at once, much art does not have such an effect.  
Art that is complex, multi-faceted, or enigmatic, defies 
such immediate classification and simple characterization.  
One need only remember the time and effort spent over the 
interpretation of Velázquez’s Las Meninas, Wagner’s operas, 
and Last Year at Marienbad for an indication of the 
“immediacy” of our reactions to these works.  (I will return 
to similar issues in the next section on “Art and 
Cognition.”) 
 
69 F.E. Sparshot, “Goodman on Expression,” Monist 48 (April 1974):  187-
202. 
70 Arrell, “Exemplification Reconsidered,” 236. 
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In Languages of Art, Goodman raises some misgivings 
about the possibility of musical representation (LA, 232).  
If the performance of a work defined by standard notation is 
claimed to denote, he remarks, still it does not represent.  
As a performance, it exemplifies what is articulate, 
disjoint, and limited (i.e. the score).  The same sound 
event, belonging to a dense set of auditory symbols, may 
represent.  So electronic music without notation may be 
representational, whereas music in standard notation may 
not. 
I am convinced that these remarks must be understood in 
light of Goodman’s later comments on the same subject 
(discussed in section 2.1).  A system is representational 
only insofar as it is dense (LA, 226), and we will remember 
that Goodman cites syntactic and semantic density as two 
“symptoms” of the aesthetic (LA, 252). Nowhere in Goodman’s 
work is there any indication that he denies music the status 
of art, or denies that music as heard possesses syntactic 
and semantic density.  As he elaborates: 
But while compliance with a score identifies a 
performance as of a given work, a performance 
ordinarily functions within the full spectra of sound:  
that is within a dense system such that every 
difference in sound – whether between correct 
performances or between correct and incorrect 
performances – makes a difference.  If a performance 
functioning in this way denotes, it is thus 
representational rather than descriptive.  Of course it 
often also or instead exemplifies or expresses in other 
systems.71 
 
71 Goodman, “Replies,” 275. 
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Goodman insists, then, that a musical performance also 
normally expresses and exemplifies much beside the score.  A 
musical performances can be taken, not only as the 
exemplification of a score, but also as a sound-event.  
However, we have to be careful about claiming that 
properties belonging to one particular performance also 
belong to the work.  It will seldom be the case that a 
property will be exemplified by all performances of the 
work, as exemplified properties not prescribed by the 
notational elements of the score are nonconstitutive of the 
work and do not affect the status of a performance as 
genuine (LA, 237).72  Once again, the differences between 
Heifetz’s romantic reading of Bach and more austere 
approaches illustrate just how widely performances of the 
same score can differ in expressiveness.  
A complete examination of the relevance for music of 
Goodman’s account of representation, expression and 
exemplification will have to wait until the fuller 
examination of these issues in chapter six, but we can make 
a few preliminary remarks.  First, the fact that some 
musical works fail to “resemble” what they are sometimes 
said to represent does not imply that musical representation 
 
72 Davies has a point when he suggests (Musical Meaning and Expression, 
139-40) that Goodman should regard expressiveness as the property of 
performances, not works.  Yet it seems possible that some works are such 
that authentic performances (in Goodman’s sense) will be consistently 
expressive. 
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is impossible.73  If the concept of denotation within 
performed music is coherent, and musical performances can at 
least sometimes be said to denote, then the notion of 
representation in music would seem to be unproblematic.  
Goodman’s account of expression as metaphorical 
exemplification does not challenge our ordinary way of 
talking about music expressing emotions.  Since a character 
in an expressive symbol system actually is what it 
metaphorically exemplifies, sad music really is sad.74   
2.3 Art and Cognition 
The fact that the appreciation of a work is informed by 
knowledge we may have about it arises centrally in the 
context of Goodman’s discussion of forgery (LA, 99-123).  
Goodman asks whether anything that an agent does not discern 
merely by looking at a picture at a given time could 
constitute an aesthetic difference for the agent at that 
time.  He answers yes; the knowledge that a painting is a 
forgery is aesthetically significant whether or not the 
agent can herself distinguish between an original and a 
forgery.  The fact that one painting is a forgery and the 
other an original tells the agent that there may be a 
difference between the two paintings that she can learn to 
perceive.  This knowledge gives the present perception a 
particular character as training toward future 
 
73 “Resemblance” is seldom obtained even in onomatopoeia.  See V.A. 
Howard, “On Representational Music,”  Noûs 6:1 (March 1972):  41-53.   
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discrimination.  Furthermore, the knowledge makes demands 
that modify and differentiate the agent’s present looking.   
The relevance for music would seem to be evident.  
Knowledge listeners have about a particular composition or 
performance has an influence on their aesthetic experience.  
For example, the title of a work, knowledge of the 
composer’s life and express intentions for the work, may 
make us listen more carefully and for different things.  
Knowledge that a performance will be executed with a 
particularly fine instrument, or that the musicians will be 
adopting historically informed performance techniques can 
affect how we listen.  We will have to leave for now the 
question of to what extent such knowledge about a work or 
performance is crucial to understanding it.   
 Like Dewey before him, Goodman rejects the dichotomy 
between the emotive (pleasure, pain, liking, loathing, “all 
brainless affective response”), and the cognitive 
(sensation, perception, truth, “all nerveless inspection and 
investigation”) (LA, 248).75  In daily life, classification 
by feeling is often more vital than classification according 
to other factors – fear or distrust of an object may prove a 
better guide to its treatment than the ability to discern 
its shape or weight.  In aesthetic experience, the emotions 
 
74 Sparshot makes this point in “Goodman on Expression,” 187. 
75 See John Dewey, Art as Experience (New York:  Capricorn Books, 1958). 
Richard Shusterman has explored the connections between Goodman’s work 
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function cognitively.  That is to say, a work of art is 
apprehended by feeling as well as by sensing.  Cognitive use 
of the emotions involves discriminating and relating them in 
order to comprehend the work of art and integrate it with 
the rest of our experience of the world.  Furthermore, the 
emotions work in combination with one another and with other 
means of knowing:  “Perception, conception, and feeling 
intermingle and interact” (LA, 249).  Emotion in aesthetic 
experience is a means of discerning what properties a work 
has and expresses.  Just as the emotions inform cognition, 
so too do the comparisons and contrasts involved in the 
cognitive process affect the participating emotions (LA, 
248-251).   
What insights, if any, does Goodman’s account of the 
emotions in art provide regarding the investigation of 
music?  The often derided connection between music and 
emotion gains some cognitive respectability if the emotions 
are understood as aspects of cognition, rather than opposed 
to it.  Discernment of a musical work’s emotional aspects is 
not an incidental part of the listener’s experience for 
Goodman, but essential to it.  In a description of music 
which shows understanding, technical terms cannot 
 
and pragmatism in “Art Infraction:  Goodman, Rap, Pragmatism,” 
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73:2 (June 1995):  269-79.   
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necessarily be substituted for predicates denoting emotions. 
76 
We noted above that Goodman sees no contradiction in 
speaking of metaphorical truth or falsity; this underscores 
both his highly cognitive approach to art and his particular 
form of relativism.  The arts, he says, must be taken no 
less seriously than the sciences as modes of creation, 
discovery, and enlargement of knowledge.  (“Knowledge” here 
taken in the broad sense of the advancement of the 
understanding.)77 Works of art, like science, present views 
of the world that can provide right insights.  According to 
Goodman, there is an enormous number and diversity of 
versions and visions of the world in the works of different 
painters and writers, in the various sciences, and in our 
own perceptions as informed by these.  There is no handy set 
of rules for transforming any of these versions into any 
other; physics cannot easily be converted into biology, nor 
the world of Beethoven into that of Van Gogh.  Furthermore, 
there is no ready-made version of the world, independent of 
 
76 Boretz’s claim (“Nelson Goodman’s Languages of Art from a Musical 
Point of View,” 548), that ascriptions to music containing emotion terms 
are “empty” and intelligible only as ascriptions to things to which 
prior recognition has been given as structural entities, seems to me 
misguided.  I will take up these issues in greater detail in chapter 6. 
77 Nelson Goodman, Ways of Worldmaking.  (Hassocks:  Harvester Press, 
1978), 102.  Henceforth WWM; further references will be in brackets in 
the text. 
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language, to which different versions can be compared (WWM, 
2-5).78   
This plurality of worlds does not imply that we have to 
give up the notions of truth and falsity.  Goodman’s 
willingness to accept countless alternative true or right 
world versions does not mean that anything goes:  “The 
multiple worlds I countenance are just the actual worlds 
made by and answering to true or right versions” (WWM, 94).  
How do we distinguish a true or right from a false or wrong 
version of the world?  In the case of metaphorical or 
artistic versions of the world, truth of statements and 
rightness of description is primarily a matter of fit:  fit 
to what is referred to in one way or another, or to other 
renderings, or to modes of organization.  Understanding, 
then, is not limited to the acquisition of true beliefs, but 
includes the discovering and devising of fits of all sorts 
(WWM, 138).  What does this mean for the music listener?  
Kulenkampf says: 
Music is the way we explore the world of what may be 
heard, or better, the world of what may be listened to.  
We do this since we are confronted with musical 
compositions which are instances of the already known 
or the previously unheard of, or the partly new – at 
any rate, instances of that which is never entirely 
known.79 
 
 
78 See also Avishai Margalit, “Goodman, Nelson.  Survey of Thought,” in 
Michael Kelly, ed. Encyclopedia of Aesthetics (Oxford:  Oxford 
University Press, 1998).  
79 Jens Kulenkampf, “Music Considered as a Way of Worldmaking,” Journal 
of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 39 (Spring 1981):  257. 
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So the composer and performer80 together create a 
world, and understanding music would seem to entail a 
willingness to enter into this world.  “Fit” in music – the 
criterion which differentiates true from false worlds - 
takes many forms:  the character of a composition can be 
fitting or not to its subject matter.  A performance can be 
fitting or not to the style and subject of a composition.  A 
composition can comfortably fit, transcend, or be inadequate 
to its genre.  It seems that none of these matters can be 
evaluated without stepping into the world the music 
presents. 
Some have wondered whether Goodman’s cognitive approach 
to art and others like it are inappropriately over-
intellectualized.  Göran Hermerén suspects that the high 
prestige of science may be part of the reason why many have 
emphasized the cognitive aspects of art, and finds that this 
emphasis, “can be an obstacle to those who want to enjoy and 
analyze the sensuous and structural qualities of works of 
art.”81  Similarly, Anthony Savile charges that to count a 
picture’s expressive qualities as features that are relevant 
to its appreciation and understanding, we have to be 
interested in them for themselves, not for their 
 
80 I will use “performer” to apply both to single performers and 
composites such as orchestras, quartets, bands, etc. 
81 Göran Hermerén, “Representation, Truth and the Languages of the 
Arts,” Acta Philosophica Fennica 43 (1988):  205. 
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informativeness about other situations.82  Both Hermerén and 
Savile fear that a semiotic approach to art will tend to 
draw our attention away from the artworks themselves.  Yet 
while this danger may exist, I cannot regard it as 
significant.  Our only access to the cognitive significance 
of an artwork is through its sensuous and structural 
properties, so concern with a work’s “meaning” is likely to 
draw us deeper into these qualities, rather than away from 
them.  Furthermore, attempts to understand the cognitive 
significance of an artwork can shed new light on its 
sensuous properties, or make us regard them in a different 
way.  
Despite my support for a cognitive approach to art, 
Stefan Morawski’s point that the different arts vary in 
cognitiveness, and that our response to different domains of 
art and particular works will not all be primarily 
cognitive, seems correct.83  Clearly, though, some work will 
have to be done before we can begin to fix the limits of the 
cognitive or evaluate the cognitive potential of the 
different arts.  
2.4 Style 
 Goodman has done much to clarify the ontological status 
of style.  The distinction between those features that are 
 
82 Anthony Savile, “Nelson Goodman’s Languages of Art:  A Study,” 
British Journal of Aesthetics 11 (Winter 1971):  18-19. 
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constitutive of a work’s style and those that are not does 
not map neatly onto the distinction between content (what is 
expressed) and form (how it is expressed) (WWM, 22-23).  A 
feature of style may be a feature of what is said, what is 
exemplified, or what is expressed.  A property counts as 
“stylistic” when it associates a work with one rather than 
another artist, period, region, school, etc.  However not 
all such features are stylistic – only those features which 
have to do with the functioning of a work of art as a 
symbol.  (So identifying features such as the label on a 
picture or the signature on a score do not count as 
stylistic) (WWM, 34).  
We have already seen that convention is a crucial 
aspect of representation and expression in art.  
Understanding art, then, will necessarily involve 
familiarity with the relevant conventions.  According to 
Goodman, the discernment of style is an “integral” aspect of 
understanding works of art.  We usually perceive the style 
of an artwork at first without being able to analyze it into 
elements or specify its necessary and sufficient conditions.  
As we gain more insight into the style of a work, so too is 
our comprehension of the work deepened; the more intractable 
a style is to our approach, the more adjustment we have to 
 
83 Stefan Morawski, “Three Observations on Languages of Art,” Erkenntnis 
12 (Jan 1978):  124.  
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make and the more our powers of discovery are developed 
(WWM, 40).   
The consequences for understanding music might seem so 
obvious as to be trivial.  Listening to a performance with 
understanding will include discerning stylistic aspects of 
the work being performed.  A more educated listener will be 
able to make ever finer stylistic distinctions – the work in 
question is not just Baroque but unmistakably Bach; the 
performer, employing historical performance techniques, is 
likely, say, Monica Huggett rather than Elizabeth Wallfisch.  
The adjustments that need to be made in order to understand 
and enjoy stylistically unfamiliar works may be 
considerable.  If Goodman is right, the effort will be 
repaid by an increased capacity to understand the work in 
question and other similarly unfamiliar music. 
2.5 Concluding Remarks 
 I have made several “promissory notes” in the course of 
this chapter.  I have put off until later discussion of the 
appropriateness of a cognitive or symbolic approach to art 
and particularly music.  Evidently I find Goodman’s theory 
of art congenial and expect it to be a fruitful approach to 
the problem of understanding music.  Before ending this 
discussion, I should indicate what I find to be the 
unresolved problems or limitations in his approach to art in 
general and music more specifically.   
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 Goodman stresses the role of convention in 
understanding art, particularly representational art.  As 
Morawski has argued, it might well be the case that systems 
of symbols draw not only on cultural standards and 
competencies, but also on suprahistorical, anthropological 
regularities.84  While Goodman would not likely take issue 
with this position, we will need to consider it at great 
length, with particular regard to music.  The task of 
differentiating the natural from the conventional aspects of 
our experience of understanding music will be no easy task.   
 Because Goodman says so little about how art is 
experienced, he leaves himself open to charges of having an 
anti-intentional, context-independent approach.  Goodman has 
stated that, “In the setting up of symbol systems, as in the 
building of bridges, intentions are indeed usually involved; 
but in both cases, we can study the results independently of 
the thoughts of the makers.”85  This is surely an 
inappropriate analogy; a bridge is a utilitarian object 
whose purpose and the intentions with which it was built are 
fairly clear.  The purpose of an artwork is certainly less 
so.  While it is certainly possible to examine an artwork 
without regard for the maker’s intentions, this may not 
 
84 Morawski, “Three Observations,” 127.  Gombrich has made similar 
claims in “Image and Code,” and “The “What” and the “How”:  Perspective 
Representation and the Phenomenal World,” in Logic and Art:  Essays in 
Honor of Nelson Goodman, eds. Richard Rudner and Israel Scheffler 
(Indianapolis and New York:  The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1972),129-149.  
85 Goodman, “Some Notes,” 566. 
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always be desirable.  Sometimes our aesthetic experience and 
understanding can be enhanced by such regard. 
Kendall Walton has argued persuasively that if a work’s 
aesthetic properties are those that are found in it when it 
is perceived correctly, and if the correct way to perceive a 
work is partly determined by facts about the author’s 
intention and/or his society, then the view that works of 
art should be judged simply by what can be perceived in 
them, is misleading.  If, for example, we were confronted by 
a work whose origins we knew almost nothing about (say, an 
artwork from another planet) we would simply not be in a 
position to judge it aesthetically.  Even the ability to see 
paintings as paintings had to be acquired, likely by 
repeated exposure to many paintings.86  All of this 
indicates that Goodman’s approach to art would be enhanced 
by greater attention to the role of contextual 
considerations in the understanding and appreciation of art. 
 With specific reference to music, Lee B. Brown has 
found that appreciation of intention and context is crucial 
for understanding improvisational music.  The point of an 
improvisational performance is to create music in the course 
of playing it.  Someone who approached a piece of 
improvisational music as though it were a string of sounds, 
or a string of sounds exemplifying a music structure, would 
 
86 Kendall L. Walton, “Categories of Art,” Philosophical Review 79 (July 
1970):  334-367. 
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not be in a position to respond to it in an informed way.  
Any system of aesthetics such as Goodman’s which treats 
artworks as continuants and subject to a criteria of re-
identification will tend to marginalize improvisational 
music.87   
 Sparshott has offered a transcendental critique of 
Goodman’s semiotic approach to art:  why think of artworks 
as characters in a symbol system?  While Goodman does not 
argue or state this view in Languages of Art, Sparshott is 
convinced that several passages insinuate that the work 
suffices to outline a new and better alternative to all 
extant views of art. Sparshott’s question, if it does indeed 
adequately reflect Goodman’s position, is not easily 
answered or dismissed.  His own answer is that if art is for 
the understanding, then in makes sense to consider it in 
terms of that which offers itself to the understanding 
through and through – symbols and their systems.  However 
reluctant we are to abandon this approach, he says, its 
shortcomings suggest that at some point we may have to.88   
 
In conclusion, we have seen that Goodman offers a rich 
and philosophically sophisticated semiotic analysis of art.  
Although he says less than one would like about the 
 
87 Lee B. Brown, “Musical Works, Improvisation, and the Principle of 
Continuity,” Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 54 (Fall 1996):  
353-369. 
88 Sparshott, “Goodman on Expression.” 
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appreciation and understanding of artworks, his remarks on 
these topics are suggestive.  Coming to understand a work of 
art requires becoming involved with it, or entering into the 
world it presents.  After a consideration of some divergent 
views (specifically, those of Scruton and Kivy), I will 
offer my own analysis of in what this involvement might 
consist. 
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Chapter 3  
Scruton on Understanding Music 
 Roger Scruton’s account of musical understanding and 
philosophy of art more generally seems to contrast 
significantly with the positions defended by Goodman.  
Scruton claims to reject semantic theories of the arts, and 
maintains that music cannot be representational.  Instead, 
Scruton stresses the role of the imagination in aesthetic 
understanding.  Although I will in the end disagree with 
much of what Scruton has to say, a careful examination of 
his position is important for my purposes because he 
provides a real challenge to the positions I want ultimately 
to defend. 
 Scruton’s Aesthetics of Music89 is an ambitious work 
which touches on virtually all issues of current interest in 
the philosophy of music, as well as other less well 
discussed topics.  Many of the positions elaborated are a 
development and extension of views presented in his earlier 
Art and Imagination.90  Scruton begins with a consideration 
of the metaphysics of sound, and ends with a diagnosis of 
the decline of musical culture, and a reminder of the “great 
task which lies before the art of sound”:  namely, the 
recovery and renewal of tonality (AM, 507-508).  In between, 
 
89 Roger Scruton, The Aesthetics of Music (Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 
1998).  Henceforth AM; further references will be given in brackets in 
the text. 
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Scruton’s focus is almost entirely on western art music, 
with primary attention given to the roles of composer and 
audience.  Performers and performances are given 
comparatively little consideration, and, whether as a 
consequence or a cause of this, Scruton’s conception of 
music is rather abstract and disembodied.  His harshest 
words are for atonal art music, although Scruton at the same 
time cannot deny the emotive power of some of the greatest 
atonal composers.   
Scruton writes, “It came as a surprise that so dry a 
question as ‘what is sound?’, should lead at last to a 
philosophy of modern culture” (AM, ix).  In what follows, I 
will have little to say directly regarding this theory of 
culture, or about Scruton’s metaphysics of sound.  Instead, 
I will limit my attention to what Scruton has to say about 
understanding music, and consider other topics only insofar 
as they relate to understanding music.  More specifically, I 
will focus on the nature of the musical object, the relation 
between musical hearing and ‘hearing as,’ the role of 
metaphor in understanding music, and Scruton’s account of 
involvement with music as a “dance of sympathy.”  I will 
attempt to show that Scruton implicitly recognizes different 
levels of understanding music, and although this distinction 
between levels of understanding is crucial for Scruton’s 
 
90 Roger Scruton, Art and Imagination:  A Study in the Philosophy of 
Mind (London:  Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1974). 
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wider project of defending cultural conservatism, it remains 
unclearly articulated.  The links between understanding 
music and aesthetic judgement remain undeveloped, and, given 
Scruton’s understanding of music as a “character-forming 
force” (AM, 502), this is a serious limitation. 
3.1 Musical Hearing and the Musical Object 
 As hinted at in the opening paragraphs, Scruton treats 
music as an abstract or disembodied entity.  This passage, 
describing the result of the displacement of song and dance 
by instrumental music and silent listening, is 
characteristic: 
Music is heard as though breathed into the ear of the 
listener from another and higher sphere:  it is not the 
here and now, the world of mere contingency that speaks 
to us through music, but another world, whose order is 
only dimly reflected in the empirical realm.  Music 
fulfils itself as an art by reaching into this realm of 
pure abstraction and reconstituting there the movements 
of the human soul (AM, 489). 
 
One of the major themes of Aesthetics of Music is that 
hearing sounds is necessary and sufficient for understanding 
music; the sounds do not have to be identified in terms of 
their causes.  Scruton proposes a thought experiment in 
which sounds are heard in an empty room.  There are no 
physical vibrations in the room, and the sounds can be 
traced to no specific source.  A person in this room who 
hears the sounds experiences everything necessary in order 
to understand them as music (AM, 3).  In listening to music, 
we hear sounds apart from the material world (AM, 221).  
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Although sounds are of course always produced by something, 
the cause of a given sound is not the intentional object of 
hearing (AM, 11).  Rather, tone is the intentional object of 
musical hearing (AM, 20).  For example, if I listen to a 
recording of Bach’s Well Tempered Clavier, the intentional 
object of my hearing is not the CD player or the piano whose 
sound it reproduces; the intentional object of my hearing is 
rather the series of musical tones (originally produced by a 
piano). 
Understanding music is a cognitive activity, and 
hearing and playing with understanding are two ways of 
manifesting a single capacity (AM, 211).  To hear music, we 
must be able to hear an order that contains no information 
about the physical world, stands apart from the ordinary 
workings of cause and effect, and is irreducible to any 
physical organization (AM, 39).  Not surprisingly, then, the 
salient features of a musical work are those which 
contribute to its tonal organization (AM, 110).  Harmony, 
melody and movement are said to belong to the “essence” of 
music, while instrumentation is accidental (AM, 453).   
Understanding music is first manifest in the apt 
organization of the musical gestalt (AM, 229). Scruton 
rejects the possibility that a theory of musical 
understanding could be founded on an analogy between music 
and language (AM, 202).  Although music has a quasi-
syntactic structure, and a “kind of meaning,” its structure 
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is not the “vehicle” of meaning (AM, 198).  While 
descriptions of music in technical language are neither 
necessary nor sufficient for understanding (AM, 212), 
theoretical analysis can be a “scaffold” by which to rise to 
higher and more complete perception (AM, 427). 
Following Pierre Schaeffer, Scruton distinguishes 
between acoustic phenomena and the “acousmatic” – the 
character of sound as heard in the context of musical 
experience and detached from the circumstances of its 
production (AM, 2-3).91  The (intentional or 
phenomenological) world of what is heard is separated from 
the physical world by “an impassable metaphysical barrier,” 
such that relations between tones, although spatial and 
causal, have nothing to do with physical space or causality.  
There is no real space of tones, but there is a phenomenal 
space (AM, 74-75).  (Scruton also characterizes the space 
and movement of tones as “metaphorical,” and I will have 
more to say about this in the next section.)  Similarly, 
form and structure in music are purely phenomenal, and the 
formal relations we perceive in music neither are, nor 
result from, any structure below the surface (AM, 323–33).  
The acousmatic realm is structured by virtual actions and 
virtual intentions.  We perceive these immediately, such 
 
91 See Pierre Schaeffer, Traité des objets musicaux (Paris:  Editions du 
Seuil, 1966). 
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that a work of music directly acquaints us with a form of 
life (AM, 115).   
Given this characterization of music as a pure 
abstraction, it is not surprising that Scruton rejects the 
possibility that music can be representational.  Indeed, 
music “inspires and consoles” us, partly because it is 
“unencumbered by the debris that drifts through the world of 
life” (AM, 122).  Scruton’s main argument for rejecting 
musical representation is that thoughts about the alleged 
subject of representation are never essential to the 
understanding of music.92  Nothing much, or at least nothing 
musical, he contends, would be lost by the listener who 
thought that Richard Strauss’s Don Quixote was about the 
life of a dog.  It is possible to understand a piece of 
music “as music” without grasping its representational 
content (AM, 129-38). 
Two problems with Scruton’s arguments come to mind.  
First, Scruton begs the question against representation by 
beginning with an account of musical understanding which 
does not require the recognition of any information about 
 
92 Scruton provided different arguments against the possibility of 
musical representation in “Representation in Music,” in The Aesthetic 
Understanding:  Essays in the Philosophy of Art and Culture (London:  
Methuen, 1983), 62-76.  Criticisms of those earlier arguments include:  
Frances Berenson, “Representation and Music” British Journal of 
Aesthetics 34:1 (January 1994):  60-68; Peter Kivy, Sound and Semblance:  
Reflections on Musical Representation (Princeton:  Princeton University 
Press, 1984), 146-58; and Richard Kuhns, “Music as a Representational 
Art,” British Journal of Aesthetics 18 (Spring 1978):  120-25.  I have 
chosen to focus on his position in The Aesthetics of Music because the 
argument there is based on the listener’s understanding – my main area 
of interest. 
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the physical world (AM, 39, cited above).  So it comes as no 
surprise that hearing music “as music” without grasping its 
representational content is sufficient for understanding it.  
Scruton is thus able to dismiss without discussion the view 
that representational elements might be significant in 
listeners’ experience, as well as the possibility that the 
recognition of composers’ or performers’ intentions 
regarding representation might enhance listeners’ 
experiences.   
Second, the requirement that a piece can be said to 
have representational elements if and only if an awareness 
of these elements is essential for understanding seems too 
stringent, even if Scruton is correct that understanding the 
music as music is possible without this awareness.  I will 
ultimately defend the position that recognizing the 
representational content of a piece often enhances our 
enjoyment and appreciation of the music as heard.  Moreover, 
Scruton admits that knowing that a piece is supposed to 
depict something can affect the way in which we listen to it 
(AM, 130). 
It is interesting to note that although music cannot 
properly be said to represent extra-musical phenomena, 
Scruton allows that it may suggest them, as, for example, 
when a fanfare on the horns suggests the hunt (AM, 126).  
Extra-musical thoughts prompted by music have an “ostensive” 
character, as though the music were making a gesture towards 
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something it cannot define (AM, 132).  Scruton seems to 
allow that music (at least sometimes) can be said to “point 
to” or denote things in the world.  We will recall here 
Nelson Goodman’s characterization of denotation as the core 
of representation.  Scruton, of course, does not accept 
Goodman’s account of representation, but it is interesting 
to note that they seem not to disagree about the power and 
capacity of music.  Similarly, Scruton’s charge that Peter 
Kivy confuses musical representation and expression seems to 
indicate a verbal disagreement, rather than a disagreement 
about music itself.93 
I have stressed the elements which contribute to 
Scruton’s characterization of music as abstract.  It is 
important to note that he does not characterize music as 
wholly other-worldly.  In the presence of sound 
intentionally produced and intentionally organized, we find 
ourselves within another person’s ambit, and that feeling 
conditions our response to what we hear (AM, 18).  Works of 
music are intended objects, and a sense of the composer’s 
intention informs our musical perception (AM, 107-08).  It 
will remain to be seen how recognition of such “human 
factors” informs Scruton’s account of musical understanding, 
and whether consideration of them can be made consistent 
with some of his more abstract characterizations of music.   
3.2 Aspect Perception and Metaphor 
 
93 I will have more to say about this in Chapter 4. 
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For Scruton, the understanding of music is crucially 
and fundamentally informed by metaphor.  The metaphorical 
incorporation of extra-musical ideas distinguishes the 
experience of perceiving sounds from the experience of 
understanding these same sounds as music.  Hence, access to 
the cognitive categories used by listeners can be had 
through an analysis of the descriptive language used to 
characterize music, as opposed to sound. 94 
Metaphor seems to play two roles in Scruton’s account:  
First, understanding music involves the ability correctly to 
apply metaphorical terms to music.  For example, music does 
not literally exist in space, so the ascription of spatial 
relations to music is one important source of metaphor.  
Second, Scruton is convinced that music exhibits a “double 
intentionality” and hence aspect perception, grounded in 
metaphor, is a crucial component of musical understanding.  
I will examine both of these roles after discussing 
Scruton’s conception of metaphor. 
Following Aristotle, Scruton understands a metaphor as 
the deliberate application of a term or phrase to something 
that is known not to exemplify it (AM, 80).95  The success 
of a metaphor (or any figurative language) consists in its 
 
94 My understanding of Scruton’s views on the relationship between 
metaphor and music has been informed by Malcolm Budd, “Understanding 
Music,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplement 59 (1985):  
233-48; and Naomi Cumming, “Metaphor in Roger Scruton's aesthetics of 
music,” in Theory, Analysis and Meaning in Music, ed. Anthony Pople (New 
York:  Cambridge University Press, 1994, 3-28.   
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bringing dissimilar things together, and creating a relation 
where previously there was none (AM, 83).  Yet a metaphor is 
not a gratuitous likening of one thing to another, rather an 
attempt to understand one thing through another (AM, 235).  
The “point” of a metaphor is captured by the experience that 
leads us to adopt them – the experience of “fit” between two 
mental contents (AM, 153).  When I come to understand a 
sentence I acquire a grasp of its truth conditions; but when 
I understand a metaphor, I come to see its point (AM, 85). 
The purpose of a metaphor is not to describe an object, 
but to change its aspect for us (AM, 84).  Scruton’s account 
of aspect perception is inspired by Wittgenstein’s 
discussion of the duck-rabbit figure in Philosophical 
Investigations.  The change of aspect is a change from one 
experience to another, but it is not precipitated by any 
change in perceptual information.96  It involves the 
transition from one entertained (yet unasserted) thought to 
another, each embodied in, say, a visual image, whose 
sensory contours remain unchanged (AM, 90).  Scruton hopes 
that aspect perception “provides sufficient proof of double 
intentionality to suggest a plausible way of looking at 
metaphor” (AM, 87).   
 
95 Note the similarity to Goodman’s account of metaphor as the 
application of an old label in a new way (LA, 68-71). 
96 It is unclear to me whether Scruton’s account of understanding music, 
based as it is on his analysis of aspect perception, can support an 
account of misunderstanding.  In seeing the duck-rabbit now as a duck, 
and now as a rabbit, one does not go from misunderstanding to 
understanding it. 
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What is this “double intentionality” in the experience 
of music?  Musical hearing is subject to the will, and this 
“fact” is of “supreme importance” to the philosophy of music 
(AM, 44).  We hear sound and “the life and movement that is 
music”; we hear life and movement in the sound and situate 
it in an imagined space (AM, 96). Scruton seems to be saying 
that it is possible to alternate between hearing the sounds 
in which music is conveyed and hearing music.  It is only 
when we listen to sound for its own sake, rather than for 
the sake of gaining information, that we begin to hear 
music:  “We may pass over from the world of sounds into the 
world of tones; our experience then ceases to be organized 
in terms of the information contained in it, and acquires a 
newer and freer organization whose foundation is metaphor” 
(AM, 220).  An illustration might help convey what I think 
Scruton is getting at:  Imagine listening to a song in a 
language you do not understand.  The first time, you listen 
and try to write down the words of the song in phonetic 
notation.  The second time, you listen without regard for 
any such information, but simply follow the “contours” of 
the voice – the pitch, rhythm, timbre, dynamics and 
expressive qualities.97   
 
97 Scruton’s account suggests phenomenological influence.  Entering the 
realm of tones would seem to be like Husserl’s “bracketting” of the 
natural attitude, in this case the “natural attitude” being listening to 
the causes of sounds.  However Scruton says little about the influence 
of specific phenomenological accounts on his own work, and indeed seems 
to want to distance himself from phenomenology at times (AM, 96). 
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What does it mean to say that the organization of music 
is “metaphorical”?  This claim is connected with Scruton’s 
conception of the role of imagination in aesthetic 
understanding.  Our ordinary intentional understanding is 
subservient to our goals; we divide the world in the ways 
most conducive to moral and practical existence.  When we 
set aside our projects, another way of seeing the world 
becomes possible; an order that we actively create through 
imaginative perception “spreads through the realm of 
appearance.”  In perceiving this order, we use our ordinary 
concepts differently from the way in which we usually employ 
them.  This “oblique” use of our concepts purifies them for 
us, and reconciles us to the world that they describe.  
Hence, “imagination cleans the window of perception” (AM, 
236).   
We may be selective in the metaphors we use; we may, 
with Scruton, characterize music as a “living, breathing, 
moving organism.”  The crucial point is that metaphor forms 
the structure of our musical experience and cannot be 
eliminated from it (AM, 332).  The elimination of 
“compelling” or “indispensable” metaphors from the 
description of music results in a description of sounds, not 
music.  Irreducible metaphors include those of unity, 
organism, growth, and life (AM, 428).  The spatial relations 
within music constitute another important set of metaphors 
(AM, 92-94). 
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In listening to music then, we listen differently from 
the way we do in our everyday (non-aesthetic) lives.  We use 
our usual concepts to describe the music – it may be sad or 
joyful, the music may move quickly or drag along, chords may 
be filled or hollow.  We use these concepts assuming the 
same meaning that we assume in non-aesthetic and non-
metaphorical contexts.  So although these concepts mean what 
they usually do, they are applied in non-standard 
contexts.98  Musical qualities, including the emotions we 
ascribe to music, are said to be like aspects in that while 
they are part of the appearance of something, they are not 
objects merely of sensory perception.  They are perceived 
through the exercise of the imagination, and their 
perception is subject to the will, within limits (AM, 94 & 
160). 
There are many problems with Scruton’s account of 
metaphor and aspect perception, as applied to music.  
Indeed, these problems seem so significant that it is 
unlikely an account of musical experience which relies 
crucially upon his conception of metaphor and aspect 
perception could be rescued.  Malcom Budd has charged that 
 
98 Scruton’s favourite illustration of the consistency of meaning in 
literal and metaphoric usage is taken from Wittgenstein’s Philosophical 
Investigations; in the sentence “Wednesday is fat,” “fat” is taken to 
have its usual meaning (AM, 84-85).  The problem with Scruton’s use of 
this example (and a problem with his account of metaphor more generally) 
is that metaphors are only illuminating (in aesthetic and other 
contexts) if they are effective as communication; that is, if we can 
have a sense of what they “mean” in a more prosaic sense.  Devoid of 
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Scruton’s position is incoherent, as the experience of 
musical understanding cannot be said to have a merely 
“metaphorical” essence.  Furthermore, it is unclear how a 
metaphor could be part of the content of a perceptual 
experience.99   
Part of the problem is that Scruton does not anchor his 
account of metaphor in any particular language community – 
naïve listeners, concert program writers, or professional 
musicologists – and so writes as if it were a simple matter 
to distinguish metaphorical from literal usage.  R. A. 
Sharpe has pointed out the need to recognize degrees of 
metaphoricalness:  “the music is sad” is well on the way to 
being a dead metaphor in company with “weighing the 
evidence.”  We do not invite interpretation when we say that 
the music is sad.100  Moreover, to what extent is the 
application of spatial relations to music metaphorical?  
Naomi Cumming has argued that such metaphorical transfer is 
not experiential but merely semantic:  “The most basic 
material foundation for musical ‘space’ is an actual 
differentiation between pitches.  ‘Motion,’ on the other 
hand, is an indication of change occurring through time as 
 
context, I have no idea what Wittgenstein might have meant by 
characterizing Wednesday rather than Tuesday as “fat.” 
99 Budd, “Understanding Music,” 242. 
100 R. A. Sharpe, “‘Hearing As’,” British Journal of Aesthetics 15 
(Summer 1975):  224-25. 
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one pitch is succeeded by another.  These words, applied to 
music, are not literally false, but trivially true.”101 
Scruton’s account of “double intentionality” seems to 
have only limited application to music or aesthetic 
experiences more generally.  We do not (as Scruton does), 
speak of seeing a picture of the queen “as the queen,” or a 
picture of a man “as a man.”102  Only when a picture is 
ambiguous does it make sense to ask someone to see it “as” 
something else.  Similarly, Sharpe has argued (compellingly, 
I think) that while the expressive character of some music 
is ambiguous (the music of Mozart and Schubert comes most 
readily to mind), it is a mistake in most cases to think of 
the sadness of music as something we can choose to hear or 
not.  The music just is sad.103 
3.3 Meaning and Perception 
 For Scruton, the meaning of a piece of music is what 
you understand when you understand it; no fact or 
interpretation that is irrelevant to musical understanding 
can be part of the meaning of music (AM, 344).104  As 
mentioned above, hearing sounds (as opposed to hearing the 
causes of sounds) is necessary and sufficient for hearing 
music, and Scruton rejects the idea that the meaning of 
 
101 Cumming, “Metaphor in Scruton,” 11-13. 
102 Scruton, Art and Imagination, 108, 118, 195.   
103 Sharpe, “‘Hearing As’,” 222. 
104 See also Roger Scruton, “Analytic Philosophy and the Meaning of 
Music,” in Analytic Aesthetics, ed. Richard Schusterman (Basil 
Blackwell:  Oxford, 1989), 85 and “Understanding Music,” in The 
Aesthetic Understanding, 77-100. 
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music could depend on anything extra-musical.  The meaning 
of a piece of music is not given by convention, as is 
meaning in language, but by perception (AM, 210).  In all 
cases of aesthetic meaning there is an irreducibly sensuous 
component, such that the meaning can only be discovered 
through an encounter with the artwork.  The meaning is not 
an “association” or a train of images; rather, it is the 
intentional object of perception (AM, 227).  Yet Scruton’s 
account of musical meaning and understanding is not 
consistent with his claims about the power and social 
significance of art and music.  To see this, we will need to 
consider Scruton’s own discussion of specific works of art.  
 We will recall Scruton’s characterization of the 
musical object as a pure abstraction, and his claim that 
knowing the cause of sound is not necessary for 
understanding, and that instrumentation (and hence timbre) 
are accidental.  Yet consider his highly perceptive and 
sensitive discussion of Bach’s D minor Chaconne: 
This is undeniably one of the most noble and profound 
utterances for solo violin in the history of music, and 
a remarkable study in implied harmony.  Its effect of 
titanic strain, as of a giant Atlas, bearing the burden 
of the world’s great sadness, is inseparable from the 
way in which the performer must stretch across the four 
strings of the instrument, to provide as many voices as 
can be produced by it, and to imply as many more.  The 
performer’s effort must be heard in the music, but 
heard too as part of the music.  The brilliance of 
Bach’s writing was precisely to achieve that effect:  
to make the difficulty of the piece into a quality of 
the music, rather than a matter of virtuosity.  The 
music is intrinsically difficult, but not because it is 
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showing off:  rather, because difficulty is inseparable 
from its message (AM, 452). 
 
It seems as though there are two levels of 
understanding implicit in Scruton’s account.  We must hear 
it as music, but to understand the “message” of this piece 
would seem also to require knowledge of instrumentation and 
performance practices.  On his account, someone who knew 
little about the difficulties of producing separate voices 
on bowed string instruments would miss something important 
in the music.  And without knowledge of the “solo” in the 
title of the piece, our uninformed listener might well get 
the impression that the piece was a duet played by two 
violinists!   
Scruton’s discussion of the D minor Chaconne brings to 
mind another limitation of his analysis:  his 
underestimation of the role of the performer in heard music.  
While Scruton tells us that a sense of the composer’s 
intention inhabits our musical perception, he makes no 
similar claim for the performer’s intentions.  His 
contention that “the performer inevitably leaves a mark on 
what is heard” (AM, 440) strikes me as a gross 
understatement:  In listening to music (as opposed to silent 
score reading) the performance is just what is heard.  While 
it is the “brilliance” of Bach’s writing that makes the 
difficulty of the Chaconne part of the music (compare, for 
example, some of Paganini’s virtuosic compositions) it is 
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surely also due to the “brilliance” of the performer that 
the difficulty of the music is not heard as mere showing 
off.  
Similarly, Scruton’s contention that meaning is the 
object of perception is hard to reconcile with his 
discussion of meaning in a particular artwork: 
When I see the dancers in Poussin’s Adoration of the 
Golden Calf, I am not merely prompted by the painting 
to think of them, or to conjure them in my mind’s eye.  
I see them there, in the painting.  And when I turn my 
eyes away I cease to see them.  If I retain an image of 
them it is also an image of the painting.  The meaning 
of this painting lies in the experience of it, and is 
not obtainable independently.  Nor is the meaning a 
simple matter of what is represented.  I do not only 
see these dancing figures, and the scene in which they 
participate.  I see their foolishness and frivolity; I 
sense the danger and the attraction of idolatry, which 
invites me to cancel all responsibility for my life and 
soul, and join in the collective dance.  A moral idea 
begins to pervade the aspect of the painting.  The 
figures come before me in a new light, not as happy 
innocents, but as embodiments of lawlessness, and 
assassins of the Father (AM, 227). 
 
How does Scruton know that the figures in the painting 
are idolaters?  Might they not be engaged in an approved 
religious rite?  Even knowing the title of the painting 
cannot does not tell us the moral and cultural significance 
of the activity depicted:  there seems to be nothing wrong 
per se with adoring a golden calf.  Once again, there seem 
to be two levels of understanding implicit here.  
Understanding just what the painting depicts is not 
sufficient for understanding the meaning of the painting.  
Recognizing what Scruton points to as the meaning of the 
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painting depends upon a great deal of information, 
particularly of the Christian religious tradition, which is 
outside of the painting.  I doubt very much that someone 
outside of the Christian tradition would have the same 
reaction to the painting as did Scruton, yet she could see 
the depicted scene equally clearly.  Furthermore, someone 
who did not share Scruton’s cultural and moral assumptions – 
imagine a young British neo-pagan – would reject his 
evaluations of the figures in the painting, perhaps seeing 
them precisely as “happy innocents.”  The issue here is not 
that Scruton’s analysis of the painting is necessarily 
incorrect; it might very well be correct.  The problem is 
that he does not come to his understanding through 
perceptual experience alone. 
3.4 Sympathy and Involvement with Music 
 By “expression” Scruton understands the aesthetic 
meaning, identified through metaphors, which works of art 
are said to have over and above their representational 
content (AM, 140).  In the case of poetry and music, this 
expressiveness cannot be detached from its sensuous form 
(AM, 360).  Although the meaning of music does not lie 
purely in its emotional content, the expression of emotion 
is a paradigm case of musical significance (AM, 346).  
Expression in music must be heard for understanding to be 
possible; to grasp the meaning of a piece of music is 
already to respond to its quality as music (AM, 169). 
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 According to Scruton, in order to understand expression 
in music, we must first understand our response to it.  His 
account of this response is thought-provoking and original 
(AM, 354-57).105  The response to expression is a sympathetic 
response, awakened by another life or subjectivity.  What is 
a sympathetic emotion?  If two people are happy their 
feelings coincide; if one is happy, and the second observes 
this happiness and comes to share it, without being happy 
for herself, then her happiness is sympathetic.  Sympathetic 
emotions are more fully released by fiction than by fact, as 
in real situations our interests tend to eclipse our 
sympathies.  One of the reasons why art matters is that 
through this “free play of sympathy” in fiction our emotions 
can become educated, but also corrupted.   
 Our response to music is sympathetic – a response to 
human life imagined in the sounds we hear.  Yet the life in 
music is abstract, indeterminate, and belongs to the music 
process.  Since music does not have the capacity to 
represent, there is no precise object of sympathy.  In 
addition to feelings, actions and gestures may also be 
sympathetic, and like sympathetic feelings, sympathetic 
gestures may arise in response to real or aesthetic 
contexts.  Scruton understands dancing as potentially 
 
105 Scruton’s account of musical expressiveness has roots in Plato and 
Schopenhauer.  His criticisms of Kivy’s theory of expression in music 
are puzzling in light of his own account.  I will have more to say about 
this in the next chapter.   
 88 
 
sympathetic in this way:  “In dancing I respond to another’s 
gestures, move with him, or in harmony with him, without 
seeking to change his predicament or share his burden.  
[…Dancing] involves responding to movement for its own sake, 
dwelling in the appearance of another’s gesture, finding 
meaning in that appearance, and matching it with a gesture 
of my own” (AM, 355). 
 When we dance to music we move with it, and silent 
listening can be a kind of dancing too:  “Our whole being is 
absorbed by the movement of the music, and moves with it, 
compelled by incipient gestures of imitation” (AM, 356).  
The object of imitation is the life imagined in the music.  
The response of the listener, then, is a kind of latent 
dancing; it is a sublimated desire to “move with” the music 
and so focus on its moving forms. 
Scruton makes a connection between the social aspects 
of dancing and the gestures and movements of social life 
more generally.  Manners are said to be a kind of 
generalized choreography.  In the “dance” we perform as a 
response to music, we are led through a series of gestures 
which gain their significance from the “intimation of 
community.”  It is this link between music and social life 
which prompts Scruton to call music a “character forming 
force” and lament the decline of taste in popular music (AM, 
502).  Plato’s conviction that dancing is a reflection of 
social character is “surely right”; the mores and habits of 
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mind and character of those who listen and dance to Nirvana 
will be radically different from those who listen to a 
Renaissance gavotte (AM, 390-91). 
Like Scruton, I am convinced that understanding music 
requires some form of involvement with the music.  His 
account of involvement as a sympathetic dance seems 
promising (although I am less sure about the culture 
critique he wants ultimately to draw from it.)  One of the 
advantages of Scruton’s account is that it indicates the 
importance of the body for musical understanding.  It may be 
that some aspects of music’s effect on us, and our reaction 
to music, will require an examination of music’s natural, 
supra-cultural aspects.  I will leave a full appraisal of 
Scruton’s account until the more extended discussion of 
these matters in chapter six. 
3.5 Concluding Remarks 
Scruton is caught in a bind:  He is convinced that we 
can learn from art, yet he wants to resist the thought that 
artworks are a means to information.  He believes that what 
we learn from art can be gained only through a direct 
encounter with the work, so he resists the thought that 
artworks refer to anything beyond themselves, or that 
understanding them requires any knowledge beyond what is 
given in immediate perception.  Yet his own analyses of 
artworks (the Bach Chaccone and Poussin’s painting) show 
that in order fully to understand art we sometimes require 
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information beyond what is perceptually given in the 
artworks themselves. 
Much of what Scruton says seems to imply the existence 
of levels of understanding: hearing the music “as music” and 
hearing its meaning, which requires extra-musical knowledge.  
Yet this theme is never developed.  Later I will argue that 
an adequate account of musical understanding requires an 
explicit awareness of levels of understanding. 
Scruton greatly overstates the importance of hearing 
aspects and “double intentionality” in the experience of 
listening to music.  It is difficult to see how metaphor can 
form the “structure” of our experience of listening to 
music, or indeed of anything else.  Lawrence Kimmel has 
pointed out that there is a “surface sense” in which we hear 
things rather than sounds.  We hear dogs bark, doorbells 
chime, telephones ring, and trucks idle.  The “sounds things 
make” is a cultural phenomenon too complex for mere ears; 
that is, hearing the sounds things make involves listening 
and understanding, not simply hearing.  Hearing music in the 
first movement of understanding is not a physiological or a 
psychological process, but a cultural facility; it is 
misleading to say that we hear sequences of sounds and 
somehow spontaneously or “metaphorically” convert them into 
melody and music.106   
 
106 See Laurence D. Kimmel, “The Sounds of Music:  First movement,” 
Journal of Aesthetic Education 26:3 (Fall 1992):  55-65. 
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I do not deny that it is possible, in special contexts, 
to hear sounds rather than music.  For example, a violinist 
might listen to a performance with the aim of ascertaining 
which fingering the performer has used in a particular 
passage.107  Rather than hearing the musical qualities 
inherent in Henryk Szeryng’s performance of Bach – the 
sonorous “warm” character of his tone – she may hear two 
succeeding pitches, the first a D on the open string, 
followed by the same pitch played on the G string.  Indeed, 
our experience of unfamiliar music, be it atonal art music 
or music of an unfamiliar cultural tradition, is sometimes 
an experience of sound rather than music.  We may hear a 
series of pitched sounds, rather than a melodic line or 
rhythmic gestalt.  But I think that we rarely listen to 
music for the sake of gaining information, and that it is 
even difficult to switch at will from one mode of listening 
to another.  For those in the western music tradition, tonal 
music is heard first as music, just as English speakers hear 
(unaccented) English as meaningful, not as a set of sounds.  
Scruton admits that hearing music is subject to the will 
only “within limits,” yet he never specifies just what these 
limits are.  I want to suggest that they are very narrow:  
 
107 On the violin, the same passage can often be played in different 
positions, avoiding or exploiting harmonics and the brightness of “open” 
or unstopped strings, with resultant differences in tone colour.  The 
performer’s decision as to fingering might be based on consideration of 
his physical features (the shape of his hand, length and strength of 
fingers), the tone quality of his instrument, the passages preceding or 
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Imagine listening to a great performance of Bach’s Chaccone 
for solo violin or Mozart’s Requiem and hearing it “as” 
light and breezy.  The demand itself does not even seem to 
make sense. 
It is interesting to note that Naomi Cumming and Rom 
Harre have examined Scruton’s account of understanding music 
as informed by metaphor and have come to different 
conclusions as to the direction further research ought to 
take:  Cumming is convinced that in order to determine 
whether and to what extent imagination and volitional 
activity direct perception of music, we need to look to 
experimental psychology rather than language analysis.108 
Harre agrees with Scruton that the idea of musical structure 
is not enough to account for the phenomenon of musical 
experience, and argues that our analytic understanding of 
music can advance only through detailed exposition and 
critical discussion of the metaphors through which the 
significance of music is generally portrayed.109  Perhaps 
these two avenues for research are not exclusive, and 
psychological research can also be made to encompass what 
listeners say about music. 
 
following the passage in question, as well as the musical qualities made 
possible by the different fingerings. 
108 Cumming, “Metaphor in Scruton,” 17-18. 
109 Rom Harre, “Is There a Semantics for Music?” in The Interpretation of 
Music:  Philosophical Essays, ed. Michael Krausz (Oxford:  Clarendon 
Press, 1993), 210. 
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Chapter 4  
Kivy on Understanding Music 
 Peter Kivy has probably done more than any other 
contemporary philosopher to encourage the serious 
philosophical study of music.  My focus will be limited to 
Kivy’s conception of understanding music, and I will 
consider his ideas regarding musical ontology, 
representation, and expression, only insofar as they 
illuminate what he has to say about musical understanding 
more generally.   
Kivy’s work on musical expression has been the subject 
of vigorous debate, and his views on musical representation, 
while not quite so widely discussed, have certainly been 
important in the ongoing controversies surrounding that 
topic.  Kivy has defended his positions vigorously, and 
occasionally rethought and modified his views in the face of 
criticism.  I will not attempt to provide anything like an 
overview of the critical assessment of Kivy’s work.  
Instead, in discussing criticisms of his work, I will 
concentrate on those which have implications for musical 
understanding. 
4.1 The Musical Object 
 Kivy is a platonist with respect to the ontological 
status of music.  That is, he defends the views that musical 
works are universals or types, while performances of them 
are particulars or tokens; and that musical works are 
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discovered, rather than created.110  (I mention this in order 
to help the reader place Kivy in a context; since I have set 
aside ontological questions as unimportant for most 
listeners, I will not here attempt to defend or oppose his 
position.)   
 Kivy distinguishes between two “arts” of music:  The 
fine art of musical text setting and the decorative art of 
pure instrumental music.  The former is primarily the art of 
representing human expression in musical tones.  The latter, 
also called “absolute” music, lacks text, descriptive title, 
program, and plot.111  Kivy prefers the term “music alone” 
for this type of music, and examples of paradigm cases 
include Bach’s Well–Tempered Clavier, Brahms’ fourth 
symphony, and Beethoven’s string quartets.112 
 Inspired by Eduard Hanslick, Kivy characterizes his 
approach to music as “formalist.”  Accordingly, music is a 
cognitive object, but has no semantic meaning.113  While 
humans may have a tendency to interpret musical sounds as 
 
110 See Peter Kivy, The Fine Art of Repetition:  Essays in the Philosophy 
of Music (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1993); especially 
“Platonism in Music:  A Kind of Defense,” 35-58, and “Platonism in 
Music:  Another Kind of Defense,” 59-74. 
111 See Peter Kivy, “Is Music an Art?” in The Fine Art of Repetition, 
360-373. 
112 Peter Kivy, Music Alone:  Philosophical Reflections on the Purely 
Musical Experience (Ithaca:  Cornell University Press, 1990), 14-29.  
Henceforth MA; further references will be given in brackets in the text.  
It is somewhat confusing that Kivy includes a titled work – The Well-
Tempered Clavier – as a paradigm example of music alone (which is said 
to lack descriptive titles).  This highlights the difficulties inherent 
(of which Kivy is aware) in giving a rigorous definition of music alone. 
113 I mean here to distinguish “semantic” meaning (analogous to the way a 
sentence is meaningful), from what might be called to “personal 
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meaningful in the fully linguistic sense, this tendency is 
easily defeated by the stringent semantic requirements on 
successful linguistic interpretation (MA, 9).  The only 
“content” that music can be said to possess is its capacity 
to express emotions and to represent non-musical objects or 
events.  Philip Alperson has used the term “enhanced 
formalism” to describe Kivy’s view, as his account of music 
admits not only sensible qualities and relations, but also 
expressive, representational, and other features that figure 
in our aesthetic appreciation of the formal presentation of 
the work or performance.114 
4.2 Representation and Expression 
 Kivy distinguishes pictures from representations.  
Pictures are those illustrations that are readily 
recognizable without verbal aids; for example, the Mona Lisa 
is readily recognizable as being a picture of a woman.  
Representations are illustrations which require verbal aids 
before they are discernible; for example, if I am drawing 
you a map of my neighbourhood, I may designate all the 
places where you can buy fresh fish with an “x”.  You will 
not know what the x’s represent until I tell you.  Kivy 
believes that there is a basis in ordinary language for the 
difference between pictures and representations, and notes 
 
significance” sense of meaning (analogous to the way a favourite blanket 
is meaningful to a child). 
114 Philip Alperson, “The Arts of Music,” Journal of Aesthetics and Art 
Criticism 50:3 (Summer 1992):  217. 
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that the distinction does not commit him to a position on 
the conventionality of pictorial representation.115 
 Similarly, musical “illustrations” can be pictorial or 
representational.  The potential for pictorialization in 
Western music is small.  Examples, which the “vast majority 
with minimal sensitivity” can recognize, include musical 
depictions of various bird songs, thunderstorms, and 
babbling brooks.  In the case of some musical pictures, the 
minimal information that one is listening to representative 
music might be needed in order to identify the object 
pictured.  Kivy sets aside the question of whether all 
musical pictures sound like what they represent, or whether 
one can make musical pictures of things other than sounds 
(SR, 28-35).   
 Kivy recognizes three types of musical representation:  
(1) those that “sound like” the thing represented, (2) those 
of objects other than sounds, and (3) representation in 
musical notation.  (Since the last is representation for the 
eyes and is therefore not part of the listening experience, 
I will have nothing to say about it).   
Musical representations which sound like the object 
they are meant to represent are distinguished from musical 
pictures, because in order to be understood the former 
require more than the knowledge that they are meant to be 
 
115 Peter Kivy, Sound and Semblance:  Reflections on Musical 
Representation (Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1984), 19-24.  
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representational.  A title or a line of text is needed to 
“fix” the object of representation.  For example, in 
Handel’s Israel in Egypt, a rapid thirty-second note figure 
in the violins sounds like and represents the buzzing of 
flies.  A similar violin passage occurs in the first 
movement of Bach’s Fourth Brandenburg concerto, but it is 
unlikely that anyone would say that the music there 
represents the buzzing of flies.  The presence of the text 
in Handel’s oratory accounts for the difference:  it makes 
the resemblance between the music and the activity of 
insects perceivable, and the representation possible (SR, 
35-37). 
Musical representation can also be secured through 
conventional association, or by stipulation within a work 
itself (SR, 50-51).  There are many conventional 
associations in western classical music:  horn fanfares 
represent the hunt, the sound of the bagpipes represents 
Scotland, etc.  Internal stipulation is also common, perhaps 
most widely employed in opera.  Wagner’s use of leitmotifs 
to stand for characters and dramatic themes is well known. 
There are other ways, besides convention or 
stipulation, that music can represent non-aural 
properties.116  Adjectives such as “bright,” “jagged,” 
“rising,” and “soft,” which denote simple perceptual 
 
Henceforth SR; further references will be given in brackets in the text.  
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properties are predicated univocally of musical sounds and 
of other things in the world.  (We also apply emotive terms 
univocally to music, but Kivy is convinced that these bear 
on musical expressiveness, not representation.)  The 
application of these adjectives to music is not 
idiosyncratic or bizarre, and neither are such applications 
merely examples of secondary usage.  Composers have 
exploited the synaesthetic properties of music in text 
setting:  In Handel’s Creation, the brightness of the First 
Light is represented by the brightness of the C-major chord 
(SR, 61-71).117   
While the representation of such synaesthetically 
transferred adjectives in musical representation is small, 
the practice of representation via structural adjectives is 
more significant.  Structural relations in music can be 
isomorphic to structural relations in the world or in a 
text.  Some of the most common examples are the 
correspondence between physical ascent or descent and the 
ascent or descent of a musical line, and the use of a rapid 
“fleeting” passage to represent flight.  Wherever there is 
isomorphism of structure, the bare bones of representation 
 
116 This is not to suggest, however, that the types of musical 
representation to be discussed shortly are free of convention. 
117 Jerrold Levinson has pointed out that light and the C-major chord can 
resemble each other without their possessing simple perceptual 
properties which are themselves highly resembling.  There is a higher-
order perceptual quality – “sensory brightness” meaning vividness or 
clarity in comparison to other presentations in a given sensory mode – 
of which visual and auditory “brightness” are species or determinates.  
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exist (SR, 72-77).  Kivy recognizes limits to musical 
representation, and in particular of the capacity for music 
to tell a story.  Musical “narration” can best be seen as 
illustration of a text, rather than narrative proper (SR, 
195).   
How can we tell a valid from a spurious interpretation 
of musical representation?  Kivy argues that a 
representational interpretation is necessary only if we 
cannot make sense of a passage on purely musical grounds.  
Also, a composer’s intention to represent is a necessary but 
not sufficient condition for representation.  Discovering 
(through, say, a letter or diary entry) that a composer did 
not intend to represent is decisive evidence against 
representation.  However Kivy thinks that such a discovery 
would be an unlikely scenario:  We seldom have evidence of 
an artist’s intention outside of the work of art itself (SR, 
197-216).118 
As mentioned earlier, Kivy distinguishes between 
musical representation and expression.  Kivy is well known 
for providing persuasive arguments against the arousal 
theory of musical expression that suggests that “this music 
 
See his Review of Sound and Semblance in Canadian Philosophical Reviews 
5:10 (1985):  456-57. 
118 Kivy’s contention that intention to represent is necessary but not 
sufficient for representation should be read in light of his discussion 
of composers’ disavowals of representation (in favour of expression) in 
his treatment of “representation as expression” (SR, 124-42). 
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is sad” entails that “this music makes me feel sad.”119  In 
Sound Sentiment Kivy vigorously defended the claim that 
music does not customarily arouse “garden variety” emotions 
like sadness, fear, happiness, or anger in listeners in 
ordinary aesthetic contexts.  Subsequent challenges, 
especially by Colin Radford, have led Kivy to revise this 
claim.  Radford argued that not all of our emotions or 
occasions of emotion are informed, explained, and justified 
by appropriate beliefs.  Just as certain colours (primrose 
yellow) have a tendency to cheer, and others (ice blue) have 
a tendency to calm, so too will certain music tend to arouse 
the emotions it expresses.  Furthermore, Radford points out 
that the view that music arouses emotions does not entail 
the view that expression in music just is this capacity to 
arouse.120  In his latest reflection on the topic, Kivy has 
conceded that certain listeners, who are musically engaged 
and perceptive, may indeed come to feel the emotions 
expressed by the music they listen to, although he notices 
no such tendency in himself.121   
 
119 See Peter Kivy, Sound Sentiment (Philadelphia:  Temple University 
Press, 1989).  Henceforth SE; further references will be given in 
brackets in the text. 
120 See especially Colin Radford, “Muddy Waters,” Journal of Aesthetics 
and Art Criticism 49:3 (Summer 1991):  247-52.  Stephen Davies has also 
pointed out that not everyone who accepts that music can arouse emotion 
also accepts that the nature of musical expression is to be analyzed in 
terms of this tendency.  See his Musical Meaning and Expression (Ithaca:  
Cornell University Press, 1994), 193. 
121 See his “Auditor’s Emotions:  Contention, Concession and Compromise,” 
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 51:1 (Winter 1993):  1-12. 
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Kivy defends what he calls the “cognitive theory” of 
musical expression.  We recognize emotion in music as a 
perceptual property.  Throughout Sound Sentiment Kivy draws 
our attention to the photograph of a St. Bernard reproduced 
in the book.  The dog’s face is expressive of sadness; this 
is not to say that she actually is sad, or that looking at 
her will arouse sadness in us.  Rather, her “drooping” face 
and liquid eyes seem appropriate to the expression of 
sadness; her expression looks like one that might be on the 
face of a sad person.  Similarly, according to Kivy, music 
is expressive in virtue of its resemblance to expressive 
human utterance and behaviour.  For example, there are vocal 
and bodily patterns typical of sad people – they tend to 
speak slowly, in low tones, and move as though under strain.  
Music expressive of sadness will resemble these features – 
it will likely be slow and in a low register.   
Such resemblance of “contour” is only one way in which 
expressiveness can be secured; conventional associations 
also play a role in musical expressiveness.  Indeed, some 
features of musical expressiveness can be explained in 
virtue of their customary association with certain emotions, 
apart from an structural analogy between those features and 
the emotions expressed.  Kivy suspects that the happy 
character of the major mode is a result of its customary 
association with positive emotions.  However he is also 
inclined to believe that many musical features which are 
 102 
 
expressive by convention were once heard as resembling 
identifiable expressive behaviour; so “contour” and 
“convention” are not easily separated. 122 
While expressiveness can contribute to musical 
illustration, it is false to claim that all illustration can 
be reduced to expression.  There are too many examples of 
music that are sound pictures or representational which are 
not so in virtue of being expressive (of emotions or of 
anything else) (SR, 133).   
4.3 Understanding Music123 
 Kivy rejects the idea that music is “meaningful in the 
full linguistic sense,” due to the stringent semantic 
requirements on successful linguistic interpretation.124  
Yet, just as human beings have a tendency to interpret 
visual stimuli as objects in the world, so too is there a 
tendency to interpret sounds as meaningful in the fully 
linguistic sense.  Both propensities likely developed 
because of the evolutionary advantages they afforded.  In 
listening to music, then, we seek to understand something 
 
122 Alan Goldman has argued that the claim that the association of minor 
keys with negative emotion is conventional, is no more plausible than a 
corresponding allegation in regard to dull, muted colours.  See his 
“Emotions in Music (A Postscript),” Journal of Aesthetics and Art 
Criticism 53:1 (Winter 1995):  59-69.  Certainly, this is a puzzle not 
likely to be resolved any time soon. 
123 My account of Kivy’s conception of musical understanding is based 
primarily on Music Alone. 
124 The question of whether and to what degree music is “language-like” 
has been the subject of much philosophical reflection.  The balance of 
opinion is on the negative, although much depends on the account of 
linguistic meaning with which one begins.  Davies has discussed and 
evaluated various positions on the relationship between music and 
language in Musical Meaning and Expression, 1-49. 
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like linguistic meaning, but this search is thwarted because 
of music’s low potential for conveying semantic meaning.  
Yet this lack of semantic content puts up no barrier to 
hearing music as expressive (MA, 1-13). 
 In the course of explicating his own views on 
understanding music, Kivy discusses certain rival positions.  
He claims that Descartes’ account of music appreciation is 
paradigmatic of what he calls the “stimulation model.”  
According to this model, music is a mere physical stimulus 
that puts the listener in a pleasurable state, analogous to 
the way in which drugs work.  Kivy is concerned to show the 
inadequacies in Descartes’ account because the stimulation 
model continues to be accepted, although now couched in the 
language of modern neurophysiology (MA, 31).125  The problems 
with this model lie in its acceptance of the view that music 
is able to arouse emotions in regular aesthetic contexts, 
and in its conception of the musical object as a mere 
stimulus, rather than cognitive object.  Kivy points out 
that if music were a mere stimulus, a listener’s level of 
musical knowledge would have no effect on her pleasure in 
listening to music.  Yet an educated listener is not like a 
pharmacologist who gets no more pleasure from heroin because 
he knows all about its molecular structure.  Rather, 
knowledge about music, such as the awareness that certain 
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things are going on technically, and knowledge of the 
difficulties involved in producing certain sounds on 
different instruments, makes for a more complex perceptual 
object.  Knowledge about music gives one more to think about 
and can increase one’s appreciation of music and pleasure in 
listening to it (MA, 38-41).  Even for the most naïve 
listener, music is not a mere physical stimulus but a 
perceived and cognized object, understood under one 
description or another (MA, 42). 
 Kivy also challenges the view, propounded since at 
least the eighteenth century, that all music is somehow 
representational.  One obvious difficulty with this view is 
that while most “normal” observers will be able to say what 
is depicted in a representational picture, there is no such 
intersubjective agreement among music listeners where the 
music lacks a descriptive title, text, or program.  An 
explanation of our enjoyment of music in terms of the 
apprehension of unconscious representations is theoretically 
possible, but unsupported by evidence and implausible.  
While it is true that some listeners may hear “pure” music 
as representational – hear battles and epic journeys in the 
music – Kivy is convinced that this type of activity is not 
listening, but free association to music (MA, 42-67). 
 
125 In his zeal to confront contemporary proponents of the stimulation 
model, Kivy overlooks the subtleties of Descartes’ position; but I will 
not develop this point here. 
 105 
 
 Despite their problems, the view that music is a mere 
physical stimulus and the view that all music is 
representational are each correct in one aspect.  The mere 
stimulus view is correct in that it leaves no place for 
semantic musical “content”; the view that understanding 
music is understanding representation is correct in that it 
conceives of music as a cognitive object (MA, 66-67).  In 
formulating his own account of musical understanding, Kivy 
seeks to draw on the strengths of these accounts.  To begin 
with, he takes it as “something of an axiom” that those who 
respond to sound merely as a physical stimulus do not 
respond to music.  Even a seemingly “mindless” response to 
music is a response to a cognitive object.  The musical 
appreciation and understanding of more and less 
sophisticated listeners form a continuum of increasingly 
complex cognition (MA, 68-70).   
 Kivy’s method of inquiry into the nature of the musical 
experience is hermeneutic phenomenology – he attends to his 
own experience of listening to music.  One phenomenon he 
notes is “finding the theme” of a fugue: 
One of the things I do when I listen to a fugue, of 
course, is to listen for the entrance of the theme.  
Sometimes I get it right, sometimes I miss an entrance 
because it is an “inner voice” or otherwise disguised, 
sometimes I am fooled into thinking that there is an 
entrance, when, in fact, it is only a scrap of the theme 
in an “episode.”  This is something I enjoy when I listen 
to fugues.  I presume others enjoy it too (MA, 73). 
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However, pleasure does not lie simply in finding the 
theme, for otherwise there would be no difference in the 
pleasure afforded by listening to fugues by composers of 
varying ability.  Upon further reflection, Kivy says that he 
takes pleasure in how the theme enters, and how he hears the 
entrance is a function of how much he knows about and can 
perceive in fugues (MA, 77).  Kivy goes on to argue that 
this experience of finding the theme of a fugue is 
paradigmatic of musical experience more generally.  He sums 
up his claim:  “[W]hen someone is enjoying music, he or she 
is, in any given instance, enjoying some sonic quality of a 
piece of music perceived under a certain description as 
doing something the listener enjoys, as doing something 
beautifully” (MA, 78). 
The descriptions under which a listener hears the 
qualities of the piece need not be technical.  One listener 
might say, “I enjoyed the funny way the theme sounded just 
then, when it came in:  like the way it sounded before, but 
somehow a little different; I don’t know, maybe a little 
more somber.”  Another listener might say, “I enjoyed how 
Bach sneaked that theme in, starting on the seventh degree 
of the scale rather than the first; and, of course, in doing 
that he gave the theme a whole new harmonic structure and 
cast.”  In both cases, the same musical event is perceived, 
yet under different descriptions.  Both descriptions evince 
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musical understanding, but the second also indicates mastery 
of technical language (MA, 77-78).   
Kivy takes it as a matter of common sense that our 
enjoyment of music correlates with our understanding of it.  
A listener’s musical understanding is shown in, indeed 
constituted by, his ability to describe what he has heard.  
Again, this description need not be in technical language, 
any more than the descriptions under which a listener hears 
need be in technical language (MA, 98).  Kivy allows that 
some Socratic “midwifery” might be necessary before an 
untrained listener can give a description of what he has 
heard (MA, 108).126 
I mentioned earlier that in Music Alone Kivy suggests 
that listeners who “hear” events represented in music are 
free associating to the music rather than listening to it, 
and that this is not the best way to appreciate music (MA, 
62).  Kivy has come to change his mind on this issue; he no 
longer thinks that his way of listening to music is the only 
way, or a privileged way of listening.127  As Alperson has 
argued, our understanding of “pure” instrumental music is 
 
126 Would Kivy say that a listener who claimed to find music “ineffable” 
and was unable to describe it had failed to understand?  Presumably such 
a listener would also benefit from Socratic midwifery.  Also, a 
description of what one has heard need not be an exhaustive 
characterization. 
127 See Kivy, “Auditor’s Emotions,” and “Listening:  A Response to 
Alperson, Davies, and Howard,” Journal of Aesthetic Education 27:1 
(Spring 1993):  24. 
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compatible with a variety of musical practices.128  Indeed, 
Kivy’s acceptance of non-technical descriptions of music as 
evidence of understanding in Music Alone already entailed 
that he would be hard pressed to reject “representational” 
descriptions as evidence of understanding.  For example, a 
listener who was in the habit of “animating” her perceptions 
of music might liken the theme in the fugue discussed above 
to a small white cat, and the second entry in a new harmonic 
structure to a smaller black cat creeping along behind it.  
If such a description could be shown to characterize the 
music accurately (however fancifully), it is difficult to 
see on what grounds Kivy could reject it as evidence of 
understanding. 
One crucial aspect of understanding music, for Kivy, is 
the ability to make basic emotive distinctions in music.  It 
is almost impossible to imagine full musical competence in 
the absence of this ability (SE, 147).  A person might fail 
to recognize expressiveness in music if he is unfamiliar 
with the conventions governing the behavioural expression of 
emotion in a given culture, or if he is unaware of the 
musical conventions that contribute to expressiveness in a 
given tradition or style (SE, 84-94).  These claims seem 
reasonable enough, but some have implied that they do not go 
far enough.  Roger Scruton has argued that such theories as 
 
128 Philip Alperson, “Instrumental Music and Instrumental Value,” Journal 
of Aesthetic Education 27:1 (Spring 1993):  8-9. 
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Kivy’s confuse expression with the route to it; an adequate 
account of musical expression will refer to the listener’s 
experience and explain why she is affected in the way she 
is.129  Similarly, Aaron Ridley contends that although 
certain features of music may be causally responsible for 
our experience of the music as expressive, they cannot by 
themselves explain what it is to experience music as 
expressive.130   
I am unable to decide whether such criticisms are 
trivial or profound.  Certain features of a photograph of my 
grandmother bring about my experience of recognizing her.  
The nature of this experience is either obvious (it just 
looks like my grandmother) or deeply mysterious, and so 
better investigated in conjunction with empirical 
psychology.  Both Scruton and Ridley contend that music 
arouses in listeners the emotions it expresses.  While no 
doubt some listeners are affected in this way, it seems 
unlikely that all are, and assuredly not all of us all of 
the time.  (Peter Kivy, for one, claims that he never is.)  
On what evidence should we accept that our experience of an 
emotion in music is more than the recognition of that 
emotion?  It seems likely that the experience of emotion in 
music at least begins with recognition, if not recognition 
 
129 Roger Scruton, The Aesthetics of Music (Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 
1998), 146-53. 
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of a specific emotion, then, at minimum, recognition of the 
presence of emotion. 
Before leaving this topic, I would like to examine 
Ridley’s arguments in greater detail because they directly 
bear on the topic of musical understanding.  For Ridley, to 
hear music as expressive is to have an experience of the 
music which has affective aspects, such that the appropriate 
musical gestures are heard as being expressive of the state 
which we experience sympathetically.131  Elsewhere he makes 
the weaker claim that unless some or even most of us had 
responded affectively to music at some point, it would never 
have become appropriate to extend the application of 
expressive predicates to music.132  According to Ridley, 
there are “reasons to think” that sympathetic response is 
essential to the experience of any kind of expressiveness:  
“There is or there can be among people a kind of community 
of affect, in which we grasp the states of others in the 
very act of responding to them and learn something of our 
own states through the responses they inspire.”133  He 
proposes an analogy with coming to appreciate the melancholy 
of a willow tree only as one is saddened by it – one 
apprehends the melancholy through a kind of “mirroring” 
 
130 Aaron Ridley, “Musical Sympathies:  The Experience of Expressive 
Music,” Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 53:1 (Winter 1995):  49-
58. 
131 Ridley, “Musical Sympathies,” 55. 
132 Ridley, “Musical Sympathies,” 54.   
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response rather than merely identifying the expressive 
stance which the willow’s posture resembles. 
 The problem with Ridley’s argument (at least, as it 
pertains to his stronger claim insisting on the necessity of 
affective response to understanding expressiveness in music) 
is that there is no consensus on the scope and importance of 
sympathetic response in human beings.  Even child 
development specialists disagree as to the importance of 
sympathetic response in the development of emotional 
“intelligence” in children.  Indeed, a psychologist’s 
assessment of the role of sympathetic response in childhood 
development will likely depend on the overall theoretical 
framework in which she works - behaviourists, freudians, 
piagetians, and social constructivisits all having differing 
views on the subject.  If the issue is controversial with 
regard to children, it is no less so with regard to adults.  
It seems unarguable that we often do respond sympathetically 
to the emotions of loved ones – their sadness and joy 
palpably affect us.  It is much more problematic to suggest 
that a sympathetic response is necessary to understanding 
the expression of emotion, be it the expression of people or 
music. 
4.4 Profundity in Music 
 
133 Ridley, “Musical Sympathies,” 53.  Notice the diminution of the claim 
made from “there is” a community of affect among people to “there can 
be” such a community. 
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Throughout Music Alone Kivy defends the view that 
although music is a cognitive object, it has no semantic 
content and limited capacity for representation.  Yet he 
recognizes that certain musical works, for example 
Beethoven’s late string quartets and Bach’s Well-Tempered 
Clavier, are considered “profound” (MA, 202-03).  Does this 
belief in the profundity of certain music make sense?  It 
seems uncontroversial to say that Goethe’s Faust is a 
profound work, while Oscar Wilde’s The Importance of Being 
Earnest, for all its charms, is not.  Drawing on this 
insight, Kivy identifies three requirements for a work to be 
profound.  First, a work must be able to be “about” 
something.  Second, the subject matter of the work must 
itself be profound – of abiding interest and importance to 
human beings.  Third, the work must treat its subject matter 
in an exemplary way; that is, it must function at a high 
aesthetic level (MA, 203-04). 
One type of music which is often said to be profound is 
counterpoint, and it would seem to meet these three 
requirements.  It is “about” the possibilities of musical 
sound, which is a subject of interest to many people.  The 
third condition – that of high aesthetic quality – is not 
met by all contrapuntal music, but that coincides with our 
intuition that only some such music is profound (MA, 209-
10).  Yet music other than contrapuntal is considered 
profound – what about it?  Generalizing from our insights 
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about counterpoint, it seems plausible that musical 
craftsmanship, so evidently exemplified in counterpoint, is 
the common feature of profound music.  More exactly, this 
craftsmanship must be such that it commands our attention as 
a primary factor in musical experience, yet at the same time 
does not obtrude or draw attention to itself (MA, 210-13).134 
Kivy realizes that there are problems with his account.  
For one, not all subjects of abiding interest and importance 
to human beings are profound.  Proper nutrition and weather 
patterns are certainly of great significance and interest, 
but we would hardly call them profound.  Kivy admits that he 
has no clear idea of why human beings should find the 
possibilities of musical sound of such abiding interest that 
we are prompted to call the subject profound (MA, 214-16).  
Another problem is the circularity of his account:  There 
are profound musical works only if musical sound is a 
profound subject matter, and musical sound is a profound 
subject matter only if there are profound musical works (MA, 
216-17). 
Kivy seems dissatisfied by his account of musical 
profundity, and ends on a note of “mystery and puzzlement.”  
He is convinced that some musical works are so compelling 
that “profound” is the only appropriate word to describe 
 
134 Thomas Carson Mark has proposed a similar account with regard to 
artworks of virtuosity:  Such artworks require skill, and are partially 
about the skill they require.  See his “On Works of Virtuosity,” Journal 
of Philosophy 77 (1980):  28-45. 
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them.  Furthermore, he does not mean “profound” as another 
way of characterizing “great” music; not all great works are 
profound.  Yet there seems to be no rational justification 
for characterizing any musical work as profound (MA, 217-
18). 
As several commentators have pointed out, Kivy’s 
formalism and denial of musical “content” gets him into 
trouble here.  David A. White has noted that to say that 
music is “of the world” but “not about the world” (MA, 67), 
leaves open the question of how music is related to and 
understandable in terms of the world.135  According to 
Davies, Kivy’s denial of musical “aboutness” generates many 
of the difficulties that his account of musical value 
acknowledges, without being able to answer.136  Levinson has 
argued that musical “aboutness” is best defended on a case-
by-case basis; there is no need to accept the principle that 
any piece of music is about all of its extra-musical 
properties:  “There is no reason we should restrict our 
useful informal notion of aboutness to systematic or 
conventional relations of reference or denotation.”137  The 
concerns pressed by Graham McFee are more far-reaching, 
relating to Kivy’s contention that pure music’s lack of 
semantic content makes it a decorative rather than a fine 
 
135 White, David A., “Toward a Theory of Profundity in Music,” Journal of 
Aesthetics and Art Criticism 50 (1992):  33. 
136 Davies, Musical Meaning and Expression, 277. 
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art.  If music alone is “nothing but” sound, how could it be 
understood?  Why would we want to make sense of our 
experience of music as valuable?  Kivy has offered a 
“wallpaper model” of decorative art, but we do not try to 
“understand” wallpaper, no matter how intricate its 
structure or much pleasure we might derive from it.  
Furthermore, there is no basis for Kivy’s claim that music 
alone can be genuinely understood, yet not be meaning-
bearing.138 
The problem of music’s “aboutness” or capacity to bear 
meaning is clearly one of the thorniest in aesthetics, and I 
will not be able to say much about it here.  I share these 
commentators’ reservations towards Kivy’s denial of music’s 
cognitive content.  Perhaps one way of considering the 
problem is to think about the difference between musical 
works which have descriptive titles and those which do not.  
In calling his composition for viola and orchestra “Abdi ne 
viderem” (“I turned away so as not to see”) Giya Kancheli 
would surely seem to be drawing our attention to its subject 
– his decision to leave his native war-torn Georgia - and 
resultant expressive character.  The music is clearly meant 
to be “about” something.  I think Kivy would agree so far; 
the descriptive title of the piece means it is not, after 
 
137 Jerrold Levinson, “Musical Profundity Misplaced,” Journal of 
Aesthetics and Art Criticism 50:1 (Winter  1992):  58-60. 
138 Graham McFee, “Meaning and the Art Status of ‘Music Alone’,” British 
Journal of Aesthetics 37:1  (January 1997):  31-46. 
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all, “music alone.”  Yet imagine the same composition 
without the descriptive title.  Is it any less “about” the 
same subject?  I would say no – the difference is that in 
the first case the composer’s intentions are on the surface, 
and in the second case they are hidden.  We would have to be 
careful about the claims we made for the second composition, 
but it would be going too far to say that it was not “about” 
anything. 
4.5 Concluding Remarks 
 In examining the work of Goodman, Scruton, and Kivy, I 
have tried to bring out what was most important to their 
accounts of understanding music, (in the case of Goodman, 
his account of understanding art more generally.)  We have 
seen that only Goodman has anything like a fully worked out 
conception of the logical structure of representation and 
expression.  Kivy claims that his account of these phenomena 
in music is compatible with Goodman’s, but certain 
commentators have doubted whether this is in fact the 
case.139  I suspect that Kivy and Goodman would fundamentally 
agree about the power and nature of music, but differ as to 
the character of logical relations underwriting 
representation and expression in music.  Scruton has 
criticized both Goodman and Kivy, yet we have seen that his 
account of expression has much in common with Kivy’s (both 
rely on the structural similarities between expressive music 
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and expressive human behaviour), and his own account of 
musical representation is not compelling philosophically or 
to common sense.   
 
In the next chapter, I will examine the Kantian 
background which, with different consequences, informs the 
views of each of these thinkers.  My goal will be to gain a 
better understanding of the premises they share and the 
issues which divide them. 
 
139 For example Davies, Musical Meaning and Expression, 83-84 and 145. 
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Chapter 5  
Kantian Themes 
 Almost everyone who writes on Kant’s contribution to 
the philosophy of music feels compelled to disclose at the 
outset that Kant seems to have had little affinity for art 
in general and for music in particular.  His preferences ran 
to loud and boisterous military music, heroic fanfares, 
large orchestras, and he is said not to have cared for solo 
instruments in the least.140  In the Critique of Judgement he 
disdainfully compares music to perfume, because both extend 
their influence further than is desired.141  Indeed, Kant 
once wrote indignantly to the director of police, commanding 
that he prevent the inmates of a nearby prison from singing 
hymns.142  Kant’s contribution to understanding aesthetic 
experience has nevertheless been immense, and an examination 
of it is necessary fully to understand many contemporary 
issues in philosophical aesthetics.  Roger Scruton has gone 
so far as to say that were it not for the Critique of 
Judgement, aesthetics would not exist in its modern form.143 
 
140 Herman Parret, “Kant on Music and the Hierarchy of the Arts,” Journal 
of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 56:3 (Summer 1998):  252.  Parret’s 
source for these remarks are the biographic materials collected in 
Siegfried Drescher, ed., Wer war Kant?  Drei zeitgenössischen 
Biographien von Ludwig Ernst Borowski, Reinhold Bernhard Jachmann und 
E.A.Ch. Wasianski (Pfullingen:  Neske, 1974). 
141 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgement, trans. J.H. Bernard (New York:  
Hafner Press, 1951), §53.  Further references (to section numbers) will 
be given in brackets in the text. 
142 Roger Scruton, Kant (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1982), 5.  
Scruton does not cite his source for this anecdote. 
143 Scruton, Kant, 79. 
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 I will not attempt to provide a full analysis and 
assessment of Kant’s contribution to the philosophy of 
music; this has already been done by others more able than 
myself.144  Rather, I will consider three aspects of Kant’s 
philosophical contribution to aesthetics:  one area - form 
and content - has been of great influence in the philosophy 
of music.  The other areas I will examine have been less 
influential, but should be of significance to philosophers 
interested in musical understanding.  They are the Kant’s 
analyses of aesthetic ideas and of the sublime. 
 Unsurprisingly, there are Kantian themes in the work of 
Goodman, Scruton, and Kivy.  I will begin with a short 
discussion of the similarities and differences between Kant 
and the three contemporary figures.  This will also help us 
see the affinities and oppositions among the latter. 
5.1 Goodman, Scruton, Kivy, and Kant 
 Goodman, Scruton, and Kivy have enjoyed a much greater 
range of aesthetic experience than Kant could have had.  
Lewis White Beck has conjectured that Kant probably never 
saw a beautiful painting or a fine statue.145  Consequently 
or not, these three philosophers have much greater 
 
144 See for example Robert E. Butts, “Kant’s Theory of Musical Sound:  An 
Early Exercise in Cognitive Science,” Dialogue 32 (1993):  3-24; Parret, 
“Kant on Music and the Hierarchy of the Arts;” and especially Herbert M. 
Schueller, “Immanuel Kant and the Aesthetics of Music,” Journal of 
Aesthetics and Art Criticism 14 (1955-56):  218-247. 
145 Lewis White Beck, Early German Philosophy:  Kant and his Predecessors 
(Bristol:  Thoemmes Press, 1996), 498.  This work has helped me to 
achieve a better understanding both of Kant’s aesthetics and of its 
place in his critical philosophy.  
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appreciation for the range of art and music than Kant did, 
bringing a richness to their discussion of specific 
artworks.  Scruton and Kivy, in particular, have had a 
significant degree of formal musical education.146 
 Perhaps the most significant aspect of Kant’s influence 
on Goodman, Scruton, and Kivy is the conception of artistic 
appreciation as primarily a cognitive activity.  Art is 
first understood and judged by the mind; its stimulus to 
emotions is secondary.  Indeed for Kant, even single tones 
are judged, not merely sensed (§14).  That said, it should 
be noted that Kant’s conception of emotions and their role 
in aesthetic judgement has few contemporary adherents.  
Neither Goodman, Scruton, nor Kivy shares Kant’s suspicion 
of emotions in aesthetic experience.147 
 While the philosophers under discussion consider the 
appreciation of art to be a cognitive activity, only Goodman 
goes so far to say that music can be a “way of worldmaking” 
– that music can be knowledge-bearing.  The greatest 
difference between Goodman on the one hand, and Scruton, 
Kivy, and Kant on the other, is that the latter adhere to 
some doctrine of aesthetic formalism.148 According to Goodman 
form cannot be distinguished from content, and we cannot 
 
146 I do not know whether Goodman ever had formal musical training.   
147 I will explicate Kant’s understanding of the role played by emotion 
in aesthetic judgement more fully in the next section.  It should be 
noted that Kant does not regard emotions themselves as inimical to 
aesthetic experience; only interested emotions are so. 
148 I will leave off a fuller discussion of Kant’s formalism and its 
application to music until the next two sections. 
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say, definitively and absolutely, which features of an 
artwork have aesthetic significance.  A feature which at one 
time seems to us incidental may later come to have greater 
importance.  His view is thus at odds both with Scruton’s 
conception of the musical object as primarily a tonal 
structure and with Kivy’s “enhanced formalism.”   
 We saw earlier that much of Goodman’s discussion of art 
focussed on the logic of the denotative relationships – 
representation, exemplification, and metaphor – inherent in 
works of art (including musical performances) and discovered 
through engagement with them.  Goodman said comparatively 
little about the process by which we come to appreciate 
those relationships, and their role in aesthetic experience.  
This approach is asymmetrical to Kant’s, who devotes most of 
the Critique of Judgement to a consideration of the mental 
process operative in understanding art, and says 
comparatively little about artworks themselves. 
 Scruton, besides accepting a formalistic conception of 
the musical object, seems to have been influenced by Kant’s 
arguments for the objectivity of aesthetic judgements.  For 
Scruton, as for Kant, when I say that something is 
beautiful, I expect others to agree, and it matters to me 
whether they do or not.  Also, we will recall that according 
to Scruton, everyday concepts are used differently in 
aesthetic experience, which in turn highlights the 
importance of metaphor in aesthetic judgements.  This 
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recalls Kant’s view that the concepts employed in everyday 
cognition are determinate, while the concepts employed in 
aesthetic judgements are indeterminate.  These Kantian 
themes in Scruton’s work coexist uneasily with what can be 
interpreted as his romanticism.  I am thinking particularly 
of his conception of music as abstract and not of the 
physical world, his privileging of diatonic tonality as 
“natural,” and the idealization of the past implicit in his 
lamentations condemning atonal and popular music. 
 We saw earlier that Kivy distinguishes between the 
“fine” art of musical text setting, and the “decorative” art 
of pure music.  Although Kant does not use the same 
terminology or work out his insights about music as an art 
consistently and in a systematic fashion, Kivy’s distinction 
is clearly Kantian.  We will see later that Kant considers 
music without a text to have no cognitive content, and 
vacillates on the question of whether music is one of the 
fine arts. 
5.2 Form and Content 
 In the Critique of Judgement, Kant distinguishes two 
types of aesthetic judgements.  Material aesthetic 
judgements (judgements of sense) assert that an object is 
pleasant or unpleasant.  Pure aesthetic judgements 
(judgements of taste) assert the beauty of an object or of 
the manner of representing it (§14).  Judgements of sense 
make no claim to universality; when I say that I find 
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broccoli delicious, I do not expect others necessarily to 
agree.  Judgements of taste, on the other hand, are meant to 
be universal; when I say that Beethoven’s violin concerto is 
beautiful, I expect that others will concur.   
 For Kant the appreciation of art is cognitive in the 
sense that the cognitive faculties are involved.  However it 
is non-cognitive in that the application of determinate 
concepts is ruled out.  Furthermore, the apprehension of 
beauty is an affective state; one feels pleasure when one 
judges an object to be beautiful.  Kant’s definition of 
beauty is “purposiveness without purpose;” that is, a 
beautiful object seems an organic whole designed for 
apprehension by our mental powers, although we either do not 
know the object’s purpose or set it aside in order to make 
an aesthetic judgement.  Pleasure in the beautiful arises 
from the “harmony” of our faculties of imagination and 
understanding in contemplating the form of a beautiful 
object.  Furthermore, in aesthetic judgements our mental 
powers are free; reflection and contemplation must not be 
determined by a previous interest.  Hence judgements of the 
beautiful are disinterested:  the perceiving subject must 
have no interest in the existence of the object.149   
 
149 My understanding of Kant’s aesthetic theory has been greatly aided 
and influenced by Donald W. Crawford, Kant’s Aesthetic Theory (Madison:  
University of Wisconsin Press, 1974); and Kathleen Marie Higgins, The 
Music of Our Lives (Philadelphia:  Temple University Press, 1991), 47-
80. 
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An example may help to clarify:  Imagine contemplating 
a particularly attractive fish arranged on ice shavings.  In 
ordinary cognition the manifold of sense impressions is 
brought under a determinate concept:  This is a fish – a 
rainbow trout, to be exact.  In an aesthetic judgement, the 
sense impressions enliven one another without coalescing in 
a determinate concept.  You contemplate the fish, noticing 
its symmetry, its particular shape, the arrangement of its 
gills and fins, etc.  Any knowledge you may have about, say, 
the appropriateness of the fish’s shape to rapid travel 
through water, must be set aside.  Any thoughts related to 
an interest in the fish’s continued existence – such as your 
desire to cook it for dinner – must also be set aside if 
your contemplation of the fish is to be disinterested and a 
free play of imagination and understanding. 
 The notion of aesthetic form plays a major role in 
Kant’s aesthetics, but it is not easy to discern exactly 
what he means by it.  According to contemporary usage in 
aesthetics, “form” refers to the perceptual elements of an 
artwork and to the relations holding between them.  
“Formalism” is the aesthetic doctrine according to which 
these related elements are said to be the primary locus of 
aesthetic value.150  When discussing the visual arts, Kant 
sometimes writes as though by form he understands 
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delineation, figure, or shape (§14, §42).  Yet the matter is 
not so simple, as the notion of form is logically related to 
the notion of purposiveness.  An object’s purposiveness is 
what we perceive in it – its form and organization – which 
leads us to say that it resulted from a concept.  The “free 
play” of our mental powers and their “harmony” arise from 
the fact that the objects’ formal properties are related in 
a purposive way, even though no concept is employed to judge 
the object at the time.  Returning to the fish example, we 
contemplate the fish without thinking of it as an instance 
of a fish, a swimming creature, a sea-dweller, etc.  So 
judgements of form are never purely “object oriented;” they 
always make reference to how the perceiver affectively 
responds to the perceptual object.  As Crawford explains, a 
pleasing form itself is insufficient for Kant - the form is 
a means to a significant experience.151 
A judgement of taste is “pure” only so far as no 
empirical satisfaction is included in the determining ground 
of the judgement.  We cannot assume that all people 
experience the same quality of sensations; hence pure 
aesthetic judgements must be based solely on the form of an 
object, as only this admits of “universal communicability.”  
A musical composition, not the pleasant tones of a 
 
150 Lucian Krukowski, “Formalism:  Conceptual and Historical Overview,”  
in Michael Kelly, ed. Encyclopedia of Aesthetics (Oxford:  Oxford 
University Press, 1998). 
151 Crawford, 124. 
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particular instrument, is the proper object of a pure 
judgement of taste (§14).  For example, different people 
will experience varying degrees of pleasure in the timbre 
of, say, the flute.  So we cannot determine whether a 
composition for flute is beautiful unless we “abstract” the 
characteristic flute timbre and judge the composition solely 
on the basis of its form or structure.  Otherwise, a 
listener who dislikes the sound of the flute might 
incorrectly judge the composition as not beautiful simply on 
the basis of its timbre.   
In all beautiful art, the essential thing is the form 
(§52).  Kant gives the example of the colours added to a 
sketch; these can increase the pleasure we take in the 
sketch and enliven it for sensation, but they can never make 
the sketch worthy of contemplation or beautiful.  In the 
instances where tone and colour add to the beauty of an 
object, it is not the case that they add something to our 
enjoyment of the form.  Rather, they make the form “more 
exactly, definitely, and completely, intuitable,” and by 
their charm fix our attention on the object itself (§14).  
This enhanced attention may thus facilitate the pleasurable 
harmony of the faculties. 
Some of Kant’s negative estimations of music come from 
the fact that we cannot decide whether sensations bound up 
with the appreciation of music are based on sense or 
strictly on reflection.  We cannot say with certainty 
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whether sounds are merely pleasant sensations, or whether 
they form in themselves a beautiful play of sensations.  If 
musical sounds could constitute a beautiful play of 
sensations, they would be able to be the occasion of 
aesthetic judgements of satisfaction in the form of an 
object.  As I interpret him, Kant leaves undecided the 
question of whether music can be a beautiful (fine) art 
(§51).152  A question which Kant does not leave undecided is 
the cognitive status of music.  Music merely “plays with 
sensations” and so offers little culture to the mind (§53). 
 Many commentators have found difficulties with Kant’s 
aesthetic formalism.  Schueller has argued that, in 
separating charm from aesthetic judgement, Kant is asking 
for form without content.  Yet sensations are necessary for 
aesthetic judgement, as they are what make the form 
intuitable.153  Crawford notes that by Kant’s own 
characterization of the form/matter distinction, the two are 
inseparable in experience.154  Perhaps more significantly, in 
decrying music’s lack of “culture” for the mind, Kant 
reveals a preference for content and moral instruction over 
form.155  Indeed, Kant’s notion of aesthetic worth as related 
 
152 This position is also held by Butts, Parret, and Schueller. Schueller 
(223) makes the interesting suggestion that the status of music as an 
agreeable or fine art depends on the listener:  If a listener only half-
hears music in the background of a dinner party, say, the music is 
decorative.  If the same listener turns from the party to contemplate 
the music aesthetically, the music has the status of a fine art. 
153 Schueller, 242-43. 
154 Crawford, 110. 
155 Schueller, 235. 
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to the supersensible and to morality indicates that he wants 
to pack more into his notion of formal purposiveness than a 
strict formalistic theory will allow.156 
5.3 Hanslick and the Tradition of Musical Formalism 
 It is likely that Kant had too little inclination for 
music to see the implications inherent for it in his 
aesthetic theory.  In particular, Kant’s formalism required 
someone with a greater appreciation of musical structure to 
work out its full potential with regard to music.  It is 
very tempting to read Eduard Hanslick’s On the Musically 
Beautiful as an exercise in Kantian formalism as applied to 
music.  Although we have no evidence that Hanslick ever read 
Kant,157 there is an uncanny similarity between their 
positions.   
Since its first appearance, Hanslick’s book has had 
considerable influence on those working in musical 
aesthetics; Payzant’s new English translation in 1986 
further stimulated philosophical discussion of Hanslick’s 
ideas.158  Although Hanslick’s avowed project in the book is 
quite modest, the reader may come to suspect that his 
polemical language belies these modest aims.  It is safe to 
say that Hanslick has exerted more direct influence on 
 
156 Crawford, 176. 
157 Geoffrey Payzant, translator’s preface to On the Musically Beautiful 
by Eduard Hanslick (Indianpolis:  Hackett Publishing Co., 1986), xv-xvi. 
158 Scruton and Kivy have both engaged with Hanslick’s thought:  Scruton 
in his Aesthetics of Music, and Kivy in Sound Sentiment, Music Alone, 
and in the essays “Something I’ve always wanted to know about Hanslick,” 
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musical aesthetics, broadly construed, than has Kant.  (If 
nothing else, Hanslick is a lively writer and his ideas are 
fairly accessible.)  We will see that despite the 
similarities between their positions, some of Kant’s most 
important and promising insights are not to be found in 
Hanslick.  In particular, we cannot find in Hanslick either 
the notion that beauty inspires the free play of cognitive 
faculties, or the potentially richer understanding of 
formalism present in Kant’s work.159 
 There are several specific points of agreement between 
Kant and Hanslick.  Like Kant, Hanslick regards the 
appreciation of music as primarily a cognitive activity, 
saying that music is composed not for the eardrum but for 
the auditory imagination.160  Hanslick considers the pleasure 
brought about by listening to music to be cognitive in 
nature:  Instead of wallowing in feeling, “to take pleasure 
in one’s own mental alertness in the worthiest, the 
wholesomest, and not the easiest manner of listening to 
music.”161  Furthermore, Hanslick shares Kant’s preference 
for disinterested aesthetic interpretation.  Pure, 
contemplative hearing is the only “artistic, true” form.162  
 
and “What was Hanslick denying?” both in The Fine Art of Repetition, 
265-275 and 276-295). 
159 See Peter Kivy, “Kant and the Affektenlehre: What He Said, and What I 
Wish He Had Said,” in The Fine Art of Repetition, 263-64; and Higgins, 
The Music of Our Lives, 72-80. 
160 Eduard Hanslick, On the Musically Beautiful, trans. Geoffrey Payzant 
(Indianpolis:  Hackett Publishing Co., 1986), 30.   
161 Hanslick, 64-65. 
162 Hanslick, 63. 
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In an aesthetic inquiry, one should not take into 
consideration anything pertaining to the personal 
circumstances and historical background of the composer.  
Rather, one hears and believes only what the artwork itself 
has to say.163 
 According to Hanslick, the beauty of a piece of music 
is specifically musical; that is, it is inherent in the 
tonal relations without reference to any extramusical 
content.164  While music can suggest ideas and convey the 
“motion” of feelings, these ideas and feelings are not 
thereby the content of the music.165  Rather, the content of 
music is structural and inherent in its “tonally moving 
forms.”  Hanslick seems to want to limit musical structure 
to those elements conveyed by the score – melody, harmony, 
and rhythm.166  Accordingly, he makes a sharp distinction 
between “the music itself” and other aspects of the 
aesthetic experience of listening to music.  Our feelings 
and mental images are “frequently misled” by verbal texts, 
titles, and other “merely incidental associations of ideas,” 
which we are “wrongly inclined” to ascribe to the music 
itself.167 
 We are reminded of elements of both Kivy’s and 
Scruton’s positions by this brief overview of Hanslick.  In 
 
163 Hanslick, 39. 
164 Hanslick, xxiii (Foreword to the Eighth Edition). 
165 Hanslick, 10-11. 
166 Hanslick, 28-29. 
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particular, I am thinking of Scruton’s resistance to the 
notion of musical representation, his contention that 
melody, harmony, and movement belong to the essence of 
music, and his construal of meaning as the intentional 
object of perception.  Kivy’s attempt to distinguish “music 
alone” from other music and his denial of musical content 
would also meet with Hanslick’s approval.  However it should 
be noted that Kivy and Scruton are much more philosophically 
sophisticated than Hanslick, and that Kivy’s “enhanced” 
formalism escapes some of the problems inherent in 
Hanslick’s more austere version.  Perhaps most crucially, 
both Kivy and Scruton reject Hanslick’s insistence on the 
primacy of “deliberate pure contemplation” of music, with 
“pure” opposed to “pathological” or affective.  Kivy holds 
that the recognition of emotion in music is essential for 
understanding, and Scruton’s account of involvement with 
music is based on a notion of sympathy.   
However both Kivy and Scruton are prey to some of the 
same worries that plague Hanslick’s austere formalism.  In 
the discussion of Scruton in Chapter 3 we saw that his 
conception of the musical object and of musical meaning were 
meager and underdeveloped, given the social and moral 
significance he accorded music.  In Chapter 4 we noted that 
Kivy had trouble reconciling his feeling that some music was 
profound with his denial of musical content.  Furthermore, 
 
167 Hanslick, 6. 
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Kivy’s distinction between “music alone” and music with 
text, title, or program, was seen to be problematic.   
In contrast to a formalist approach to art, in a 
semiotic account such as Goodman’s, art is considered as a 
symbol system.  Symbolic relations within artworks and 
between elements of an artwork and the world are the focus 
of attention.  The way we come to appreciate such symbolic 
relations is through engagement with the work, including 
engagement with its perceptual qualities.  A semiotic 
approach, construed in a such a way that the symbolic is 
approached through a work’s formal properties, would seem 
better able to make sense of the listening experience.  A 
formalist account would have us concentrate on certain 
features of artworks; some formalists, like Hanslick, would 
even encourage us to censor those responses which were not 
prompted by approved features.168  A semiotic account, on the 
other hand, preserves the strengths of a formalist position 
– the importance of engagement with a work’s perceptual 
qualities – and would not seem to share the weaknesses of 
formalism.   
 
168 At least, the desirability of censoring such responses is implied in 
Hanslick’s rhetoric.  Consider, for example, the following description 
of listeners whose attitude to music is pathological or affective, 
rather than contemplative:  “Slouched dozing in their chairs, these 
enthusiasts allow themselves to brood and sway in response to the 
vibrations of tones, instead of contemplating tones attentively.  […]  
These people make up the most “appreciative” audience and the one most 
likely to bring music into disrepute.  The aesthetical criterion of 
intellectual pleasure is lost to them; for all they know, a fine cigar 
or a piquant delicacy or a warm bath produces the same effect as a 
symphony.”  Hanslick, 59. 
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For example, one of the difficulties with formalism is 
that it is difficult on such an account to connect our 
encounter with an artwork with the wider range of our 
experience.  According to a semiotic approach, appreciation 
of a work’s symbolic character can be enhanced by attention 
to its historical and cultural context, as well as 
speculation as to the artist’s likely intentions.  (Recall 
that for Goodman any knowledge a person has about an artwork 
can effect how she sees it, while according to Hanslick, we 
should attempt to forget what we may know about a composer’s 
historical and cultural context.)  A semiotic approach to 
art thus provides for a potentially richer experience than 
does a formalist approach.  Furthermore, a semiotic account 
can better account for the feelings we sometimes get that 
there is more to an artwork than given in immediate 
perception. 
5.4 Aesthetic Ideas 
 Aesthetic ideas and rational ideas are counterparts of 
one another, comparable to two sides of a coin.  A rational 
idea is a concept of the mind to which no sensible intuition 
or representation of the imagination can be adequate.  
Kant’s example of a rational idea is the kingdom of the 
blessed.  An aesthetic idea is a (sensible) representation 
of the imagination which brings about much thought, but to 
which no definite thought or concept is commensurate.  It is 
difficult to provide an example of an aesthetic idea, as 
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they cannot be completely compassed and made intelligible by 
language (§49).   
 According to Kant, the poet (one is tempted to say, the 
creative artist more generally), tries to express rational 
ideas by using sensory means.  That is, he tries to give the 
appearance of objective reality to certain concepts which 
lie beyond the bounds of experience.  Or, if the artist 
deals with things of which experience is possible – death, 
the emotions, vice, etc., he tries to present these things 
with a “completeness” they lack in nature.  In this type of 
creative work, the artist’s faculty of aesthetical ideas is 
manifest (§49).   
 Closely linked to aesthetical ideas are the aesthetical 
attributes.  These are forms which the artist uses to make 
us think of rational ideas.  The aesthetical attributes are 
“approximate representations of the imagination” and express 
the consequences bound up with a given concept and its 
relationship to other concepts.  However the aesthetical 
attributes do not simply present given concepts.  These 
concepts, as rational ideas, cannot be adequately 
represented; and if these concepts are given in experience, 
they lack a certain completeness.  The aesthetical 
attributes of rational ideas “furnish” aesthetic ideas; that 
is, they enliven the mind by alerting it to the possibility 
of unlimited range of related representations (§49).  
Because aesthetic ideas are representations of the 
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imagination for which an adequate concept can never be 
found, they cannot be cognized as knowledge.  Similarly, a 
rational idea can not be cognized as knowledge because it 
involves a concept corresponding to which no intuition can 
be given.  Aesthetic ideas are inexponible (ineffable) 
representations of the imagination, meaning that they cannot 
be conveyed to others through language (§57, Remark I).   
 Kant’s examples of aesthetical attributes are not very 
illuminating:  The aesthetical attribute of the king of 
heaven (a rational idea) is Jupiter’s eagle with lightning 
in its claws.  By way of further explication he analyzes a 
poem by Frederick the Great which many subsequent 
commentators have found notable only for its banality (§49).  
I will try to offer a more illustrative example:  “The act 
of Divine creation” is a rational idea which is not given in 
experience.  Michelangelo tried to evoke or “realize to 
sense” this idea in his well-known fresco of two 
outstretched hands about to touch one another (God’s hand 
touching Adam’s).  The aesthetic ideas expressed by the 
fresco – impossible to convey adequately in language - might 
include the God’s benevolence and wisdom, the fundamentally 
dependent and contingent nature of human life, and the 
perfection of divine design.  The aesthetical attribute by 
which these ideas are evoked is the form of Michelangelo’s 
fresco; that is, the perceptual qualities inherent in it and 
their relations to one another, as perceived by a subject. 
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 Kant indicates that music can express aesthetic ideas: 
 
Thus as modulation is, as it were, a universal language 
of sensations intelligible to every man, the art of 
tone employs it by itself alone in its full force, viz. 
as a language of the affections, and thus communicates 
universally according to the laws of association the 
aesthetical ideas naturally combined therewith.  Now 
these aesthetical ideas are not concepts or determinate 
thoughts.  Hence the form of the composition of these 
sensations (harmony and melody) only serves instead of 
the form of language, by means of their proportionate 
accordance, to express the aesthetical idea of a 
connected whole of an unspeakable wealth of thought, 
corresponding to a certain theme which produces the 
dominating affection in the piece (§53). 
 
We see here Kant’s acceptance of the notion of a 
universal “language of passions,” conveyed through the 
intonation of the speaking voice, which can in turn be 
expressed in music.  In commenting on this passage, Kivy 
claims that, with the integration of the notion of aesthetic 
ideas, Kant transforms the “shopworn” 18th century notion of 
the Affectenlehre into something “entirely novel” and 
“indelibly marked with the signature of the third 
Critique.”169  However Kivy’s enthusiasm is short-lived, as 
Kant seems to back away from the insights expressed above in 
favour of a physicalistic account of musical experience: 
It is not the judging the harmony in tones or sallies 
of wit, which serves only in combination with their 
beauty as a necessary vehicle, but the furtherance of 
the vital bodily processes, the affection that moves 
the intestines and the diaphragm – in a word, the 
feeling of health [… .]  In music, this play proceeds 
from bodily sensations to aesthetical ideas (the 
objects of our affections), and then from these back 
again to the body with redoubled force (§54).  
 
 
169 Kivy, “Kant and the Affektenlehre.,” 252-53. 
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According to Kivy, this passage gives us “nothing more 
than the standard, pre-critical explanation in the British 
manner,” which Kant had already put behind him in the 
“Analytic of the Beautiful.”170  Kivy conjectures that Kant 
failed to live up to the promise of his earlier insights 
about music and aesthetical ideas (§53, quoted above), 
because of his “almost complete ignorance” of music as an 
art, including his ignorance of the larger elements of 
musical form.171  What Kant was groping towards in his 
application of aesthetic ideas to music, Kivy believes, is 
an attempt to capture “that feeling of logical coherence we 
have, but cannot state in conceptual terms, in a well 
wrought musical structure, a feeling of connected 
discourse….”172 
I cannot share Kivy’s view that the aesthetical ideas 
which Kant thought music able to convey were ideas related 
(exclusively) to its formal structure.  For one thing, if 
Kant really was as ignorant of music’s formal properties as 
Kivy and other commentators believe, it would seem unlikely 
that he would elevate musical form to the status of an 
aesthetic idea.  None of the examples which Kant gives of 
rational ideas have to do with the form of an artwork.  Form 
rather pertains to the aesthetic attributes – those features 
of an artwork which get us to think of aesthetic ideas.  It 
 
170 Kivy, “Kant and the Affektenlehre.,” 258. 
171 Kivy, “Kant and the Affektenlehre.,” 263. 
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seems more likely that the “connected whole of an 
unspeakable wealth of thought” is linked specifically to the 
expressive properties of music.  The aesthetical ideas in 
music do, after all, correspond to a theme “which produces 
the dominating affection in the piece.”173  Perhaps Kant’s 
linkage of the aesthetical ideas conveyed in music to 
“bodily sensations” (§54, quoted above), is an 
underdeveloped attempt to provide a stronger physical basis 
for the natural and transcultural effect of music on the 
emotions.  
 Kivy rejects the notion that Kant sought, in his 
doctrine of aesthetic ideas, to ascribe a content to 
music.174  Yet we can question the view that Kant meant the 
aesthetic ideas conveyed by music to be its form only, 
without thereby suspecting Kant of attributing content to 
music.  The fact that Kant was unlikely to have thought that 
music possessed semantic content need not stop us from using 
his doctrine of aesthetic ideas to make sense of some 
listeners’ propensity to hear music as meaning-bearing.  
Setting aside the question of content and thinking of 
Goodman’s notion of art as a symbolic system may help here.  
Perhaps the aesthetic ideas are what music denotes, yet the 
symbol system is dense rather than articulate, so we can 
never say exactly what music conveys.  That is, there is no 
 
172 Kivy, “Kant and the Affektenlehre.,” 256. 
173 I assume that by “theme” Kant is here referring to a musical theme. 
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one-to-one relationship between the elements of the music 
and of the world.  Each musical work can be seen as having a 
different symbolic structure and as utilizing different 
semantic relationships.  The denotative relationships which 
are found in artworks - representation, expression, and 
exemplification - are not universal or immutable.  They must 
be “decoded” in each artwork we encounter, although 
knowledge of the artistic tradition and operative 
conventions will help us gain a better understanding of the 
work in question.  For example, an ascending chromatic 
passage need not signify the same thing in works by 
different composers, nor even in works by the same composer, 
nor even twice in the same work.  Semantic density ensures 
that we will never be able to say exactly what a particular 
musical passage conveys.   
 I do not mean to suggest that Kant had anything like 
Goodman’s account of art as a symbol system in mind, or that 
Goodman needs Kant’s analysis of aesthetic ideas to round 
out his own thought.  However bringing the two together in 
such a way is suggestive and is not precluded by anything 
either says.  If we take seriously Kant’s contention that 
music denotes aesthetic ideas, and accept Goodman’s claim 
that the symbol systems of artworks are dense rather than 
 
174 Kivy, “Kant and the Affektenlehre.,” 254-55. 
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articulate, we can begin to see why some ascribe semantic 
content to music.175 
5.5 The Sublime 
 The beautiful and the sublime have much in common: both 
please in themselves and both presuppose judgements of 
reflection (§23).  That is, in both types of judgements, a 
particular is given, and a universal has to be found for it 
(§IV).  However the beautiful and the sublime are 
importantly different in a number of ways.  For one, the 
beautiful is connected with the form of an object, while the 
sublime is found in formless objects.  Furthermore, the 
sublime is incompatible with charm; we saw above that charm 
could add to our appreciation of a beautiful object’s form.  
In judgements of the sublime, however, the mind is 
alternately attracted and repelled by the object (§23).  
 The chaos and disorder of nature arouse the feeling of 
the sublime within us, provided that we also perceive 
nature’s size and might (§23). Among Kant’s favourite 
examples of phenomena which occasion judgments of the 
sublime are mountains, the raging sea, the vast starry sky, 
and violent weather patterns.  Although much of Kant’s 
discussion of the sublime centers on the sublime in nature, 
he does not preclude the possibility that artificial objects 
might occasion judgements of the sublime.  Indeed his 
 
175 In the following chapter, I consider in greater detail the propensity 
of some listeners to ascribe semantic content to music. 
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inclusion of the pyramids and St. Peter’s in Rome among 
examples of the sublime suggests as much (§26).   Kant 
focuses on the sublime in nature, as the sublime in art is 
“limited by the conditions of agreement with nature” (§23).  
The presentation of the sublime in fine art may be combined 
with beauty to form a tragedy in verse, a didactic poem, or 
an oratorio.  In these combinations, fine art is even more 
artistic (§53).176 
The fact that a judgement of the beautiful can be made 
presupposes that the mind is in a state of restful 
contemplation, and this mental repose is maintained 
throughout the judgement.  A characteristic feature of 
judgements of the sublime, however, is the “movement” that 
the mind makes in contemplating the object.  This movement 
is referred through the imagination, either to the faculty 
of cognition, or to the faculty of desire.  In the first 
case the judgement is of the mathematically sublime; in the 
second, of the dynamically sublime (§24).   
Both types of judgements of the sublime are related in 
a distinct way to our mental powers, as well as to our 
understanding of ourselves as rational beings, and 
especially as moral rational beings.  Nature is 
 
176 Schueller doubts that Kant thought an art could be sublime, as a 
defining characteristic of objects which arouse sublimity is 
formlessness (243).  I am not sure what to make of this apparent 
contradiction in Kant’s writing.  As Schueller points out, judgements of 
the sublime are subjective and based on feelings.  Perhaps the 
“formlessness” of an object is the result of seeing it a certain way.  
Schueller suggests as much, as we will see.  
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mathematically sublime in those of its phenomena, “whose 
intuition brings with it the idea of its infinity.”  We 
contemplate certain objects without reference to their form; 
the mind “abandons itself” to the imagination and to reason.  
The mind finds the whole power of the imagination inadequate 
to its ideas and feels itself raised in its judgement (§26).  
An example of a judgement of the mathematically sublime 
might be the experience of contemplating a vast plain, 
stretching flat in all directions as far as the eye can see.  
We do not measure the plain or examine it according to any 
idea of what a plain should be like; we merely try to take 
in the vast space.  The possibility of actually experiencing 
infinite space challenges the limits of the imagination, yet 
we can understand the idea of infinite space well enough.  
The mind enjoys the feeling of its own power, and this 
feeling is the basis of judgements of the sublime. 
In judgements of the dynamically sublime, the object is 
considered in an aesthetic judgement as something mighty or 
powerful which has no dominion over us.  In such cases, the 
object is regarded as fearful, although we are not actually 
afraid of it.  The object calls up the power in us of 
considering the things we care about (life and health, for 
example) as unimportant in comparison, yet regarding the 
might of the object as nonetheless without dominion over us.  
The mind thus feels the sublimity of its purpose, in 
comparison with the object itself, (which lacks such a 
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purpose) (§28).  Imagine watching and listening to a 
thunderstorm from the safety of your home.  You realize that 
if the storm were a few miles closer, your house would risk 
being struck by lightning and burnt to the ground.  This 
thought causes a feeling of displeasure.  The feeling of 
being safe at home and out of immediate danger is necessary 
for the feeling of the sublime, but not the immediate reason 
for that feeling. Rather, the feeling of the sublime is the 
respect you have for nature as a superior force, combined 
with the realization that a part of you is “supersensible” – 
not subject to the laws of nature and thus potentially 
autonomous.   
 The judgement of the sublime needs culture; without the 
development of moral ideas, those objects which occasion 
judgements of the sublime would be merely terrible.  Yet the 
feeling of the sublime is not therefore primarily produced 
by culture and conventional.  Rather, it is rooted in human 
nature, perhaps in the universal tendency to what is moral 
(§29). 
 Schueller has made some interesting applications of 
Kant’s analysis of the sublime to musical experience.  
First, he questions Kant’s claim that objects which occasion 
judgements of the sublime such as mountains are really 
“formless.”  It would seem rather that the form of a 
mountain is ideal, since we cannot see it all at once.  
Sublimity may then be the feeling that certain immense 
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objects elude us in immediate perception, only to be 
captured as remembered experience or imagined form.  He 
gives the example of listening to Wagner’s Ring cycle as 
such an experience which eludes us only to be “grasped” 
later.  (If you don’t like Wagner, think instead of Mozart’s 
Requiem or Bach’s Well-Tempered Clavier.)  Such “noble” 
musical works can arouse the feeling that an overwhelming 
object eludes us temporarily, yet tests our capacities.  
Kant’s distinction of the beautiful from the sublime, then, 
suggests that there are two mutually exclusive (but usually 
combined) ways of judging art:  According to form (beauty) 
and according to intensity of subjective emotional response 
(sublimity).  An art object such as a Beethoven symphony can 
combine beauty and sublimity by combining (small scale) form 
with more elusive (large scale) “formlessness” and with the 
emotions aroused by that which appears greater than us.177  
In Schueller’s own words, 
If the feeling of the sublime is the awareness by the 
mind of its own, orderly, moral superiority to formless 
nature, then surely music can be sublime too just 
because it is the least “graspable” and the most 
abstract of the arts.  It can give one the feeling that 
it is beyond form.  It can give the feeling of the 
formless, of the discrepancies of the parts, in Kant’s 
terms, especially if it is the feeling of the occasion, 
not of the form itself, which defines sublimity.178 
 
 I find Schueller’s application of Kant’s notion of the 
sublime to music to be compelling, whether or not Kant would 
 
177 Schueller, 244-45. 
178 Schueller, 245. 
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have sanctioned such an application.  (Parret has 
conjectured that the music that Kant could have loved, and 
would have judged sublime, had not yet been written.  He 
gives the music of Mahler, Richard Strauss’s Alpensymphonie 
and Beethoven’s Pastoral symphony as examples.)179  Sometimes 
we do indeed have the feeling that we have not understood a 
piece of music, although it was not particularly difficult 
to follow.  Some type of “meaning” has escaped us.  Yet the 
feeling is not one of outright perplexity, such that we do 
not want to ever hear the piece again.  (We do, of course, 
sometimes have that reaction, but I am setting aside such 
cases for the moment.)  If Kant’s notion of the sublime does 
account for some aspects of aesthetic experience, it is 
tempting to apply it here.180 
 
 While an assessment of Kant’s aesthetics as applied to 
music has not been my intention in this chapter, still less 
a general appraisal of the Third Critique, I have found it 
to be extremely fruitful in its application to the problem 
of musical understanding.  Kant’s formalism is rich and 
nuanced enough to elude many of the difficulties which 
plague other versions of formalism, most notably Hanslick’s.  
One virtue of Kant’s formalism is that, in the doctrine of 
aesthetic ideas, it leaves open the possibility that a 
 
179 Parret, 252-53. 
180 I say more about this in chapter 6, section 3d. 
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semiotic approach to art can be pursued in conjunction with 
the strengths of a formalist account.   
Another virtue of Kant’s account of aesthetic 
experience is that such experiences are founded on pleasure, 
and hence are affective by their very nature.  Even the 
comparatively more sophisticated versions of formalism 
suggested by Scruton and Kivy were found liable to 
difficulties which Kant’s formalism escaped.  In particular, 
both Scruton and Kivy accord music considerable 
significance; Scruton is convinced that music is of social 
and moral importance, and Kivy believes that music can be 
profound.  Yet it is only in Kant’s version of formalism 
(with its attendant doctrine of the sublime and connection 
between the rational, the moral, and aesthetic judgements) 
that music can really be seen as having significance beyond 
the audible.   
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Chapter 6  
The Experience of Understanding Music 
 So far I have examined in detail four thorough-going 
and astute, yet contrasting, accounts of aesthetic 
understanding as applied to music, three of them 
contemporary.  In this chapter I shall present my own view 
of musical understanding, drawing on the strengths of these 
analyses, and hoping to avoid some of their weaknesses.  
Understanding the music of one’s own cultural tradition 
may seem so transparent as to require no elucidation or 
explanation.  Yet it is also clear that unfamiliar music, be 
it from another culture or from the work of composers who 
challenge one’s own tradition, can elude understanding on 
initial (and subsequent) hearing.  What then is the 
difference between understanding and failing to understand 
as musical experiences?  In section one of chapter one I 
suggested that, based on Socrates’ discussion of knowledge 
in the Theaetetus, an account of understanding implies an 
account of misunderstanding, and that an analysis of musical 
misunderstanding will help us to arrive at an account of 
musical understanding.  
 An important desideratum of an account of musical 
understanding is that it be sufficiently detailed and 
nuanced so as to be able to comprehend the experience of 
listeners with diverse musical backgrounds and different 
degrees of technical expertise.  One of the problems we saw 
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with Scruton’s account of understanding music was that, 
although his analysis ultimately relied on there being 
different levels of understanding, the differences between 
these levels were not made explicit.  Jerrold Levinson’s 
analysis of the “ordinary listener’s” experience in his 
Music in the Moment, also suffers, I think, from a similar 
failure to delineate levels of understanding.  Yet not all 
differences in musical understanding necessarily correspond, 
as Stephen Davies, Michael Tanner, and Mark DeBellis have 
suggested, with differences in listeners’ technical 
musicological knowledge.  
I will argue that a continuum of two levels of 
understanding music can be distinguished.  These are 
hierarchical in the sense that the first is foundational, 
and without it the second cannot be reached.  The first 
level is hearing the music as music (rather than as sounds), 
which I will call “recognitional understanding.”181  At this 
level, the listener can hear a series of tones as a rhythmic 
and melodic gestalt, and understand a minimum of expressive 
and gestural characteristics.  Virtually all cognitively 
normal members of a given musical tradition can understand 
the music of their own culture or sub-culture in this way.  
 
181 By “recognitional understanding” I do not mean simply that listeners 
recognize that there is music in their vicinity; they must also hear the 
sounds identified as music, that is, as forming a rhythmic and melodic 
gestalt.  It is possible to hear sounds (say, coming from an open 
window), recognize that it is music, yet not hear the tones as forming 
such a gestalt.  The hypothetical listener might think, “Some people 
regard these sounds as music, but they do not make sense to me.” 
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The second level - which I will call “enhanced 
understanding” – entails greater sensitivity to the music’s 
expressive character, being able to place the music in an 
appropriate historical context (hearing it “as” Baroque 
rather than late romantic, for example), and some awareness 
of musical form, including knowledge of how the music is put 
together.  
Alongside these two levels, that is, neither above nor 
below them, is a third aspect of musical understanding, 
which I will call “interpretive understanding.”  Listening 
to music, we sometimes get the sense that the music is 
“profound” or has something to say, if only we could grasp 
it.  I want to explore what this might mean, and what an 
adequate account of such “understanding” might entail.  I 
have resisted characterizing interpretive understanding as a 
“level” of understanding because I do not see it as better 
or more advanced than the two types of understanding already 
mentioned.  Interpretive understanding is in one sense 
superior to recognitional understanding, as the first 
presupposes the second.  But I do not want to suggest that a 
listener who can hear music as music, yet has no sense that 
the music might have “something to say” is inferior to one 
who has this sense.  I am trying to make sense of an 
existing phenomenon (the variety of responses to music) 
rather than to recommend particular listening strategies.  
Nor do I suggest that these three aspects of understanding 
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are exhaustive; other responses, more or less cognitive, are 
available. 
For musical understanding of any sort, involvement with 
the music is crucial, and part of my task will be to analyze 
the nature of that involvement.  First I will develop the 
notions of recognitional and enhanced understanding.  Then, 
by way of moving toward an account of interpretive 
understanding, I will examine philosophical debates over the 
possibility of music’s cognitive content.  If arguments 
against the possibility of extra-musical content are 
decisive, we may have to think twice about the status of 
interpretive understanding.  Finally, I will offer an 
account of the nature of involvement in the listening 
experience. 
6.1  Two Levels of Musical Understanding 
What I have called recognitional understanding 
involves, at a minimum, hearing music as music.  The 
listener must be able to follow the music and hear a series 
of tones as rhythmic.  He or she recognizes the beginning, 
course, and ending of melodies, and hears tones which sound 
together, where appropriate, as harmonies.  In addition, the 
listener is able to detect some large scale relationships 
within the music (repeats of sections, for example), and to 
distinguish between significant and insignificant features 
of what is heard. 
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 Virtually all cognitively normal people understand 
culturally familiar music at this basic level.182  Indeed, 
there is evidence from developmental psychology which 
suggests that infants as young as six months possess adult-
like musical processing capacities.183  While humans seem to 
possess the cognitive capacities to comprehend music from a 
very young age, musical understanding is shaped through 
exposure to the music of one’s culture.  There is some 
interesting research in this area:  Infants were found to 
exhibit comparable processing capacities for melodies based 
on diatonic and non-diatonic scales.  Western infants and 
musically untrained adults were tested for their ability to 
detect subtle pitch changes to simple rise-fall melodies 
consisting of notes from the diatonic major scale or from 
the Javanese pélog scale.  While adults performed better on 
the major than on the pélog scale, infants performed equally 
well on the two distinct scale types.  The findings suggest 
that both scales begin on an equal footing for 
 
182 The “tune deaf” or those suffering from dysmelodia lack the ability 
to recognize wrong notes in simple tonal melodies.  H. Kalmus and D.B. 
Fry who studied tune deafness in Britain estimate the frequency of tune 
deafness there to be 4.2% of adults of both sexes.  They found that tune 
deafness was more closely related to tonal memory than either was to 
pitch discrimination, and suggest that the material defect underlying 
tone deafness in a deficiency in gestalt perception, probably located in 
the cerebral cortex, as opposed to a defect in the ear.  See H. Kalmus 
and D.B. Fry, “On Tune Deafness (dysmelodia):  Frequency, development, 
genetics and musical background,” Annals of Human Genetics 43 (1980):  
369-82. 
183 See Sandra E. Trehub, “The World of Infants:  A World of Music,” 
Early Childhood Connections (Fall 1996):  27-34; and Sandra E. Trehub, 
G. Schellenberg, and D. Hill, “The Origins of Music Perception and 
Cognition:  A Developmental Perspective” in Perception and Cognition of 
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unacculturated listeners, but culture-specific experience 
enhances one in relation to the other.184  
My characterization of recognitional understanding 
implies that music, once understood, makes sense:  the tones 
form a rhythmic and melodic gestalt.  Beginnings and endings 
of melodies do not seem arbitrary, but follow a sort of 
coherent plan.  Tones do not simply sound together randomly, 
but form intelligible harmonies.  With such harmonic and 
melodic gestalts readily apparent, the gross emotional and 
gestural character of the music is also evident.  I have 
said nothing about the need for the listener to recover the 
structure or “grammar” of the music – the formal   thought 
process embedded in the composition.  For recognitional 
understanding the listener need not be able to pick out the 
theme of a fugue or the tones employed in a tone row.  
Tonally unfamiliar music, be it atonal art music or 
music of a different culture, can be difficult to comprehend 
even at the level of recognitional understanding.  Some 
examples of my own experience with musical understanding 
might help here, but I should briefly defend this course of 
action.  Because I am interested in music as heard, it makes 
sense to pay close attention to listeners’ concrete 
 
Music eds. Irène Deliège and John Sloboda (Psychology Press, 1977), 103-
28. 
184 Sandra E. Trehub, et. al., “Music and Speech Processing in the First 
Year of Life,” Advances in Child Development and Behavior 24 (1993):  
22-23.  The research discussed is M.P. Lynch, et. al., “Innateness, 
experience, and musical perception,” Psychological Science 1 (1990):  
272-76. 
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experience.  I do not (and cannot) claim that my experience 
of the following musical examples will conform to everyone 
else’s experiences of them, nor that I am a “typical” 
listener.  Yet I do not believe that my responses will be 
wildly idiosyncratic either.  As someone with a basic 
background in the history of western tonal music and some 
familiarity with twentieth century developments, I might be 
better prepared than certain listeners, and assuredly know 
less and am less well prepared than a great many others.  
While caution must be exercised in drawing general 
inferences about the phenomenon of musical understanding 
from the experience of a single listener, one listener’s 
experience seems a reasonable place to start.  
The first composition I propose to consider is the 
symphony in C major by Joseph Martin Kraus (1756-92), a 
Swedish contemporary of Mozart.185  I will then turn to music 
which seems likely to present greater challenges to 
understanding.  Specifically, I will examine Alban Berg’s 
Three Pieces for Orchestra (atonal art music) and some 
Georgian folk songs (culturally and tonally different from 
either).  
Until I was given the CD of Kraus’s work, I had never 
heard of him and was unfamiliar with his music.  Yet before 
even taking the disc from its case, I had some idea of what 
 
185 Kraus, Tre symfonier, Uvertyr till Olympie performed by the Svenska 
Kammarorkestern with Petter Sundkvist conducting (Naxos 8.553734S). 
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the symphony would sound like.  I knew from my previous 
exposure to tonal music that C major is a “bright” key, I 
could assume that Kraus would likely sound something like 
other 18th century composers with whom I was more familiar, 
and I thought it likely that I would be familiar with the 
instruments used to perform the symphony.  
My expectations turned out to be correct.  Within a 
measure or two, I could place the slow and stately music as 
in the classical style, somewhat reminiscent of Haydn.  
After the statement of the first theme (the upcoming ending 
signaled by a diminuendo), there was a slight pause, 
followed by the statement of the second, faster, theme.  I 
knew that the pause was just that – a pause and not an 
ending.  As the first movement progressed, I was aware of a 
sense of direction; things were moving forward.  When the 
ending of each of the three movements came, I recognized 
that this was the ending – the music did not stop abruptly 
but came to a musically appropriate close.  Throughout each 
movement, I could readily distinguish the melody from its 
accompaniment.  This was so even when the melody was passed 
between different sections, and even when, as in the second 
movement, the accompanying strings and harpsichord were 
slightly louder than the flutes which carried the melody.  
The emotional character of the symphony was not particularly 
marked and did not strike me as especially important.  If 
pressed, I would say that the first movement was happy and 
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triumphant, the second somewhat yearning, and the third 
joyful (due to its skipping, accented rhythm.)  
In being able to place the music historically, and hear 
it as in the classical style rather than baroque or 
romantic, I displayed some elements of “enhanced”  as 
opposed to merely “recognitional” understanding.  A more 
sophisticated listener with greater enhanced understanding 
would be able to identify the symphony’s underlying harmonic 
progressions and better understand how the music was put 
together.  Such a listener might also be able to make 
intelligent comparisons between different performances of 
the same composition, as well as among different works by 
the same composer.  For the latter, she would need to have a 
sense of large-scale musical form, and the various 
challenges facing the composer of the symphony, the 
overture, the string quartet, etc.186  Enhanced understanding 
also demands the recognition and comprehension of extra-
musical references:  representational elements, quotations, 
etc.  (These were absent in the symphony under 
consideration, as far as I could tell.)  
 
186 Stephen Davies has stressed that knowledge of how a particular work 
(say, a sonata) differs from others of its kind, and in turn a grasp of 
what distinguishes one musical kind from another (say, a quartet from an 
overture) is fundamental to musical understanding.  See his “Musical 
Understanding and Musical Kinds,” Journal of Aesthetics and Art 
Criticism 52:1 (Winter 1994):  69-82.  While such knowledge is 
undoubtedly important and would enhance the listening experience, I 
cannot see it as fundamental to basic understanding.  If it were, we 
would have to say that few listeners besides musicologists understood 
music, which seems deeply implausible. 
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Turning now to more challenging music, I had listened 
(in passing) to Berg’s Three Pieces for Orchestra (op. 6) a 
few times before making an effort to understand it.187  My 
usual reaction on hearing the work would be mild irritation 
and impatience.  I got into the habit of skipping over it 
and listening instead to the performance of Berg’s concerto 
for violin and orchestra included on the same CD.  As an 
experiment, but also in the hope of better appreciating a 
composer whose work others I respected found compelling, I 
resolved to listen more closely in an effort to better 
understand the Three Pieces.  
The first piece (“Prelude”) begins very softly with 
muffled percussion.  Since becoming more familiar with 
composers who experiment with extreme dynamic ranges and 
contrasts, I have found that very quiet music has a similar 
effect to that of whispering in a crowed room – I find 
myself drawn in, straining to hear what is going on.188  
Paying attention in this way, I began to find myself drawn 
into the music as it got increasingly louder and more 
complex, and other instruments joined the percussion.  While 
I could not discern an obvious theme or tonality, I became 
able to recognize repeated motifs and felt a sense of 
progression in the music.  I became able to hear how the 
 
187 Deutsche Grammophon Classikon 439 435-2, the Berlin Philharmonic 
conducted by Herbert von Karajan. 
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music built in volume to a cymbal crash, and them died away 
to finish softly, as it began, with muffled percussion.  On 
repeated listening, then, I was able to discern structure in 
the music.  
The second piece (“Rounds”) was lighter than the first, 
and I could discern disconnected snatches of melody first in 
the strings, and then in the flutes.  A haunting melody 
played by a solo violin was “taken over” by another motif 
played by louder instruments.  Unlike with the Kraus 
symphony, I had no sense of one theme ceding gracefully to 
another – the music seemed to be somehow in constant 
struggle.  At one point, the music died away and I thought 
that the piece had ended.  After more attentive listening 
this pause no longer fooled me.  The “real” ending when it 
came was signaled by a descending passage of harmonics on 
the strings, which was later taken up softly by the brass, 
with the accompanying strings continuing to play 
harmonics.189  
I will not say too much about the third piece (“March”) 
which I have found the most recalcitrant to understanding.  
This may be because it is almost twice as long as the first 
two pieces, or because there is little discernable melody 
 
188 I am thinking here especially of the work of contemporary Georgian 
composer Giya Kancheli, whose CD’s typically come with a warning about 
not playing them too loudly on headphones! 
189 A “harmonic” or “flageolet tone” is a ghostly sound achieved by 
touching the finger gently on the string at some point (rather than 
fully depressing the string.)  These are rare in violin music before the 
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which one might follow.  I knew enough of Berg’s music not 
to expect a traditional march, and sure enough, there were 
only hints and indications of a march (an underlying march 
rhythm which came and went), coupled with the music’s 
overall aggressive character.  Despite the chaotic 
foreground, I felt a sense of direction in the music, and 
had a idea of what was the most important thing happening at 
any one time.  
 While I came to a greater familiarity with each of 
these pieces, which in turn led to deeper understanding, the 
first two came to appeal to me in the way that the third did 
not.  I find it difficult to say whether this means that I 
failed in some way to understand the third, or whether I 
simply disliked what I understood.  As the case with the 
Kraus symphony, I have no doubt that a more sophisticated 
listener than myself would be able to come to a better 
understanding of this work and in doing so, enjoy a richer 
aesthetic experience.  Such a listener might be able to pick 
out the specific tonal patterns used by Berg, as well as 
more aware of Berg’s relation to his musico-historical 
context.  Despite my difficulty with the work, I feel that I 
displayed elements of enhanced understanding.  My knowledge 
of sound production on the violin, for example, enabled me 
to pick out and follow the harmonic passages in very short 
 
19th century but become increasingly frequent after, and are used to 
great effect in some 20th century string quartets. 
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order.  A listener without this kind of knowledge might have 
been confused (“what is that high eerie sound?”) and 
distracted from the flow of the music.  
 Finally, I want to briefly discuss my ongoing attempts 
to better understand Georgian folk singing.  I first became 
interested in Georgian musical traditions when I read about 
the importance of singing in a National Geographic article 
on the region.  The author’s claim that the Georgians had a 
“tradition of atonal folk singing” turned out to be not so 
much false as a misapplication of categories.  (While 
Georgian music does not adhere to western diatonic tonality, 
it is not “atonal” in the same sense as western atonal art 
music.)  Since then, I have heard Georgian polyphonic 
singing on various CD’s, as well as performed by travelling 
Georgian choirs and Canadian groups which sing in 
Georgian.190  Most often, the singing is without instrumental 
accompaniment, and there are elements of variation in vocal 
technique, etc. within different areas of the country.  
There are songs for virtually all aspects of traditional 
life, including religious and liturgical songs, work songs, 
agricultural songs, drinking songs, laments, and historical 
songs.  
 
190 Two available CDs of Georgian music are Georgian Voices:  The Rustavi 
Choir  Elektra Nonesuch Explorer Series 9 79224-2 and Georgian Polyphony 
[I]:  Choral music from Caucasia JVC World Series VICG-5003.  Georgian 
choirs are strictly segregated – men and women never sing together.  The 
second CD listed has the advantage of including some performances by a 
women’s choir.  The vast majority of recordings available seem to be of 
men’s choirs only. 
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 At first, most of the harmonies sounded strange to me – 
some strangely beautiful, and others merely odd.  I liked 
some Georgian songs immediately and found them readily 
accessible.  I later learned that these were mainly 
religious and liturgical songs.  Work songs and drinking 
songs were soon readily recognizable as such, mainly due to 
their characteristic rhythms.  Yet I frequently misjudged 
the emotive and gestural character of the music.  I can 
remember hearing a hauntingly beautiful song during a 
concert, and being sure that it must have been a love song 
or lament.  This turned out to be a cow-herding song.  
 How important is it to recognize representational and 
expressive characteristics of music?  Does it matter that I 
sometimes misjudged what type of song I was listening to?  
We will recall that according to Scruton, representational 
elements in music are unimportant; you can hear music as 
music without knowing what, if anything, the music is about. 
Scruton’s example was that it makes no difference to a 
listener if she believes that Strauss’s Don Quixote is about 
the life of a dog – nothing musical is altered.   
At one level, Scruton seems to be correct; not knowing 
the cultural function of the Georgian songs I heard did not 
stop me from appreciating them as music.  I could still 
follow the melodic line and hear the various voices sounding 
together as harmonies.  Yet there is arguably more to the 
appreciation of music than appreciation of sonic qualities.  
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In particular, we need to take seriously the view that music 
is a form of communication.  If Scruton’s claim is 
questionable with regard to art music, it is all the more 
problematic when we consider folk music.  Music and art more 
generally are not things set apart from a group’s general 
culture.  Indeed, music might be seen to reflect the most 
significant preoccupations of social groups.  My difficulty 
discerning the representational and expressive character of 
Georgian songs served to block a richer appreciation of the 
music and of its role in the general culture.  Furthermore, 
if I lack the ability to tell a love song, say, from a cow-
herding song, it follows that I would not be able to compare 
two love songs to one another, or compare a Georgian cow 
herding song with similar songs from Armenia or Azerbaijan.  
As I listened to more and more Georgian singing, the 
harmonies came to sound less odd and made more musical 
sense.  In addition, some aspects of the music which at 
first I had found slightly off-putting – hocketting 
(alteration of tones in the melodic line between different 
voices), yodels, melodic leaps, and drone accompaniment – I 
came to hear differently.  As I paid greater attention, 
these assumed a “fit” with the surrounding music.  However, 
I feel that as much as I enjoy Georgian music, I rarely get 
beyond the stage of recognitional understanding.  No doubt 
that my understanding would be enhanced by ear training, and 
the ability to discern underlying harmonic patterns.  Yet 
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formal training in music is not the only way in which my 
understanding could be improved.  After all, knowing the 
harmonic structure of a song still might leave me unable to 
tell whether I was listening to a lament or an agricultural 
song.  This ability would be more likely enhanced by a 
greater understanding of Georgian culture and traditions.  
 In the musical experiences described – of understanding 
with little difficulty, coming to an increased 
understanding, or feeling that I have failed to understand - 
what exactly have I done?  How has my understanding 
increased, and why as it increased in some case but not in 
others?  Part of the answer, I think, is given in this 
advice from Donald Francis Tovey to readers of the eleventh 
edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica:  
though the music of one age or style may be at first 
unintelligible to a listener who is accustomed to 
another style, and though the listener may help himself 
by acquiring information as to the characteristics and 
meaning of the new style, he will best learn to 
understand it my merely divesting his mind of 
prejudices and allowing the music to make itself 
intelligible by its own self-consistency.191  
 
Tovey, as I read him, seems to be saying that to 
understand unfamiliar music we need to set aside the 
expectations with which we usually listen.  All music has 
its own self-consistency; the rules which underlie the self-
consistency of unfamiliar music are likely to be different 
from those implicit in music to which we are more 
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accustomed.  For example, almost all people in the developed 
west acquire the expectations which underlie the 
intelligibility of music in diatonic tonality.  Music which 
does not adhere to expected tonal patterns – including 
various forms of non-western music, as well as avant-garde 
art music – is likely to sound odd if approached according 
to the norms of diatonic tonality.  For such music to sound 
intelligible, it must be heard according to the expectations 
which inform its own self-consistency.  
Part of what it is to come to a greater understanding 
of music, then, is to alter the expectations with which the 
music is approached.  Returning to the example of my 
experience with Georgian music, I had said that at first 
some of the harmonies sounded odd, and later they seemed to 
make more sense.  Obviously, the tones themselves did not 
change.  Through repeated listening I became better able to 
set aside my prejudices and expectations and let the music 
reveal itself to me.  To put it another way, the music’s 
inner structure became more and more apparent.  Still, this 
is only part of the story; one’s initial approach to music – 
the expectations with which one begins – is only one aspect 
of involvement in the listening experience, and itself needs 
to be seen in light of a wider context.  
 
191 Donald Francis Tovey, “Music – General Sketch,” in Encyclopaedia 
Britannica, 11th ed. 
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In the introductory section to this chapter, I began to 
develop an aspect of understanding that I called 
“interpretive.”  This begins with the sense that there is 
something more to the music that can be grasped simply by 
following it with comprehension.  To make an analogy with 
reading a poem, it is possible to understand the meaning of 
every line of a poem, but nonetheless feel that one’s 
understanding is inadequate.  Take for example, Robert 
Frost’s “Stopping by Woods on a Snowy Evening.”  The poem 
conveys somehow that more is going on than its modest 
depiction of a man riding a horse on a winter night.  I will 
try to suggest reasons why music might also give us this 
feeling, but put off a full discussion until section 6.3. 
6.2 The Debate over “Content” 
 The debate over musical content occurs on two levels:  
Arguments over how best to characterize the “meaning” of 
particular passages, and the meta-question whether it is 
even appropriate to say that music can have an extra-musical 
content.  These questions are too often discussed in 
isolation from one another, the first tending to be the 
preserve of musicologists, and the second of “card-carrying” 
philosophers.  I am more interested in the second question, 
but I am convinced that to come to an adequate answer, the 
variety of listeners’ responses to music must also be taken 
seriously.  So I will begin by quoting some descriptions of 
music as heard. 
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6.2a Some Listeners’ Experience 
 The historian James H. Johnson notes the “literalism” 
of contemporary listeners’ responses to the music of 
eighteenth century French opera: 
One critic faulted Mondonville for not distinguishing 
clearly enough between the depiction of titans, demons, 
and the cyclops.  Another discerning listener admired a 
musical passage that “painted the painful and hopeless 
effort of a dying eighty-year-old trying to spit up a 
piece of phlegm in his chest.”[…]  Popular accounts of 
Rameau’s music from mid-century are filled with 
unexpected images:  d’Aquin de Châteaulyon wrote that 
the “bursting of shells, speeding rockets, a sparkling 
sky, tumult, shouts of joy, are all depicted in the 
manliest hues”; Clément complained that the overture to 
Zaïs “paints so well the unraveling of chaos” that the 
effect was unpleasant….192 
 
Here is a contemporary listener’s description of the 
Allegretto from Beethoven’s Seventh Symphony: 
Imagine an enormous cathedral of marvelous 
architecture.  It is night.  A pale stream of starlight 
falls through the windows.  The stones begin to move.  
The souls of the dead leave their underground tombs.  
They whisper, and their obscure sounds grow more and 
more distinct as they advance toward the nave.  They 
rise, they unfurl into the high galleries, they 
continue their funereal procession.  Life comes back to 
them slowly.  Suddenly it bursts into a fortissimo.  
Pizzicato fugues mark the irregular and urgent steps of 
those phantom people that have recovered their 
existence through the tender invocation of harmony.193 
 
The following is taken from Proust’s Remembrance of Things 
Past: 
Whereas the sonata opened upon a dawn of lilied 
meadows, parting its slender whiteness to suspend 
itself over the frail and yet consistent mingling of a 
rustic bower of honeysuckle with white geraniums, it 
 
192 James H. Johnson, Listening in Paris, a Cultural History.  
(Berkeley:  University of California Press, 1995), 37. 
193 Hermione Quinet, quoted in Johnson, Listening in Paris, 273. 
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was upon continuous, level surfaces like those of the 
sea that, in the midst of a stormy morning beneath an 
already lurid sky, there began, in an eerie silence, in 
an infinite void, this new masterpiece, and it was into 
a roseate dawn that, in order to construct itself 
progressively into me, this unknown universe was drawn 
from silence and from night.  This so novel redness, so 
absent from the tender, rustic, pale sonata, tingled 
all the sky, as dawn does, with mysterious hope.194 
 
It is important to note that the three preceding 
descriptions were made before the advent of recording.  In 
each case, the writer is communicating with others who will 
not possibly be able to hear the same thing.  The writer 
must try, then, to convey some of the musical object itself, 
as well as a description of it and some indication of its 
effect. 
More recent are these remarks by Adorno: 
The aim of jazz is the mechanical reproduction of a 
regressive moment, a castration symbolism.  “Give up 
your masculinity, let yourself be castrated,” the 
eunuchlike sound of the jazz band both mocks and 
proclaims, “and you will be rewarded, accepted into a 
fraternity which shares the mystery of impotence with 
you, a mystery revealed at the moment of the initiation 
rite.”195 
 
And a present-day musicologist on Beethoven’s ninth 
symphony: 
This explosive rage fuels most of the remainder of the 
symphony.  The important exception is the third 
 
194 Quoted in Johnson, Listening in Paris, 283.  I realize that the 
“sonata” Proust describes here is fictional.  I have nonetheless 
included this description because it is certainly based on Proust’s 
general listening experience, although not necessarily on any particular 
experience.   
195 Quoted in Susan McClary, Feminine Endings:  Music, Gender, and 
Sexuality.  (Minnesota:  University of Minnesota Press, 1991), 65.  The 
original source is Theodor Adorno, “Perennial Fashion – Jazz”, in 
Prisms, trans. Samuel Weber and Shierry Weber (Cambridge, Mass.:  MIT 
Press, 1981), 129.  
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movement, which serves as a kind of negative image to 
the rest.  If the first two movements are monomaniacal, 
the Adagio is dialogic.  It stands strangely aloof from 
the striving narrative of the other movements:  perched 
as it is on the never-never-land degree of flat-six, it 
may be arcadian recollection, the imaginary sublime, or 
a dream of utopia.  It offers the image of a world in 
which pleasure is available without thrusting desire, 
where tenderness and vulnerability are virtues rather 
than fatal flaws.  But it can never be reality, as its 
infinite regress through a spiral of flat-six 
relationships indicates.196 
 
 One thing that is readily noticeable about these 
descriptions is that all of the listeners quoted (with the 
exception perhaps of the last, who is somewhat more 
speculative) seem confident of what they hear. The remarks 
quoted arguably reflect both the listeners’ concerns, and 
their historical context.  While many have perhaps found 
jazz distasteful, I would guess that few have seen it as the 
direct challenge to masculinity which Adorno seems to fear.  
The feminist analysis which underlies the description of 
Beethoven’s ninth symphony quoted above would have been 
unthinkable before the 20th century.  Had I included 
listeners from non-western musical cultures, it is possible 
that the descriptions assembled would have been even more 
varied and reflective of different cultural preoccupations. 
 Why pay attention to listeners’ descriptions of their 
experiences?  For one thing, I want to acknowledge 
differences among individual listeners and so avoid the 
 
196 McClary, Feminine Endings, 128. 
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tendency to posit the existence of an “aperspectival ear.”197  
Listeners are situated in a particular cultural and 
historical context, in addition to having individual 
concerns and experiences which are brought to the listening 
experience.  To cite just one small example, I have noticed 
that I listen very differently to performances of works 
which I have attempted to play myself.  While it would be 
foolish to hope that a single inquiry into the nature of 
musical experience and understanding could account for the 
variety of listeners’ experiences across historical period, 
culture, and the particularities of lived experience, it 
nonetheless seems important to acknowledge that such a 
variety does exist.   
6.2b Philosophers on Musical “Content” 
 In the philosophical literature which deals directly or 
indirectly with musical content, questions of “meaning,” 
extra-musical “content,” and the possibility of music’s 
cognitive value are not sharply distinguished.198  This is 
 
197 See Kathleen Marie Higgins, “Musical Idiosyncrasy and Perspectival 
Listening,” in Music and Meaning ed. Jenefer Robinson (Ithaca and 
London:  Cornell University Press, 1997), 83-102. 
198 For example, M. Beardsley, “Understanding Music,” in On Criticizing 
Music:  Five Philosophical Perspectives ed. Kingsley Price (Baltimore:  
Johns Hopkins UP, 1981), 55-73; Frances Berenson, “Interpreting the 
Emotional Content of Music,” in The Interpretation of Music ed. Price, 
61-72; Stanley Cavell,  “Music Discomposed,” in Must we Mean What we 
Say?  A Book of Essays (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1976), 
180-212; David J. Elliot, “Music as Knowledge,” Journal of Aesthetic 
Education 25:3 (1991):  21-40; Rom Harre, “Is There a Semantics for 
Music?”  In The Interpretation of Music ed. Price, 203-213; Vladimir 
Karbusicky, “The Anthropology of ‘Semantic Levels’ in Music,”  Acta 
Philosophica Fennica 43 (1988):  54-69; Thomas Carson Mark, “On Works of 
Virtuosity,” Journal of Philosophy 77 (1980):  28-45; Graham McFee, 
“Meaning and the Art Status of ‘Music Alone,’” British Journal of 
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not surprising, and I do not think it is a flaw or an 
indication of confusion.  If music can be meaningful 
(analogous to the way that a sentence is meaningful, rather 
than the way that a favourite stuffed toy is meaningful to a 
child), then this meaning will be describable as the music’s 
“content.”  If music has cognitive, as well as hedonic 
value, then this will likely be assessed in terms of its 
meaning or content.  I will briefly consider two 
philosophical attempts to account for music’s meaning 
(loosely construed), followed by a look at Kivy’s argument 
for the rejection of the possibility of musical semantic 
content.  Finally, in the next section, I will present my 
own views.  Briefly, I find the debate as it has been 
conducted unproductive, and propose a different approach. 
 In his article, “The Cognitive Value of Music,” James 
O. Young attempts to defend the thesis that music, even so-
called “absolute” music, is valuable as a source of 
knowledge and can help us understand non-musical matters.  
According to Young, the arts contribute to our knowledge by 
means of immediate demonstration – placing someone in a 
position to recognize that something is the case.  Immediate 
demonstration can be achieved using interpretative or 
 
Aesthetics 37:1 (January 1997):  31-46; Anthony Newcomb, “Action and 
Agency in Mahler’s Ninth Symphony, Second Movement,” in Music and 
Meaning ed. Robinson, 131-153; Jay Newman, “The Philosophical in Music” 
The Music Review 41:4 (November 1980):  302-08; Kingsley Price, “Does 
Music have Meaning?” British Journal of Aesthetics 28:3 (Summer 1988):  
203-215; and Donald Walhout, “Music and Moral Goodness” Journal of 
Aesthetic Education 29:1 (Spring 1995):  5-16. 
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affective representation.  In the first, something about an 
object is made apparent to an audience; techniques 
facilitating interpretive representations include 
amplification and simplification.  For example, in the work 
of Dickens, aspects of character or institutions are 
amplified or exaggerated so that the audience is in a better 
position to understand the features in question.  An 
affective representation puts an audience in a position to 
know something about an object by making them feel a certain 
way about it.  Affective representations may be extroverted, 
when the affects are directed outwards, or introverted, when 
the aroused affects are themselves the objects of 
knowledge.199 
 Music employs interpretive representation when it 
indirectly represents affects by representing the movements 
with which affects are associated.200  The representation of 
these movements can provide audiences with insight into 
certain affects;  “Listening to a skillfully composed piece, 
listeners can realize, for example, what it is like 
simultaneously to feel attracted to something and hesitant 
about embracing it.”201  More commonly, music employs 
affective representation – it arouses feelings in some 
 
199 James O. Young, “The Cognitive Value of Music,” Journal of 
Aesthetics and Art Criticism 57:1 (Winter 1997):  41-54. 
200 I have not discussed Young’s account of how music represents affects, 
as it does not significantly differ from accounts of musical expression 
already discussed.   
201 Young, “Cognitive Value,” 48. 
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listeners and in so doing, shows them something about the 
affect in question.202  For example, in listening to the 
music of the nineteenth century, one can gain insight into 
what it was like to adopt a romantic perspective on life. 
 Although I think that Young has to be admired for 
trying to bring some conceptual clarity and philosophical 
insight to such a nebulous and difficult topic, it must be 
admitted that his conclusions are very modest:  Some (not 
all) music may have cognitive value to some (not all) 
listeners.  The cognitive value of music turns out to be 
fairly banal:  Surely everyone who has tried to quit smoking 
or follow a diet knows what it is like to feel attracted to 
something and hesitant about embracing it.  While listening 
to sad music might make me better able to appreciate 
varieties and gradations of sadness, I might also gain such 
knowledge by reading a novel or talking to a sad person.  I 
doubt the possibility that listening to music could tell me 
anything more or better than other courses I might follow. 
 Kendall Walton is concerned with meaning “for” the 
listener, rather than with the semantic meaning of music 
more narrowly construed.  He begins by trying to specify how 
music differs from other more obviously representational 
arts, and considers the possibility that the semantic 
content of music is more general than that of figurative 
 
202 I will not take up the point, noted by Young, that not all listeners 
experience emotions listening to music.  
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painting, literature, etc.203  While it seems presumptuous, 
even “unmusical” to suggest that a sonata is about, say, the 
Trojan war, or even warfare in general, it makes sense to 
suggest that music can be about struggle in general.  
Depending on a listener’s personality, interests, and 
immediate situation, she might hear a struggle in music as a 
clash between two people, an internal battle, or a struggle 
for dignity under oppression.   
Walton then turns to the “puzzle” of how a musical 
passage gets connected to the idea (say) of struggle in 
general, without somehow portraying a particular instance of 
struggle.  His solution, as I understand it, is that music 
often calls for imaginative introspecting.  We imagine that 
our actual introspective awareness of auditory sensations is 
an experience of being aware of our states of mind:  “My 
suggestion is not that the music portrays an objective event 
or circumstance, and then induces the listener to imagine 
responding to it in a certain manner; it just induces the 
listener to imagine the experience of responding to an 
object of a certain sort.”  However, the fact that music 
elicits imaginings does not justify talk of musical meaning 
or semantic content. 
 I think that Walton is definitely on the right track in 
focusing his investigation into musical meaning on the 
 
203 Kendall L. Walton, “What is Abstract about the Art of Music?” Journal 
of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 46:3 (Spring 1988):  351-64. 
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listener’s experience.  Walton does not get any farther than 
Young with regard to the possibility of musical content, and 
his account (at least as I understand it) is somewhat 
puzzling.  I know what it is to imagine, and to introspect, 
but I am not sure what it would be to imagine that I 
introspect while listening to music.  Walton hopes to 
facilitate “the daunting task of uncovering the secret of 
[music’s] power,” but there is little specifically musical 
in his account.  It could serve just as well as an account 
of why different people see various things in Rorschach 
blots or cloud formations.  What is it about music that 
elicits such imaginings?  Without a fuller account of how 
meaning for the listener is underwritten, it is difficult to 
see how there can be even the broadest consensus among 
listeners.  While it seems uncontroversial to say that a 
particular passage might make me imagine a struggle between 
weather patterns, and symbolize for you the struggle between 
good and evil, what about the listener who hears no struggle 
whatsoever?  
 Walton assumes that it is unproblematic to say that 
music can be “about” struggle in general.  We saw in chapter 
4 that Levinson, in his criticism of Kivy’s account of 
musical profundity, defended “our useful informal notion of 
aboutness,” seeing no reason to restrict it to systematic or 
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conventional relations of reference or denotation.204  Kivy, 
in his response to Levinson’s critique, argues that 
“aboutness” is a semantic concept, and a causal connection 
between music’s expressive properties and thinking about 
those properties is not enough to establish it.205  It simply 
begs the question to go from the fact that many works of 
music have expressive properties as part of their structure 
to the conclusion that these properties make up an emotive, 
semantic content.206  Furthermore, it is not enough to 
establish that music can be about some extra-musical 
subject; defenders of musical “meaning” also need to show 
why musical “aboutness” is interesting.  Kivy finds it 
difficult to see how music could say anything valuable 
regarding what it is about.207  So even if we allow that a 
certain composition is about struggle in general, it still 
needs to be shown that the music could tell us or show us 
something interesting about struggle.  More alarming, for 
Kivy, is that he detects Schopenhaur’s views on music, minus 
their metaphysical niceties, widely held among musical 
scholars.  Accordingly, music has a hidden content, not 
apparent on its surface, which is in need of hermeneutical 
revelation.208 
 
204 Jerrold Levinson, “Musical Profundity Misplaced,” Journal of 
Aesthetics and Art Criticism 50:1 (Winter  1992):  58-60. 
205 Peter Kivy, Philosophies of Arts (Cambridge:  Cambridge University 
Press, 1998), 169. 
206 Kivy, Philosophies of Arts, 165. 
207 Kivy, Philosophies of Arts, 175. 
208 Kivy, Philosophies of Arts, 181-83. 
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 Kivy does not say what would be necessary to establish 
the concept of “aboutness” in music.  He offers no 
suggestions as to the necessary and sufficient conditions, 
or other indications of how to discuss “aboutness” in the 
arts.  I suspect he does not because he realizes how 
difficult it would be to do this with any rigour.  I think 
that Levinson is right to claim that a loose, informal sense 
of aboutness is valuable for aesthetics.  Indeed, 
restricting the notion of aboutness would excessively 
constrict our ability to discuss other arts.   
For example, literary works often seem to be “about” 
things not explicitly discussed.  If someone were to ask me 
what Chekhov’s short story “The Lady with the Small Dog” was 
about, I might answer that it was about an adulterous love 
affair between a man and a younger woman whom he meets on 
vacation.  I might also say that it was about the power of 
love to triumph over the cynicism and despair of middle age.  
What is my warrant for saying this?  My analysis of the 
story’s meaning required interpretation, although I have not 
claimed to reveal any hidden content or say what Chekhov 
“really” meant.  I would likely be able to convince other 
readers that my interpretation was correct by pointing to 
aspects of the story – for example the change from the 
protagonist’s initial world-weary boredom to his increased 
attentiveness and joy in his children by the end of the 
story.   
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 What is the relevance for music?  Literary works, 
unlike music, often have an unambiguous propositional 
content.  However literary works are not always about their 
propositional content.  To determine what a literary work is 
about requires judgement and careful reading, with attention 
to details, nuances, and sometimes also to the context in 
which the work was written or initially received.  These 
various factors cannot be enshrined in a formula or given in 
the form of necessary and sufficient conditions.  Despite 
such difficulties, we can talk with profit of what literary 
works are “about,” and offer evidence in favour of rival 
interpretations.  I would suggest that it is similarly 
possible to discuss what a particular musical work may be 
about, despite the conceptual difficulties involved.  
Furthermore, the clarity of a literary work’s propositional 
content does not invariably make possible a clear 
determination as to what the work is about.  So lack of 
agreement as to the “content” of a musical work should not 
necessarily prohibit speculation as to what that work is 
about. 
Kivy develops his arguments against the possibility of 
extra-musical meaning through a consideration of two recent 
attempts by musicologists to find “content” in non-
programmatic music.209  Even if we knew, for example, that 
 
209 Hans Eggebrecht on Bach’s The Art of the Fugue and David P. Schroeder 
on Haydn’s London Symphonies. 
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Bach intended the Art of the Fugue to express the 
proposition, “I seek salvation,” we cannot conclude that 
this is what the music actually expresses.  Music cannot 
express this proposition, so Bach’s purported intention 
simply fails.  While particular structural features of the 
Art of the Fugue can indeed represent seeking and reaching a 
goal, how do we know which goal is represented?  We have no 
more right to say that the goal is “salvation” than to say 
that it is victory over enemies or returning home after a 
long journey.  What, exactly, is the “message concerning 
tolerance” expressed in Haydn’s symphonies?  Even if it 
could be shown that the music refers to tolerance (which 
Kivy doubts), how do we know what Haydn wanted to say about 
tolerance?  And even if we had evidence (say, in a letter) 
that Haydn wanted to endorse Shaftesbury’s views on 
tolerance in his music, it seems silly to say that we could 
gain a better understanding of Shaftesbury by listening to 
Haydn.   
6.2c My views on the “Content” Question 
We have seen that the sophisticated attempts by Young 
and Walton to make sense of musical “content” proved 
disappointing.  A philosophically rigorous analysis of 
musical content seems to allow us to say far less than is 
indicated in the experience of many listeners.  Kivy would 
have an answer to my qualified defense of musical 
“aboutness”:  Defenders of musical content have been misled 
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by analogies between music and the “contentful” arts of 
literature and representational painting.  And his arguments 
against the presence of a complex extra-musical content in 
the music of Bach and Haydn seem fairly devastating.  
Attempts to expound the “hidden meaning” of instrumental 
music in propositional terms seem doomed to fail for the 
reasons that Kivy indicates – even if we allow that music 
can refer, how can we tell whether it endorses or condemns, 
and how can music tell us the precise terms in which it 
endorses or condemns?  
It seems to me that Kivy accords respect to those with 
whom he disagrees, and gives their claims and arguments the 
serious treatment they deserve.  What he fails to do, 
however, is to take seriously their listening experiences 
(all the while insisting, plausibly, that his listening 
experience must be taken seriously).  If Kivy is right, and 
defenders of musical content (both musicologists and 
philosophers) have been misled by analogies between music 
and literature, what does this say about music and about the 
listener’s experience?210  What can we learn from such 
misleading analogies (if that is indeed what they are)?  The 
musicologists Kivy attacks certainly have the capability to 
make sense of their experience in theoretical and musico-
 
210 I will develop my position on musical content examining the analogies 
between music and literature, and say nothing about painting.  The 
classic statement of the differences between poetry and the visual arts 
in G.E. Lessing’s Laocoön, trans. Edward Allen McCormick (Indianapolis:  
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structural terms.  Why, then, do they chose to describe 
music according to notions perhaps more appropriate for 
literature?  It may be easy to dismiss the experiences of 
untrained listeners, such as some of those quoted in 6.2a, 
but there seems little good reason not to take seriously the 
experiences of performers and musicologists, even if there 
is little consensus among them.   
Is the debate over musical content doomed to end in a 
stalemate between those who “hear what they hear” and those 
who insist that, for sound philosophical reasons, those in 
the first group cannot possibly hear what they claim?  Does 
philosophical rigour insist that we condemn those who insist 
on the reality of extra musical content?  Only if the debate 
continues in the manner that it has; I want to suggest an 
approach that I hope will be more fruitful.  Rather than 
continuing to ask “does music have an extra-musical content 
or meaning?” let us consider the question, “what is it about 
music, and about the experience of listening to music, such 
that listeners frequently experience it as carrying semantic 
weight?”  However in asking this question, we must not 
ignore those who claim to hear “the music itself,” devoid of 
any extra-musical content.  I am convinced that it is 
important to take the experiences of both types of listeners 
seriously and perhaps even seek to reconcile them.  While I 
 
The Bobbs-Merrill Co. Inc., 1962).  Sadly, the part of the work which 
was to have examined music was never completed. 
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shall not defend the existence of hidden messages in 
instrumental music, I do want to try to understand the 
ground of the possibility for claims of hidden content.  To 
that end, we have to examine the nature of involvement with 
music as heard.  Even particular claims about a 
composition’s “hidden content” must ultimately be assessed 
by what a listener hears.   
6.3 The Nature of Involvement with Music 
Music can be part of a rich variety of experiences; I 
cannot adequately address the many ways of being involved 
with music and coming to understand it better.  The 
particular integration of body and mind fostered by moving 
with music – whether in dance or physical labour – deserves 
extended phenomenological investigation.  I have been 
focusing on listening because it is clearly foundational to 
other forms of involvement including performing, composing, 
and formal study.  But what is the nature of the listener’s 
involvement with music in listening?  An account of musical 
understanding and of the involvement which underwrites it 
should be able to make sense of listening experiences as 
active, cognitively engaged processes.  Ideally, it should 
be able to clarify the experiences of those with varying 
levels of musical competence, and be applicable to different 
types of music.  Furthermore, an account of musical 
understanding should speak to both the formal aspects of 
music (particularly its character as an evolving structure 
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over time), and the semantic aspects.  With regard to the 
latter, it should help us comprehend why some listeners 
experience music as rich in extra-musical significance, 
while other listeners do not. 
Throughout my discussions of philosophical accounts of 
musical understanding and in descriptions of my own 
listening experiences, I have used such expressions as 
“sense of direction,” “follow along,” “come to a musically 
appropriate close,” “chaotic foreground,” “in constant 
struggle,” and “sense of progression in the music.”  These 
expressions gesture towards the account of involvement I 
wish to present.  Briefly, I propose to develop an account 
of involvement with music which stresses the similarities 
between following a musical performance and following or 
constructing a narrative.   
6.3a What is Narrative? 
In what follows, I will be employing a conception of 
narrative that is loose, but, I hope, sufficiently rigorous 
to be fruitful.  According to some psychologists of 
language, the minimum requirement for narrative is at least 
two sequential clauses, temporally ordered, about a single 
past event.211  As I see it, the most important 
characteristic of narrative is that it is a way of making 
 
211 W. Labov, Language in the Inner City:  Studies in the Black English 
Vernacular (Philadelphia:  University of Pennsylvania Press, 1972).  I 
am relying on the discussion in Jean Berko Gleason, The Development of 
Language Fourth edition (Boston:  Allyn and Bacon, 1997), 407. 
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sense of – of giving a structure to – events over time.  I 
will try to show that music as heard has a narrative 
structure, and where this structure is not readily apparent, 
the listener nonetheless approaches the music and tries to 
comprehend it within the framework of a narrative structure.  
When musicologists use the term “narrative,” they often have 
in mind one form of musical structure, that of tonal 
striving, climax, and closure, typical of many 19th century 
symphonies.  My own broader use of narrative includes but is 
not limited to this pattern.  Indeed I will argue that even 
minimalist “non-narrative” music utilizes a narrative 
structure to involve us. 
 Telling stories or imposing a narrative coherence on 
events is one of the main ways in which we make sense of our 
experience.  When a person, known to us or not, does 
something unexpected, we try to make sense of his actions 
within a narrative framework, usually working on the 
assumption that he is rational and acting in what he feels 
to be his own best interest.  Even when we doubt that an 
actor is rational, we look for a rational explanation for 
his behaviour.  Our narrative explanation of his behaviour 
may be correct or incorrect, plausible or implausible.  If 
we believe a person to be self-deceived, we typically 
mistrust his own narrative reconstructions of the events in 
which he is involved.  In the philosophical literature on 
understanding music, one comes across claims such as 
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“understanding a musical work is like understanding a 
person.”212  Underlying such assertions, I am convinced, is 
the fact that we get to know and understand other people 
largely through learning their stories, and the narrative 
coherence that they place on their own lives.213  I will hope 
to show that we come to understand music in a similar way. 
While the use of narratives appears to be worldwide, 
there seems to be no universal standard for narrative form.  
Psychologists have found that narrative structure varies 
according to the teller’s age and cultural background.  For 
example, studies of children in the west suggest that four-
year-olds most commonly use a “leap-frog narrative” 
structure, in which the child jumps unsystematically from 
one event to another, often leaving out important points.  
By the time children are eight years old, they are capable 
of organizing events into the “classic” narrative structure 
in which events build to a high point, are briefly 
suspended, then resolved and evaluated.214  However this 
“classic” narrative structure is by no means the only 
 
212 For example, Frances Berenson, “Interpreting the Emotional Content of 
Music,” in The Interpretation of Music ed. Price, 61-72; and Göran 
Hermerén, “Art and Life:  Models for Understanding Music,” Australasian 
Journal of Philosophy 73:2 (June 1995):  280-92.  As we see in chapter 
3, section 4, Scruton implies such a position in his comparison of 
involvement with music to an internal dance and his claim that the 
response to music is a response to a human life in the sounds.   
213 Some philosophers have gone so far as to argue that narrative 
structure is the organizing principle, not only of experiences and 
actions, but also of the self who experiences and acts.  See for example 
David Carr, Time, Narrative, and History (Bloomington:  Indiana 
University Press, 1986), 73. 
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legitimate or most potent form.  To cite only one counter-
example, Japanese children tell stories in which temporally 
distinct events are linked thematically, often using a 
structure that emulates Haiku.215  The world-wide adoption of 
American media formats should not blind us to the fact that 
the linear “classic” narrative structure is far from being 
the only available or most effective way of ordering 
events.216  
 “Narrative,” as I use the word, is not the same as 
“plot.”  I take “plot” to be a smaller structural unit 
within a narrative, often advanced by conflict.  
Traditionally, there are three types of conflicts:  between 
individuals, between an individual and nature, and between 
an individual and God.  A narrative does not require 
conflict.  Some examples will be helpful here.  The story of 
Cain and Abel (Genesis 4:1-16) is a narrative with a clear 
plot:  Two brothers are rivals, one kills the other and is 
sent into exile.  In this narrative (variations of which 
still provide a basis for movie screenplays) we have an 
initial situation, a conflict, and a resolution.  A 
narrative may contain more than one plot.  The story of 
 
214 C. Peterson and A. McCabe, Developmental Psycholinguistics:  Three 
ways of looking at a child’s Narrative (New York:  Plenum, 1983), as 
discussed in Gleason, Development of Language, 408-09. 
215 M. Minami and A. McCabe, “Haiku as a Discourse Regulation Device:  A 
Stanza Analysis of Japanese Children’s Personal Narratives,” Language in 
Society 20 (1990):  577-99, as discussed in Gleason, Development of 
Language 409. 
216 See Jeremy Tunstall, The Media are American:  Anglo-American Media in 
the World (London:  Constable, 1977). 
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Joseph and his brothers (Genesis 37-50) can be seen as 
having one underlying plot (the betrayal of Joseph by his 
brothers and his ultimate forgiveness of them), which 
contains many smaller plots within it (the story of Joseph 
and the Pharaoh’s wife, Joseph’s divination of the dreams, 
etc.).  But a narrative need not have a plot at all.  The 
genealogy of Christ which begins the Gospel according to 
Mathew (“Abraham was the father of Isaac, and Isaac the 
father of Jacob, and Jacob the father of Judah and his 
brothers…,” etc.) is also a narrative. 
Philosophical applications of narrative to music, as 
far as I have been able to judge, do not make clear this 
distinction between narrative and plot, often treating the 
two as synonymous.  The result is that only music containing 
“conflicts” is recognized as having a narrative structure, 
and a narrative analysis is seen as applicable to only a 
limited range of music.  For example, in his paper, “Music 
as Drama,” Fred Everett Maus points to literary theorist 
Tzvetan Todorov’s account of plot:  “An ideal narrative 
begins with a stable situation that some force will perturb.  
From which results a state of disequilibrium; by the action 
of a force directed in a converse direction, the equilibrium 
is re-established; the second equilibrium is quite similar 
to the first, but the two are not identical.”217  This 
 
217 Tzvetan Todorov, Introduction to Poetics trans. Richard Howard 
(Minneapolis:  University of Minnesota Press, 1981), quoted in Fred 
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account of narrative-as-plot works nicely for the Beethoven 
string quartet which Maus analyses, and it would work nicely 
for the Kraus symphony I discussed in 6.1.  However it is 
less applicable to Berg’s “March” in the Three Pieces for 
Orchestra or to the Georgian folk songs also discussed 
earlier, or to much other music. 
“Narrative,” as I use it, does not require antagonism, 
and its beginnings and endings may be largely arbitrary.  
Again, this means it may be applicable to a wide variety of 
music – music without clear beginnings and endings, and 
music without “conflicts.”  We can see that a narrative’s 
beginning and endpoints may be arbitrary by considering the 
type of newspaper articles typically written after someone 
has behaved in a manner seen as requiring explanation (such 
as committing an act of violence or heroism).  The article 
may begin with a sketch of the actor’s parents, with 
information about his or her childhood generally, with the 
description of a formative event in the actor’s earlier 
life, or with a report of how he or she began the day in 
question.  The “logical” starting point depends ultimately 
on what the writer deems to be important or interesting.  
Similarly, the ending of a narrative is rarely obvious or 
explicit, and usually reflects the teller’s preoccupations.  
 
Everett Maus, “Music as Drama,” in Music and Meaning ed. Robinson, 126.  
Maus’s article is one of the best I have read on the connection between 
music and narrative forms, and has influenced my own thinking on the 
subject. 
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The story of a person’s life may end with his or her 
physical death, but just as often some reference is made to 
surviving relatives, or to the deceased’s influence on them 
and on the world, or an indication is made as to how he or 
she will be remembered.  
The events described in a narrative need not even be 
coherently connected.  Indeed, if events seem disconnected 
from one another rather than rationally ordered, a narrative 
recounting these events may seem similarity disjointed.  But 
a narrative, by its very structural arrangement of events in 
a sequence, whatever the organizing principle of that 
sequence, can give recounted events a coherence that they 
lacked as lived events.  Events may be selected and 
hierarchically ordered according to strict time sequence, 
dramatic potential, significance for any one of the actors 
involved, or some other principle.  Once events are 
recounted and understood in terms of the chosen principle, 
they can at least be assessed for coherence.  To use an 
analogy:  events before their arrangement in a narrative 
structure are like separate scattered puzzle pieces.  It is 
only once they are selected and arranged in some order that 
their connections with one another and overall significance 
can be assessed.  When an initial ordering has been 
achieved, the order itself can be questioned.  The selection 
and arrangement of events according to an “artificial” or 
arbitrary coherence may never be enough fully to explain 
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these events, but it is a powerful tool enabling more 
sophisticated forms of coherence and greater understanding.  
6.3b Narrative Involvement with Music 
The fundamental feature shared by music and the various 
forms of artistic narrative (stage drama, epic poetry, short 
stories, novels, and dance narratives, among others) is that 
all are arts of time.218  As such, they present themselves as 
temporal gestalts, demanding continuous and continued 
attention.  In this they are different from the visual arts; 
paintings and drawings exist in time, but they do not occupy 
time.  Music and narratives fill up time; they impose an 
organization on time.219 
Now, a critic who wanted to challenge the analogy 
between music and the narrative arts (and their mutual 
disanalogy with the visual arts) might remind me that long 
narrative works are frequently not the object of continued 
attention.  No one, for example, is likely to try to read -
War and Peace in a single sitting.  We might read a chapter 
or two of a novel, put it aside for hours or days, and 
continue our reading later with little disadvantage.  In 
this way, appreciating a long musical work is significantly 
different.  Something seems to be lost if we leave a gap of 
 
218 Performed dramas and dance narratives are spatial as well as 
temporal, of course.  I will leave the differences between these and the 
non-spatial arts of written literature and music unexplored.  On the 
question of what it is for an art form to involve time, see Jerrold 
Levinson and Philip Alperson, “What is a Temporal Art?”  Midwest Studies 
in Philosophy 16 (1991):  439-50. 
219 I say more about music and the experience of time in the Appendix. 
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days between listening to the first and second movements of 
a symphony, to say nothing of leaving off a recording of a 
work somewhere in the middle.  However the differences 
between music and literature in this regard do not seem to 
me so obvious or pronounced.  In reading, each section of 
the narrative on which we focus is the object of continued 
attention, and this section will have to be of at least a 
certain minimum length.  We may choose to read War and Peace 
chapter by chapter on a daily basis over a month or so, but 
we would not read it sentence by sentence on a daily basis 
over several years. 
Let me now turn more specifically to the nature of 
musical involvement.  First, the title of a work creates 
expectations as to the character of the music, including 
narrative expectations.  The knowledge that we are about to 
listen to the “Pastoral” symphony alerts us that the music 
will likely contain representational elements.  Similarly, 
the “Pathétique” symphony is likely to be very expressive.  
Narrative expectations are elicited even by non-descriptive 
titles.  For example, the “Symphony in D major” is likely 
(but not absolutely certain) to consist of three or four 
distinct movements, with some thematic continuity among 
them.  One of the movements is likely to be slower than the 
others.  We know that a “Concerto” is likely to be a musical 
dialogue between a solo instrument and an orchestra, again 
usually in three distinct movements.  A “tone poem” is 
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likely to be less formally structured than either a symphony 
or a concerto, and may be notable more for its expressive 
and sonorous qualities than for the excellence of its 
thematic material. 
A great deal of music has a narrative structure, even a 
plot, apparent on its musical surface.  I mentioned earlier 
that some musicologists speak quite unproblematically of a 
“musical narrative” in many 19th century symphonies.  Think 
of the Kraus symphony discussed earlier.  A slow and stately 
opening theme was followed by a slight pause, and then the 
statement of a second, faster theme.  It is not implausible 
to think of these statements as separate actions, and as the 
rest of the movement as consisting in the further unfolding 
and ultimate consequences of these actions.  The musical 
narrative is the conveyance of these actions, reactions, and 
consequences.   
The listener hears this narrative, but also becomes 
involved with it or swept up; he wants to know what will 
happen next.  One mark of a bad story is that we can stop 
listening or reading at any point – we no longer care how 
things will turn out.  Something similar can be said of 
music; one indication of an interesting work or performance 
is that while we enjoy the music, we also want to know what 
will happen next.  We want to hear where it is going. The 
musical narrative also includes indications as to how the 
various actions are to be hierarchically ordered, and hints 
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as to how they will ultimately be resolved.  For example, a 
pause may signal that something new is about to happen; a 
ritard or deceleration can indicate that what we are now 
listening to – the phrase, theme, or entire work - is about 
to end.  Becoming involved with much music is a matter of 
discerning and following its narrative structure, perhaps 
revising expectations as the music continues.  By 
“following” I mean paying attention and being alert to the 
“clues” in the music and to the expectations – tonal and 
rhythmic – which it generates.220  
A skeptical critic might ask, “If musical themes are 
actions, who are the actors – the composer, the performers, 
or some imaginary others?”  Maus addresses this question 
explicitly:  Music is abstract and can be dramatic without 
imitating or representing any determinate characters.  While 
this answer may seem strange, Maus reminds us that for 
Aristotle, tragedy is an imitation of an action and of life, 
not of human beings, and character is subsidiary to the 
action.  So music can be thought of as a drama that lacks 
determinate characters.221  
Of course, not all music has a structure as easily 
discernible as that of the Kraus symphony; indeed, some 
 
220 To discuss in any detail the role played by expectation in the 
experience of listening to music would demand much greater command of 
musicology and the psychology of listening that I possess.  The reader 
is referred to Leonard B. Meyer, Emotion and Meaning in Music (Chicago:  
University of Chicago Press, 1956). 
221 Maus, “Music as Drama,” 128. Aristotle’s discussion is in Poetics, 
1449b20-1450b20. 
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music is composed specifically so as to be difficult to 
follow and elude ready understanding.  What then of music 
which lacks an obvious narrative or dramatic structure?  In 
some cases, the narrative is on the musical surface, yet the 
listener must do some work before its structure can be 
discerned.  I had this type of experience trying to gain a 
better understanding of Berg’s “Prelude” in his Three Pieces 
for Orchestra.  At first the music seemed to make little 
sense; with repeated listening, I could discern a mirror-
like structure, in which the second half of the piece could 
be heard as an inversion of the first.  
In other cases, where there is no apparent or even 
concealed narrative on the surface of the music, we follow 
the music as if it were a narrative.  When a narrative 
structure is not evident, we impose such a structure, or 
attempt to do so.  We follow such music as a narrative 
despite the lack of clues as to how the various musical 
actions are to be ordered and ultimately resolved.  We 
expect music to signal to us what is important and to 
indicate to which aspects we should pay most attention.  We 
listen for such indications even when they are not 
forthcoming.  We also listen for hints as to the music’s 
ending – will the ending be signaled harmonically, with 
dynamics, or otherwise?  As in the case of listening to 
works with an unambiguous narrative structure, we may need 
to revise expectations as the music continues.  In listening 
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in this way, I suggest, we are imposing a narrative 
structure where one is concealed or absent.  
6.3c Narrative and Understanding 
 Recognitional understanding of a work’s narrative 
structure might be achieved in several different ways.  In 
the case of structurally unambiguous works, discerning and 
responding to the music’s narrative structure forms the 
basis of recognitional understanding.  If a work lacks an 
explicit narrative structure, or if we cannot discern the 
structure, we impose one.  Listeners with greater 
sensitivity to musical structure (typically, but not always, 
as a result of formal training) may find that a work’s 
narrative structure rarely eludes them.  The more a listener 
knows about music, the less likely it is that she will have 
to impose a narrative structure to make sense of a 
particular work.  
I am now in a position to say more about my failure 
fully to understand Berg’s “March.”  In my earlier 
discussion of this piece, I felt that I had failed even to 
come to an adequate recognitional understanding of it.  
While I noticed a sense of direction in the music, and had 
an idea of what was most important at any given time, the 
whole thing somehow eluded me.  I suspect that my 
distraction was due to the relative absence of clues as to 
the underlying narrative structure.  I knew that the music 
had a particular character (brassy, aggressive) and was 
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going somewhere, but I could not discern a narrative, and 
was not given enough indications as to how I could impose 
one.  The relative length of the piece (about ten minutes) 
in comparison to the first two pieces (about five minutes 
each) made the lack of clear indications particularly 
challenging.  
Lack of conscious understanding is often manifested as 
a negative affective response.  The ease with which 
listeners can discern or impose a narrative structure seems 
a factor in the level of enjoyment they take in listening.  
I suspect that I found the “March” less appealing that 
either of the other two pieces by Berg partly because it 
seemed more recalcitrant to recognitional understanding.  
The particular challenges it presented, I am convinced, were 
due to the difficulty of becoming fully involved with the 
music.  Involvement with the music might have been 
facilitated by a more transparent narrative structure, or 
clearer indications as to the narrative structure I might 
impose myself.  
In chapter one, I contrasted “intrigued uncertainty” 
with both unmediated understanding on the one hand, and 
incomprehension and aversion on the other, as possible 
reactions to music.  A listener who feels intrigued but 
uncertain is not quite sure that she has understood the 
music in question, and would like to hear it again.  Why 
does some music that the listener does not fully understand 
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elicit a reaction of intrigued uncertainty, while other 
music prompts an aversive reaction?  The answer to this 
question certainly has as much do with the listener as with 
the music.  However I would suspect that some works more 
than others have a tendency to prompt reactions of aversive 
rather than intrigued uncertainty.  Works which a listener 
cannot “get into,” which eschew a clear narrative structure 
and give the listener few indications (in terms of tonal 
structure or otherwise) on how to impose such a structure, 
would seem to be particularly frustrating.  
Intrigued uncertainty can occur before or after the 
listener has gained a basic recognitional understanding.  My 
initial experiences of listening to Georgian music 
frequently prompted intrigued uncertainty.  Before I could 
make sense of Georgian music as music, I wanted to hear 
more.  Sometimes, the feeling of intrigued uncertainty 
disappears when recognitional understanding has been 
achieved.  While I still find some of the harmonies in 
Georgian music slightly strange, I no longer listen with as 
much uncertainty as I once did.  I have become able to allow 
the music, in the words of Tovey, “to make itself 
intelligible by its own self-consistency.”  I have learned 
to divest myself of some of the “prejudices” which come from 
years of familiarity with diatonic tonal music.  I can 
follow the structural narratives of Georgian folksongs with 
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greater success, and am more attuned to the clues and 
indications on the musical surface.  
Yet music which does not challenge understanding on 
such a basic level can also arouse intrigued uncertainty.  
For example, while I have little difficulty understanding as 
music and following Bach’s great works for solo instruments 
(violin, cello, and keyboard), certain passages give me the 
feeling that the music has somehow eluded me.  This type of 
uncertainty is not resolved through the attainment of 
recognitional understanding, although enhanced understanding 
may assuage it.  If I were to study the score of, say, 
Bach’s suites for solo cello, I would likely have a much 
better idea of what was going on in the music at particular 
points, of how the different parts related to one another, 
and a more sophisticated grasp of the work as a whole.  This 
knowledge might be enough to end any feelings of uncertainty 
prompted by listening to the work.  
However just as a poem sometimes gives the sense that 
it conveys a meaning beyond what would be contained in a 
literal paraphrase, music can give the feeling that 
following its progression does not result in complete 
understanding.  I can imagine a sophisticated listener, 
perhaps even a skilled performer, who enjoyed an enhanced 
understanding of a work yet still felt that the music was 
somehow elusive.  Such a listener might express this feeling 
in various ways.  He might say that the music was “beyond 
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words” or ineffable; he might describe the music and 
feelings it aroused in figurative language.  Here we 
approach what I described earlier as “interpretive 
understanding.”  Why do different people have such different 
reactions to music, often hearing different things in the 
same work?  Attention to the narratological character of 
music might assist us make sense of its capacity to carry 
semantic weight for some listeners.  
It will help here to recall what Goodman had to say 
about understanding music.  For Goodman, understanding a 
work of art requires entering into the world of the work.  
What Goodman calls “entering the world of the work” I have 
been calling “involvement” with music, and I have tried to 
give an account of what this involvement amounts to.  
Musical performances, as artworks, are semantically and 
syntactically “dense.”  That is, there is no one-to-one 
relationship between the elements of the music and of the 
world.  Each musical work can be seen as having a different 
symbolic structure and as utilizing different semantic 
relationships.  The denotative relationships of 
representation, expression, and exemplification, are not 
universal or immutable.  They must be “decoded” in each 
artwork we encounter, although knowledge of the artistic 
tradition and operative conventions will help us gain a 
better understanding of the work in question.  
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For example, an ascending chromatic passage need not 
signify the same thing in works by different composers, nor 
even in works by the same composer, nor even in two passages 
of the same work.  Let us imagine a listener who hears such 
a passage in the context of a work which she understands 
fairly well.  She has a sense that the passage holds some 
greater significance within the overall narrative structure 
of the work.  The “dense” nature of music makes it difficult 
for her to say exactly what the passage signifies, and 
unlikely that there is any one “correct” answer.  Her 
knowledge about the work – including its title, information 
about the composer and the circumstances of its composition 
– may lead her to favour one possible interpretation over 
another. 
So far my discussion of narrative structure in music 
has been highly abstract.  I have said nothing about the 
epistemic status or value to the listener of specific 
narratives applied to or heard in particular musical works.  
Examples of these include the narrative of destructive male 
sexual desire which McClary hears in Beethoven’s ninth 
symphony (part of which was quoted in 6.2a), and the “drama 
of the outsider” that Charles Fisk finds in the first 
movement of Schubert’s sonata D. 960.222  Considering the 
question of epistemic status first, I would postulate that 
 
222 See Charles Fisk, “What Schubert’s Last Sonata Might Hold,” in Music 
and Meaning ed. Robinson, 179-200. 
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it is best to regard such narratives taking a cue from the 
way in which William James regarded the epistemic status of 
mystical experiences:  These are real or true to the person 
who experiences them and may count as evidence in favour of 
his religious beliefs.  They need not have significance nor 
count as evidence for anyone else.223  If I listen to 
Beethoven’s symphony with an open mind and fail to 
experience the music as McClary does, this would not count 
as evidence against her experience of the music, any more 
than the fact that she hears something I do not would count 
as evidence that my hearing was somehow deficient.  
However the analogy with mystical experience breaks 
down quickly:  we can discuss and argue about the 
interpretation of artworks in way that would make little 
sense if applied to mystical experience.  For example, I do 
not find Fisk’s narrative analysis of Schubert’s sonata very 
compelling.  If Fisk wanted to convince me of the 
appropriateness of his analysis, we could listen to the 
sonata together, and he could point out those elements which 
make him experience the music as he does.  Perhaps he would 
convince me; perhaps not.  Yet the value of such an 
exercise, like the value of considering specific narratives 
with respect to particular musical works, seems clear.  
Listening to the sonata with Fisk’s narrative in mind, I 
 
223 William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience:  A Study in 
Human Nature (New York:  Collier Books, 1961), 331-34. 
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might come to hear the music differently and gain a greater 
awareness of its underlying structure, even though I might 
ultimately reject the specific narrative which he suggests.  
Anything which opens our minds to the possibilities inherent 
in music and helps us to hear different things in a work, or 
hear what we have always heard in a new way, is ipso facto 
valuable.  
 Does this mean that all interpretations are created 
equal and there is no way to tell which of two specific 
narratives most suits a musical work?  Not necessarily:  
Some interpretive narratives are better than others at 
making sense of the narrative structure of the music.  We 
can judge interpretive narratives as more or less 
appropriate according to their correspondence with the 
musical structure.  For example, while I fail to hear 
Beethoven’s ninth symphony in the way that McClary hears it, 
I cannot deny hearing the elements of the work which she 
indicates in support of her interpretation – the tonal 
striving and conflict in much of the symphony as contrasted 
with the calm of the third movement.  An interpretive 
narrative which failed to make sense of these features of 
the music would have to be judged inferior to McClary’s.  It 
is even arguable whether the notions of “striving” and 
“conflict” make sense outside of a narrative framework.  To 
notice these features is already to hear a narrative, 
regardless of how described. 
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Why do some listeners get the feeling that there is 
more to music than what “meets the ear,” so to speak?  The 
human desire to know – which is a source of pleasure as well 
as the root of all scientific exploration, broadly construed 
– includes the desire to understand abstract patterns.224  
Perhaps our sense that some music calls for deeper 
understanding is nothing more than a misplaced desire for 
comprehension.  However there are at least two reasons to 
resist such a conclusion.  First, the human tendency to 
discern meaning is matched by a corresponding desire to 
communicate significance.  The feeling that music is 
meaningful in the fully semantic sense and the desire to 
understand it as such is informed by a sense that the music 
is a human product.  Music is composed, performed, and 
appreciated in specific social and cultural contexts, and 
becomes invested with significance in these contexts.  
However due to the syntactically and semantically dense 
nature of artworks, this meaning is rarely easy to 
interpret.  The fact that music attains meaning in specific 
social situations does not make this meaning 
inconsequential.  After all, words in a language are 
similarly meaningful only in a social context.225  
 
224 In chapter 4 I briefly touched on Kivy’s hypothesis that the human 
tendency to see abstract patterns as objects in the world helps account 
for the tendency for some to interpret sounds as meaningful in the fully 
linguistic sense.  See his Music Alone, 1-13. 
225 This point is made by McClary in Feminine Endings. 
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Second, much remains unknown regarding the effects of 
music on human beings, both physical and psychological.  
Music brings about measurable physical responses in 
listeners, including heightened awareness, alertness, and 
excitement.  Electro-myograph readings show marked increases 
in electrical activity in the leg muscles in subjects 
listening to music, even when they have been told to sit 
still.226  Neurological research indicates that music can 
have a direct effect on the brain – whether therapeutic or 
harmful.  Oliver Sacks has written movingly about his 
patients with neurological disorders who are given a respite 
from their condition through music.  He describes one 
patient with Parkinson’s disease who tended to remain 
completely motionless for hours a day; she regained ease and 
fluency of movement when she played the piano, heard, or 
even imagined music.  Another was able to regain the use of 
her apparently paralyzed leg through music therapy after 
conventional physiotherapy had failed.227  That music may act 
directly on the brain to harmful effect is indicated by the 
rare phenomenon of musicogenic epilepsy – seizures induced 
by hearing or (in very rare cases) imagining music.228  
 
226 Anthony Storr, Music and the Mind (New York:  The Free Press:  1992), 
24-25. 
227 Oliver Sacks and Concetta M. Tomaino, “Music and Neurological 
Disorder” International Journal of Arts Medicine 1:1 (Fall 1991):  10-
12. 
228 Storr, Music and the Mind, 35; and Donald Scott, “Musicogenic 
Epilepsy (2) The Later Story,” in Music and the Brain:  Studies in the 
Neurology of Music eds. MacDonald Critchey and R. A. Henson (London:  
William Heinemann Medical Books Ltd., 1977), 354-64. 
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Even this short discussion should demonstrate that the 
effect of music on human beings remains mysterious and in 
need of further empirical research.  The philosophical 
implication I would like to draw is to suggest that music’s 
direct physical effect may be differently manifested, 
depending on the listener.  The pre-conscious physical and 
neurological effects of music may result, in different 
listeners, in different varieties of conscious response.  
For example, some listeners may be induced to imagine, while 
others may not.229  
I said earlier that the more a listener knows about 
music, the less likely it is that she will have to impose a 
narrative structure to make sense of particular works.  
Perhaps it is also the case that the richer a listener’s 
appreciation of musical structure, the less she will feel a 
need to describe her experience in figurative language.  For 
these listeners, descriptions of musical structure may be 
largely adequate to their listening experience.  Of course, 
this suggestion will only be plausible for some listeners, 
as we have seen that even some highly sophisticated 
 
229 It is tempting to conjecture that as a listener becomes more 
sophisticated and more critical, the left hemisphere may become more 
involved in music perception, with the result that less importance is 
accorded to the emotional aspects of music.  The topic of cerebral 
dominance for musical functions is still controversial, and many 
important aspects of musical function defy attempts at localisation.  
See N. Wertheim, “Is there an Anatomical Localisation for Musical 
Faculties?” in Music and the Brain eds. Critchey and Henson, 282-97.  
The literature on music and brain damage is difficult to interpret and 
inconclusive. 
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listeners (i.e. musicologists) testify to hearing “deeper 
meanings” in music.230 
6.3d Why narrative? 
Why do we impose a narrative structure on music that 
does not exhibit one to us?  For the same reason that we 
struggle to construct a narrative framework in which to 
comprehend events in the world which defy understanding.  
The quest to make sense of our experience, whether it is 
aural experience, experience with other people, or 
experience of natural phenomena, is a necessary feature of 
human life. The temporal framework of narrative seems 
especially apt for coming to an understanding of events 
across time.  In addition, the flexibility of narrative – 
the fact that we can choose those features of experience 
which seem important and order them according to whatever 
variable we choose – means that a narrative account of 
experience can be particularly useful in helping us to grasp 
and make sense of the connections between events.  
Furthermore, creating and learning narratives is 
intrinsically pleasurable, and this pleasure can have an 
aesthetic component. 
Why invoke narrative to explain the ground of musical 
involvement and understanding?  Have I, like those whom Kivy 
criticizes, been misled by an analogy between music and 
literature?  The answer to that question will ultimately be 
 
230 I take up some of these issues briefly in the Appendix. 
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up to the reader, but I want to say a few things in my 
defense. 
One advantage of my analysis of involvement with music 
as a type of narrative discovery or construction is that it 
is applicable to different listeners, and different types of 
music.  I have tried to show that a narrative understanding 
of music underlies both sophisticated analyses of musical 
structure and ordinary language descriptions by more naïve 
listeners, as well as even fanciful accounts of musical 
significance.  Furthermore, when we define “narrative” in a 
way that owes more to empirical psychologists of language 
than to literary theorists, it is flexible enough to help us 
makes sense of many different types of music.  We can gain 
insight, not only into music composed with attention to the 
expectations created by diatonic tonality, but also into 
atonal, minimalist, and highly repetitive music.  If my 
account is plausible, it should be equally applicable to art 
music, folk music, commercially popular music, and jazz. 
An account of musical understanding as narrative in my 
sense helps to explain (without explaining away) the 
perennial appeal of other accounts of understanding music.  
I have already mentioned the comparisons often made between 
understanding music and understanding persons. It is likely 
that the comprehension of both relies on the discovery or 
imposition of a narrative structure.  Attention to the 
narrative structure of music also helps to explain the 
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attraction which many have to the “music as language” 
hypothesis, even though this hypothesis has been found to be 
deeply problematic.  If my arguments are compelling, then 
comparisons between music and language can be fruitful, but 
not as a comparison between musical phrases and sentences in 
natural language.  The appropriate comparisons, rather, are 
between musical works, and larger structured units such as 
stories and novels. 
In chapter three I briefly discussed Scruton’s 
explanation of musical involvement as a “dance of sympathy.”  
According to Scruton, the response to music’s expressivity 
is a sympathetic response, awakened by another life or 
subjectivity.  The life in music is abstract and belongs to 
the music process - there is no precise object of sympathy.  
Moving to music as well as silent listening can be a “dance 
of sympathy”:  “In dancing I respond to another’s gestures, 
move with him, or in harmony with him, without seeking to 
change his predicament or share his burden.  […Dancing] 
involves responding to movement for its own sake, dwelling 
in the appearance of another’s gesture, finding meaning in 
that appearance, and matching it with a gesture of my 
own.”231  
Scruton’s analysis has much to recommend it.  In 
particular, it takes account of and helps us to understand 
the role of the body in understanding music – something 
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which my analysis of musical involvement as narratological 
does not do as well.  However its flaws are serious enough 
to recommend rejection or at least reconsideration.  First, 
the account of dance which underlies Scruton’s analysis 
seems highly specific; while he does not state which form of 
dance he has in mind, his description corresponds to 
ballroom dancing and perhaps a few other forms.  There are 
many types of dance which cannot be made to fit his 
description, including ritual dances with a sequence of 
strictly decreed movements, as well as dances in which a 
movement is meant to be imitated rather than responded to 
“for its own sake,” and totally free-form or unstructured 
dances.  The narrowness of his definition of dance raises 
the worry that the account of involvement with music based 
on this definition is similarly applicable only to a 
narrowly defined range of music.  
Second, music and dance are so intimately related and 
their origins likely so intertwined, that it is not 
legitimate to explain one in terms of or prior to the other.  
Such a strategy ultimately raises more questions than it can 
answer.  Scruton’s account of involvement with music pushes 
the problem of understanding music to another level – the 
problem of how we are involved with and understand dance.  
One advantage of my approach to musical involvement as the 
discovery or creation of a narrative is that it encompasses 
 
231 Scruton, Aesthetics of Music, 355. 
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both music and dance and might help us make sense of the 
latter as well as the former.  
In chapter five, I discussed briefly how Kant’s notion 
of the sublime might be applied to music.  Certain musical 
works – because of their length, formal complexity, or 
intense expressivity - can arouse the feeling that something 
overwhelming has eluded us temporarily, while testing our 
capacities.  The experience is not one of utter perplexity, 
rather a feeling that we have not quite “got it all.”  Music 
which is too recalcitrant to understanding may simply cause 
a aversive response – turn that off, I don’t want to hear it 
now.  However a listener can appreciate or enjoy music which 
is difficult, yet does not completely evade understanding.  
The experience of the sublime can be seen as one of 
“controlled” or “safe” misunderstanding:  The listener 
experiences feelings of confusion combined with 
understanding, or within the context of an overall basic 
(recognitional) understanding.  
Attention to the narratological aspects of musical 
experience, together with an awareness of different levels 
and varieties of understanding music can help illuminate the 
experience of the musical sublime.  The experience that one 
has failed fully to understand music can occur at the level 
of recognitional, enhanced, or interpretive understanding, 
depending on one’s knowledge and level of exposure to the 
type of music in question.  Of course, not every experience 
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of misunderstanding is also an experience of the sublime.  
The difference between the two is that music which evokes 
feelings of the sublime makes us aware of the limits of our 
cognitive capacities.  Our attempts to discern the narrative 
structure of such music or to construct our own continually 
evade our impressions of the music.  
6.4 Concluding Remarks 
 At this point I propose to consider some of the 
possible shortcomings of my account of understanding music 
as fundamentally narratological in character. 
 I have taken a cognitive approach and assumed that art 
and music are objects for the mind, as much as they are 
objects for the senses.  Art is something to be understood; 
responding to a work of art on a purely sensual or visceral 
level, while possible, is less rewarding than attempting to 
understand it.   
There are at least two possible criticisms of the 
approach I have favoured.  First, it risks treating the 
value of art as instrumental in nature, rather than treating 
art as something to be esteemed for its own sake.  My 
response to this is that learning from art is not 
incompatible with being delighted by it or appreciating it 
for its own sake.  Although art may become an instrument in 
the acquisition of knowledge, it need not be a mere 
instrument.  Artworks that we learn from are not like 
ladders to be thrown away once we have reached the summit.  
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Perhaps their capacity to allow us to learn from them is 
inexhaustible.  However unlike merely utilitarian objects, 
we can continue to appreciate artworks even if we no longer 
feel that we benefit from their presence.   
Second, a critic might charge that a cognitive approach 
to art fails to take seriously the role of emotion and 
affect in the appreciation of art.  If this were the case, 
it would indeed be a powerful indictment of the cognitive 
approach.  However such a criticism has force only if a 
cognitive approach assumes a rigid separation between mind 
and body, between intellect and affect.  While I have not 
offered a comprehensive philosophical psychology, I have 
tried to avoid such dualistic thinking. 
Coupled with my cognitive approach to art, I have 
argued for the merits of a semiotic over a formalist 
orientation.  However I have tried, at the same time, to 
preserve the strengths of formalism, in particular its 
insistence on the importance of attention to an artwork’s 
perceptual qualities.  A common criticism of semiotic 
approaches to art is the charge that they treat artworks as 
codes to be deciphered.  I would argue however that in the 
best semiotic accounts of art and art appreciation, such as 
Goodman’s, this criticism is misplaced.  The relationship 
between the elements of an artwork and what it denotes or 
exemplifies is not an uncomplicated or one-to-one 
connection.  Understanding a work of art, then, is not a 
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matter of deciphering its codes but of entering into the 
world it presents. 
Finally, in my discussion of understanding music I have 
said relatively little concerning physical reactions to 
music.  I have not taken up how understanding music might be 
manifested and expressed in the lived body.  Possibly this 
criticism is just.  However in my defense I would note that 
any adequate account of music and the body needs to be 
underwritten by a comprehensive philosophical psychology, 
which itself must take seriously the mental or cognitive 
aspects of understanding music.  Perhaps the account I have 
offered will provide one of the stepping stones to such a 
philosophical psychology. 
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Appendix  
Further Directions 
 In the course of my research on understanding music I 
became acquainted with some fascinating material to which I 
could not devote the time to do it justice.  In this 
Appendix, I would like to propose some possible further 
directions for research related to the issues and problems 
discussed in the previous six chapters.  These remarks are 
meant to be suggestive rather than exhaustive.  They fall 
into two groups – issues related to philosophical 
psychology, and issues related to the phenomenological 
investigation of musical experience. 
1. Music and Philosophical Psychology 
 I mentioned in chapter one that one of the 
methodological principles operative in my investigation of 
understanding music was the view that an adequate account of 
understanding must be sensitive to the character and scope 
of possible misunderstanding.  The nature of 
misunderstanding music is perhaps nowhere more clearly 
illustrated than in the psychological and neurological 
literature on brain injury and amusia.  Amusia may be 
receptive (loss of ability to appreciate music that one has 
previously enjoyed), or productive (loss of ability to sing 
or play a musical instrument).  Underlying these defects may 
be deficiencies in the perception of pitch, rhythm, musical 
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affect, or some combination of the three.  Related to the 
amusias are musical alexia (loss of ability to read music) 
and agraphia (loss of ability to write musical notation).  
Amusia sometimes occurs together with some form of aphasia; 
however there are cases of amusia without aphasia, and 
aphasia without amusia. 
 Although it is fascinating, the literature on brain 
damage and amusia is inconclusive and difficult to 
interpret.  Patients with brain injuries are not routinely 
tested for amusia and the discovery that musical functions 
have been either damaged or spared may be fortuitous.  To 
cite just one example, two patients with severe aphasia who 
were incapable of speech were discovered to have spared 
musical abilities when they surprised one of their 
caregivers by joining her in song.232  Another source of 
difficulty is that it can be difficult to ascertain a 
patient’s level of musical culture before his or her brain 
injury.  Along with the considerable difficulties involved 
in quantifying musical abilities, relatives or friends may 
unwittingly exaggerate a patient’s pre-morbid musical 
competence. 
 In chapter six I hypothesized that the pre-conscious 
physical and neurological effects of music may result, in 
different listeners, in a variety of different conscious 
 
232 O. S. Morgan and R. Tilluckdharry, “Preservation of Singing Function 
in Severe Aphasia,” West Indian Medical Journal 31:3 (1982):  159-161. 
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responses.  The fact that two patients with similar brain 
disorders will not both show musical disabilities also might 
be interpreted as evidence that some individuals show 
dissociated hemispheric dominance with respect to music.233  
While there is much evidence indicating that music and 
language activity are mediated by distinct neurobehavioral 
systems,234 there are also cases reported which suggest that, 
in some patients, functions of music and language may share 
contiguous or even common areas within the left 
hemisphere.235   
One likely place to start looking for differences among 
listeners which might underwrite such a variety of responses 
is to compare musicians with non-musicians.  Some research 
of this type has been undertaken.  According to one study, 
different nervous structures may be engaged in the 
processing of musical stimuli, depending on listeners’ 
contact with music.  While naïve listeners perceive melodies 
in a gestalt fashion, musically experienced listeners tend 
to approach sets of relations between musical elements.  The 
authors conjecture that holistic apprehension is carried out 
 
233 Arthur L. Benton, “The Amusias,” in Music and the Brain:  Studies in 
the Neurology of Music, eds. MacDonald Critchely and R.A. Hanson 
(London:  William Heineman Medical Books Ltd., 1978), 378-97. 
234 See for example, H.R. McFarland and D. Fortin, “Amusia due to Right 
temporoparietal infarct,” Archives of Neurology 39 (November 1982):  
725-27; Isabelle Peretz, et. al., “Dissociations entre musique et 
langage après atteinte cérébrale:  un nouveua cas d’amuise sans 
aphasie,” Revue canadienne de psychologie expérimentale 51:4 (1997):  
354-67; and J.L. Signoret, et. al., “Aphasie sans amuise chez un 
organiste aveugle,” Revue Neurologique (Paris) 143:3 (1987):  172-81. 
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by the right hemisphere, and detailed, piecemeal analysis by 
the left.236  
Besides suggesting further avenues for research, the 
difficulty in localising the components of musical function 
in the brain, and the possibility that music may be 
processed differently by different listeners, have 
implications for the modularity of mind thesis.  According 
to this thesis, the human cognitive system is composed of 
physically separate subsystems, each with a specific body of 
procedural and declarative knowledge.237  Most researchers in 
the field of the neuropsychology of music have been 
reluctant to adopt a modularistic view.238  Philosophers 
wishing to defend the modularity thesis would do well to 
consider the empirical evidence offered by research in the 
psychology of music perception.239 
2. Music and Time Consciousness 
 The philosophy of Edmund Husserl has had less influence 
in the philosophy of music than one might expect.240  In his  
 
235 For example, S. Hofman, et. al., “Common hemisphericity of language 
and music in a musician:  A case report,” Journal of Communication 
Disorders 26 (1993):  73-82. 
236 T. Bever and R. Chiarello, “Cerebral Dominance in Musicians and 
Nonmusicians,” Science 185 (1974):  537-39, as discussed in Antonio R. 
Damásio and Hanna Damásio, “Musical Faculty and Cerebral Dominance,” in 
Music and the Brain, eds. Critchely and Hanson, 141-55. 
237 Isabelle Peretz and José Morais, “Music and Modularity,” Contemporary 
Music Review 4 (1989):  279-80. 
238 Peretz and Morais, “Music and Modularity,” 281. 
239 For a defense of the relevance of such research, see Mario Bunge, “A 
Philosophical Perspective on the Mind-Body Problem or, Why 
Neuroscientists and Psychologists Should Care about Philosophy,” 
Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 135:4 (1991):  513-23. 
240 For example, a search of The Philosopher’s Index turned up only a 
handful of items. 
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work on the perception of time and temporal consciousness 
Husserl often uses musical examples and appeals to the 
perception of melodic gestalts.  His thought on these 
matters is extremely rich and suggestive.  Although Husserl 
examines music and time consciousness in order to come to a 
better understanding of the a priori nature of time, we can 
learn from his insights into the former without thereby 
committing to his conception of the latter.  I propose to 
give a brief outline of some relevant aspects of Husserl’s 
analysis, and suggest how these are significant for the 
philosophy of music in general, as well as for my own 
narratological conception of musical understanding.241 
 When we hear a melody, we do not hear a series of 
discrete pitches.  Individual tones do not utterly disappear 
with the cessation of the musical stimulus; when a new tone 
sounds, the preceding tone has not simply disappeared.  If 
it had, we would be incapable of noticing the relations 
among successive tones and of forming the representation of 
a melody; in each moment we would have a tone, or perhaps an 
empty pause in the interval between the sounding of tones, 
but never a melody.242  Husserl’s point seems to be that at 
least two tones must be “present” in consciousness for us to 
perceive a relationship between them. 
 
241 My understanding of Husserl was greatly aided and influenced by David 
Carr, Time, Narrative, and History (Bloomington:  Indiana University 
Press, 1986), especially 21-29. 
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However, the abiding of tone representations in memory 
is not the end of the story.  If these representations were 
to remain unmodified, we would not have a melody but a chord 
of simultaneous tones, or a disharmonious tangle of sound.  
The perception of a melody is possible only because every 
tone “awakens from itself” a representation with temporal 
determination, and only because this determination 
continuously changes.  It is in this way that individual 
tones have their definite places and terms of duration 
within the representation of a melody.243 
 Husserl gives the name of “retention” or primary memory 
to this abiding of tones in memory.  Retention is different 
from recollection, or memory in the ordinary sense.  Only in 
primary memory do we perceive what is past and does the past 
become constituted; primary memory is perception.244  The 
past which I retain is constitutive of the presence of the 
object I am perceiving.  The present and the past function 
together in the perception of time somewhat as do the 
foreground and background in spatial perception.  
Expectation of the future, or “protention” is as much a part 
of experience as retention of the past.  At a minimal level, 
we expect bodily coordination and equilibrium – the very 
 
242 Edmund Husserl, On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal 
Time (1893-1917), trans. John Barnett Brough (Dordrecht:  Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 1991), 11. 
243 Husserl, 11-12. 
244 Husserl, 43. 
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conditions for the possibility of continuing to experience – 
to continue into the immediate future.  
In perception, a “grasping as now” takes place moment 
by moment, and in this grasping the actually present phase 
itself becomes constituted.245  Apprehensions succeed and 
continually blend into one another, and terminate in an 
impression that constitutes the now; however, the “now” is 
an ideal limit.  Retention and protention function as 
horizons for ongoing, present experience.  How much is 
“taken in” by these horizons will vary according to the 
character of the foreground and may be quite extensive.246   
For Husserl, then, the character of the objects to 
which we attend, as well as the quality of our attention, 
will together influence the temporal nature of our 
perceptual experiences.  This phenomenon is illustrated in 
the experience of listening to music and other aesthetic 
contexts.  If it has not happened to us personally, we have 
likely all heard of someone emerging from a concert hall or 
theatre to say, “I thought it would never end – it seemed to 
last forever,” or “The two and a half hours flew by as 
though they were minutes.” 
Husserl’s work has implications for the philosophy of 
music and suggests further avenues for phenomenological 
investigation.  Different musical works (and different 
 
245 Husserl, 32. 
246 Carr, 24. 
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narrative structures) can constitute time consciousness 
differently.  For example, consider the way in which time is 
constituted by a work such as Arvo Pärt’s Fratres, with its 
long, slow melodic lines, minimalist structure, and 
extensive repetition.  Compare this to the time-constituting 
properties of the Gershwins’ “Let’s Call the Whole Thing 
Off.”  Fine performances of either work could rightly be 
absorbing, but the experience provided by each will be very 
different.  Not the least of these differences will be the 
otherworldly or “timeless” quality of Pärt’s work, as 
compared to the robust “in the moment” character of a well-
written popular song. 
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